66

Why, sar, they used to say, them's jest as good to scare as any." When the intelligence reached the main body of the army at Fairfax Court-House that the rebels had evacuated Manassas as well as Centreville, and had all escaped, no one knew where, the disappointment was bitter. The troops had been chafing in their tents all the autumn and winter, impatient for action. Many of them actually shed tears in the intensity of their chagrin that the enemy had eluded them. The intelligent soldiers saw at a glance, that, formidable as these earthworks were in position, even had they been lined with well-served artillery, and defended by fifty thousand men, they could have been without difficulty flanked, and could not have withstood a direct assault from our impetuous troops.

The few lines of earthworks at Manassas were quite unimportant, and evidently had not been relied upon since the construction of the forts at Centreville. No additions had been made to them since the last summer. There were three or four smaller forts on gentle elevations, pierced for eight or ten guns each, and separated nearly a mile from each other. These formed the outer works. Behind this line, at the distance of half a mile, at Manassas Junction, there was a small redan with a low rampart of turfed earth. From letters found within the deserted camp, it seemed that trusty spies had communicated to the rebels the most minute intelligence respecting the fortifications around Washington, and the troops within the intrenchments. We knew nothing of their movements; they knew every thing respecting ours. Still the following extraordinary statement is made, in the publication upon the " Army of the Potomac" to which we have alluded, attributed to the Prince de Joinville.

6

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"McClellan had long known, better than anybody else, the real strength of the rebels at Manassas and Centreville. He was perfectly familiar with the existence of wooden cannon,' by which it has been pretended that he was kept in awe for six months. But he also knew that, till the month of April, the roads of Virginia are in such a state that wagons and artillery can only be moved over them by constructing plank roads. We have the right, we think, to say, that McClellan never intended to advance upon Centreville. His long-determined purpose was to make Washington safe by means of a strong garrison, and then to use the great navigable waters and immense naval resources of the North to transport the army, by sea, to a point towards Richmond. For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had been secretly maturing. But the moment came, in which, notwithstanding the loyal support given him by the President, that functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of war of all the divisional generals was held. A plan of campaign, not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day they were known to the enemy. Informed, no doubt, by one of those thousand female spies, Johnston evacuated Ma

The abandonment of the enemy's works had been accomplished, deliberately, skilfully, and thoroughly. For more than a month the trains of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad had been leisurely transporting

cannon, troops, and commissary stores toward Richmond. When the entire army had been safely removed, every bridge and culvert on railroad or turnpike was destroyed. The machine-shops and disabled locomotives were blown up, and most of the buildings at Manassas fired. Numerous clusters of log huts remained: the indications of the warm and comfortable quarters in which the rebels had passed the winter. So deliberate was their retreat, that their main column of twenty thousand men, after marching some miles on Saturday, and finding the roads badly crowded, retraced their steps to Centreville, slept quietly through the night in their log huts, and on Sunday morning again resumed their journey. The rear-guard left on Sunday night. They marked their path with utter desolation, hoping thus to retard the advance of the patriot troops. All the male inhabitants of the region, capable of bearing arms, were compelled, by the terrible energies of rebel conscription, to fall into the ranks of the retreating army.

On Friday morning, March 14th, a reconnoissance in force was made, twelve miles beyond Manassas, to find out in what direction the rebels had fled. It was greatly feared that they might be taking a northerly circuit, around by the way of Leesburg, to cross the Upper Potomac, and to assail Washington, now comparatively defenceless, in the rear. General Stoneman, therefore, with twelve hundred cavalry and seven hundred infantry, followed the rear-guard of the foe along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to Catlett's Station. Here he came upon a superior force of the rebels, consisting of five thousand horse and foot, with artillery. He immediately attacked them. But they, refusing an engagement, retreated across Cedar Run, burning the bridge. General Stoneman, not being provided with artillery, was unable to follow them farther, and returned to Manassas.

The National Army of over one hundred and fifty thousand men, perhaps as splendidly equipped as any force which ever marched to a field of battle, and eager to be led against the retiring foe, was encamped at Manassas and Centreville. The people at the North were lost in wonder why there was not an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the rebels. But, as we have mentioned, it was never General McClellan's intention to disturb the enemy at Manassas. His plan was to leave them behind their intrenchments there; not to molest them at all in their blockade of the Potomac; to transport his army across the country to Annapolis, there embark them in transports, send them down the Chesapeake Bay, and, landing them in the vicinity of Richmond, to attack that city where least defended. Nearly all the trouble of Virginia mud would be avoided by this ocean conveyance. Since transports could be had in any quantity, and the rebels had no navy, it is difficult to explain why the design was not carried into execution during the long months of the autumn and winter, when the troops were apparently idle. The Army of the Potomac was certainly as well equipped and drilled as the troops in other parts of the field, who were, through the most heroic battles, winning signal victories. It was this plan which, when tardily revealed, at the council summoned by the President early in March, was overruled

by him as we have stated, and the army was ordered to advance upon Manassas.

General McClellan, finding that the enemy had escaped him, instead of pursuing them in their flight, as many thought he ought to have done, decided to return to his original, plan. It was indeed uncertain but that the foe who had so stealthily escaped, was already upon the march to cross the Potomac in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, and to attack Washington in the rear. Therefore it seemed essential that the army should return as speedily as possible to the capital. It so happened, however, that while the National troops were returning on the double quick to Washington, the rebels were leisurely marching south to Richmond. When the rebels evacuated Manassas, it of course became necessary for them to abandon all their batteries with which they had blockaded the Potomac.. Thus the river was opened for our transports, and the Union troops could be easily sent down the Potomac, and landed within a few miles of Richmond. But dilatoriness, which the Prince de Joinville says belongs to the American people, but which, the people say, controlled unaccountably the movements of many of our leading generals, frustrated this plan.*

Richmond is about one hundred and twenty miles south of Washington. It is connected with the capital mainly by two railroads: one through Fredericksburg to Acquia Creek; and the other through Gordonsville, Warrenton, and Manassas. It was the general sentiment of the community, that these two railroads presented the most available routes for our army to approach Richmond, since the divisions could easily co-operate, and the advancing army would itself prove the protection of Washington. By sending the main army down the Potomac, Washington would be left unguarded, inviting a rapid onset from the vigilant foe. But, as General McClellan chose the route by the Potomac, it became necessary to leave a large force to protect Washington from sudden assault by the lines of these railroads. It was decided that about fifty thousand men should be left for the defence of the capital. The remainder of the army was assembled at Alexandria, to embark in a fleet of over three hundred transports. According to statements made by Quartermaster-General Meigs before the Congressional Committee upon the conduct of the war, the force shipped for the Peninsula amounted to one hundred and twenty-three thousand men, eighteen hundred wagons, and forty

* It was deemed by most military men a matter of great moment that this large army should be divided into corps d'armée, that it might act more effectively in the field. The Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war urged this; the President and Secretary of War urged it. "But," says the Congressional Committee, "it did not seem to be regarded with much favor by General McClellan. Indeed, General McClellan stated to your Committee, at the time of their conference with him, that although it might at some time be expedient to divide the army into army corps, the subject was one of great difficulty. He said it was a delicate matter to appoint major generals before they had been tried by actual service, and had shown their fitness to be selected to command thirty or forty thousand men. A major-general could not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, as easily as a brigadier-general. He proposed therefore himself to manage this entire army in some battle or campaign, and then select from the brigadier-generals in it such as proved themselves competent for the higher commands. Consequently, the division of the army into army corps was not even begun until after the movement in March had commenced, and then only in pursuance of the direct and repeated orders of the President."-Report of the Congressional Committee on the Army of the Potomac.

four batteries of artillery. The reënforcements soon after dispatched made the total of the forces sent to the Peninsula over one hundred and fiftyeight thousand men. It was not possible to send more than this, since otherwise the safety of Washington would have been seriously imperilled. Indeed, great anxiety was felt that so many troops should have been withdrawn.

The Government at Washington very reluctantly consented to General McClellan's plan of the campaign. Still, a majority of his subordinate generals voted with him to move by the way of Yorktown. A council of war was held in February; twelve generals were present; four only voted to advance upon Richmond by the direct route, vid Fredericksburg and Gordonsville. These four were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard. Eight, namely, Keyes, Fitz John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, and Naglée, voted in approval of General McClellan's plan of an advance by the way of Yorktown. The principal objections urged against the Yorktown route were, the total want of information in reference to the nature of the country there, the condition of the roads, and the preparations which the rebels had made for defence.

After the evacuation of Manassas, a council of general officers was held at Fairfax Court-House on the 13th of March, when it was decided that a force of fifty-five thousand men should be left for the protection of Washington. The forts on the right of the Potomac were to be fully garrisoned, those on the left occupied, and such a force was to be left at Manassas as to render it impossible for the foe to reoccupy that position.* For some reason,. however, General McClellan, when he left Alexandria, issued orders for all the corps of the Army of the Potomac, excepting General Banks's corps of about thirty-five thousand men, who were on the other side of the Blue Ridge, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, to embark at once for the Peninsula-the narrow strip of land so called, between the York and James Rivers. This led the President, anxious for the safety of Washington, to issue an order for one corps of the Army of the Potomac to remain for the protection of the city. Thus the corps of General McDowell, which had not then moved, was detained.

This unfortunate conflict between General McClellan and the powers. at Washington continued through the whole campaign. On the 2d of April, General Wadsworth, in command of the forces in and around Washington, stated that, for the protection of the capital and the immense amount of military stores accumulated there, he had but nineteen thousand men. General McClellan objected strongly to the order of the President detaching General McDowell's corps. Again and again he sent the most urgent entreaties to have portions of that corps forwarded to him. The

* On the 13th of March, General McClellan informed the War Department that "the Council of Commanders of Army Corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations, and General McDowell will at once proceed to Washington and lay it before you."

The Secretary of War, impatient that there should be some vigorous action, immediately telegraphed back, "Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed at once to execute, without losing an hour for my approval."-Report of Congressional Committee, p. 6.