road south of Corinth. The country was almost uninhabited. It was exceedingly difficult to obtain forage or food. Though the march was attended with great hardships, the object was accomplished. Besides tearing up the track, a train of twenty-six cars, laden with arms and ammunition, was destroyed.

It now seemed evident that a battle could not long be delayed. The National troops were immediately before the last line of rebel works. A step in advance would bring them in contact with the foe. On the 2d of May General Beauregard had issued an appeal to his army, to rally for a decisive battle. Every subsequent step of the patriot troops had been stubbornly resisted. The decisive hour had come. On the morning of the 30th of May, just as our troops were ready for the final rush, heavy explosions were heard in the midst of the enemy's works at Corinth. "About six o'clock in the morning," writes General Sherman, "a curious explosion, sounding like a volley of large siege-pieces, followed by others singly and in twos and threes, arrested our attention. Soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth, when I telegraphed to General Halleck to ascertain the cause. He answered that he could not explain it, but ordered me to advance my division, and feel the enemy, if still in my front." General Morgan L. Smith's brigade was sent forward. Moving rapidly down the main road, they entered the first redoubt of the enemy at seven o'clock in the morning of May 30th. It was completely evacuated. Not the vestige of an enemy could be seen. The reconnoitring force pushed boldly on into Corinth, and beyond it, to College Hill. Silence, solitude, desolation reigned everywhere. Abandoned camps, a burning town, smouldering ruins, provisions of all kinds scattered wastefully around, broken gun-carriages, and piles of shot and shell, were all that remained to tell of the proud host which, but a few hours before, had garrisoned those almost impregnable ramparts.

It subsequently appeared that the enemy had spent several days in their leisurely retirement. All of the sick, and most of their stores, artillery, and ammunition, had been carefully removed. But even the immense rolling stock of the railroad, at their command, could not remove an army of one hundred thousand men, with the enormous supplies which such a host requires. Most of the troops were compelled to march away. Their retreat commenced at ten o'clock on the night of the 29th. Their dense and massive columns crowded all the roads leading to the south and west. During the evacuation an unbroken line of pickets had been kept out, and a strong show of resistance made. The ruse was quite successful. General Halleck and his army had been kept for more than a month at bay, and now the foe had escaped, leaving nothing of value behind. By some unexplained mistake, General Pope officially announced the capture of ten thousand (probably two was written) prisoners. The public press also announced that the rebel army had fled utterly demoralized. Both of these statements were very far from the truth.*

* General Halleck's dispatch to the Secretary of War, dated May 30th, announcing the capture, is as follows:

"The enemy's position and works in front of Corinth were exceedingly strong. He cannot now occupy a stronger position in his flight. This morning he destroyed an immense amount of public

The moral and strategic results of the siege of Corinth were, however, very great. Fort Randolph and Fort Pillow were no longer tenable. Memphis was forthwith surrendered. All Western Tennessee was henceforth under National authority; and a very important and essential step had been taken towards the final opening of the Mississippi River.

General Halleck has been severely criticised for not proceeding with more rapidity in his advance on Corinth. The event did indeed demonstrate that a more vigorous assault would probably have been successful. But it must be remembered that the National arms had already suffered a serious disaster, that another reverse would have been terrible, that the rebels had concentrated a large army in a very commanding position, strongly fortified, and that there was every indication of their resolve to maintain their post at every hazard.

The country over which General Halleck was to pass, full of forests and ravines, was such as required the utmost caution to avoid falling into ambuscades. The advance upon Corinth military men will probably pronounce to have been well conducted. But the allowing the rebels to retreat with their whole army and all their fine material, when our whole army was, for forty-eight hours, within half a mile of their lines, was surely an unmilitary act.

The conduct of the rebels, in thus retreating, is quite incomprehensible. A vigorous defence would have made any attempt to carry Corinth by assault exceedingly difficult, and doubtful of success. Its cowardly evacuation excited general contempt both throughout the North and the South.

Historic fidelity compels us to say one word in conclusion. "Parson Brownlow" speaks of a disease called "negro on the brain." Many of our officers at that time had this disease dreadfully. Several of our generals would not allow a negro to shoulder a musket, or handle a spade in the trenches, or enter the camp to give any information. There were thousands of these dark-skinned patriots all around, eager to inform General Halleck of the movements of their rebel masters. With patriot zeal and brawny arms they were hungering to relieve the weary soldiers in the trenches, and to lighten much of the most onerous toil of the camp. But by an inexorable decree they were excluded from the lines. General O. M. Mitchel informed the writer that with all his powers of heart and utterance he remonstrated against this insane folly.

The result was as might have been anticipated. As we have narrated, one morning the rebels had all vanished, like the river-fog; and so adroitly did they conduct their retreat, that they left not a gun, a wagon, or a biscuit behind them. It is humiliating to reflect that it took two years of toil and carnage to conquer the prejudice that, though we may

and private property, stores, provisions, wagons, tents, &c. For miles out of the town the roads are filled with arms, haversacks, &c., thrown away by his fleeing troops. A large number of prisoners and deserters have been captured, estimated by General Pope at two thousand. General Beauregard evidently distrusts his army, or he would have defended so strong a position. His troops are generally much discouraged and demoralized. In all the engagements for the last few days their resistance has been slight."

use mules and donkeys in the army, we must not let men help us, whose skins are not as white as ours. God's dealings with us soon cured the nation of this delusion. Gradually we gathered into the National army between two and three hundred thousand of these patriots of Ethiopic hue.

And when at length the nation saw Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee standing hat in hand before a group of negroes, saying, "Please come and help us; if you will, we will give you your freedom and a farm," all were compelled to admit that the world does indeed move.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PURSUIT OF THE REBELS.

(From January to March, 1862.)

STATE OF THE ARMY AFTER FREMONT'S REMOVAL.-RETREAT OF THE REBEL PRICE.-CONCENTRATION OF THE PATRIOT ARMY AT ROLLA.-FLIGHT AND PURSUIT OF THE REBELS.-CONFLICT AT SUGAR CREEK.-HEROISM OF COLONEL ELLIS.-THE REBELS PRICE, MCCULLOCH, AND VAN DORN.-MAJESTIC PLAN TO CRUSH THE PATRIOTS.-PRELIMINARIES OF THE BATTLE OF PEA

HISTORY has no record of any war which, in the magnitude and variety of its operations, will compare with the Civil War in America. It comprises a variety of quite distinct campaigns, often simultaneously in operation, either one of which would, in earlier ages, have sufficed to furnish materials for volumes of history and libraries of romances. The single Department of the West, under General Halleck, embraced three almost independent campaigns. One was the ascent of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, including the attempted occupation of East Tennessee. The second was the descent of the Mississippi River by the gunboat fleet. The third was the campaign to drive the invading rebels from Missouri. To this campaign we now invite the attention of the reader.

It will be remembered that the National army had been withdrawn from Springfield at the time of General Fremont's untoward supersedure. As the disheartened army, declining a battle, was marched back to the vicinity of St. Louis, the exultant rebels, under General Price, occupied the ground they vacated; the rebel general extended his lines as far north as the Little Osage. The southernmost point occupied by the Union forces was the town of Rolla, which was at the southern terminus of the southwestern branch of the Pacific Railroad. General Sigel, who had displayed military ability as yet unsurpassed, was stationed at this point, with the Third Division of the army.

In December, 1861, the rebel General Price fell back to Springfield, built huts for his soldiers, and made extensive preparations to pass the winter comfortably in quarters. He also established a recruiting camp at this spot, and soon augmented his command by an addition of four thousand volunteers. General Price, however, was not destined long to be left undisturbed. General Halleck, while he was making vigorous preparations for the descent of the Mississippi, and also for a flank movement by the army upon the frowning bluffs of Columbus, by the occupation of Nashville, was also noiselessly but efficiently organizing a force to drive the invading rebels out of the State of Missouri. The rebels had avowed their determination to force into their Confederacy every State in which there was a

slave, and to secure unity in their realm by driving from it, or hanging, every man who was even suspected of being hostile to their sway.

The force organized by General Halleck, for the redemption of Missouri, consisted of four divisions. They were commanded repesctively by Colonel Osterhaus, Brigadier-General Asboth, and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis and E. A. Carr. The first and second divisions constituted a single corps, under the command of Brigadier-General Sigel. The whole force was led by Major-General Curtis.

In the latter part of January, 1862, these forces were quietly concentrated at their rendezvous at Rolla. They then advanced to Lebanon, an important point half way between Rolla and Springfield. General Price being apprised of this fact, and of the assault with which he was thus menaced, immediately prepared for a retreat. Without making any show of resistance, he abandoned his winter-quarters so precipitately that six hundred of his sick were left behind him, and a considerable quantity of wagons and forage. The National troops, pursuing the identical plan which General Fremont had marked out for them three months before, moved rapidly forward and took possession of the abandoned intrenchments. The only opposition they encountered was a slight skirmishing with the enemy's pickets.

It was the 13th of February when the Union troops entered Springfield, and the National banners again floated over the same position in which General Fremont had placed them in the autumn. The weather was then fine, the roads good, and a month or six weeks of the most favorable season for operations in the field remained, before winter would set in. Now it was midwinter, and the most difficult period in the whole year for military movements. It was the time for storms of sleet and snow, and icy gales, and of thaws, rendering the roads so miry as to be almost impassable for wagons. It was weather to try the endurance of the hardiest soldiers. Such were the disadvantages which had been incurred by this three months' delay.

General Price conjectured that the National troops would remain a few days at Springfield to recruit, and to enjoy the comforts of the camp he had surrendered to them, but he miscalculated. General Curtis left a small force to guard the town, and with the remainder of his army pressed immediately and energetically on, in pursuit of the retreating rebels. A series of extraordinary marches ensued. The advance-guard of the National army came up several times, at night, with the rear-guard of the rebels; but invariably, during the darkness, the rebel host slipped noiselessly away, and made good their escape. Every man in the patriot army was elated in the chase, and they pressed forward through roads which could often be fitly compared with the Slough of Despond, at the rate of twenty miles a day. It was impossible to transport supplies with such rapidity, and the army became mainly dependent upon its daily forage for its daily food.

The frightened rebels fled with such rapidity, that they left behind them many signs of their continually increasing disorganization. The road was strewed with broken wagons, army stores, and dead and dying horses

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