The History of the Civil War in America

INACTION ON THE POTOMAC.-UNEASINESS OF THE COMMUNITY.-PLAN OF THE WAR.—PEREMP TORY ORDER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. THE ARMY IN MOTION. REBEL DEFENCES AT MANASSAS.-FORCE SENT TO THE PENINSULA.-DREAD OF THE MERRIMAC.

THE disastrous battle of Bull Run was fought on the 21st of July, 1861. After this, the summer, the autumn, and the winter passed slowly away, while the immense Army of the Potomac, numbering not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men, remained quietly within their intrenchments. General Scott, and after him, General McClellan, deemed these months of inaction necessary, that the mass of raw recruits might be organized and drilled. In the community there were two parties, the one approving, the other condemning this policy. The general voice of the public was, however, very loud and incessant against this long delay of any military action. It was said that we were thus affording the enemy time to strengthen his position; that though our troops were new, they had only undisciplined troops to encounter; that it was important to avail ourselves of the enthusiasm which the assault upon our National flag had created, and that a few prompt victories would so discourage the rebels, that the war would speedily be brought to a close. The result, however, showed that it was not the Divine will that the war should be speedily ended. It became manifest to every believer in an overruling Providence, that the war was the instrument which God had brought forward to sweep from our land the gigantic crime of American Slavery. Every hour during which the war was protracted, slowly undermined that massive fabric of sin and shame.

The autumn and the winter, in the mild climate of Virginia, were delightful, even to the commencement of the New Year. The rebel troops, raw recruits, not nearly so well disciplined as our own, certainly not better armed, and quite inferior in numbers, were encamped at Manassas, distant from our outposts not more than twenty miles. The roads between the two armies were in good condition. They led over a gently

undulating country, where our troops could meet with no obstructions until they reached the intrenchments of the foe.

The general plan, at this time, for the conduct of the war was simple, and one which, under able leaders, could hardly fail of ultimate success. First, by a vigorous blockade, the rebels were to be isolated from the rest of the world, and cut off from all supplies. We have already narrated the wonderful vigor with which a navy was created, and have shown what an Herculean task it was to undertake the blockade of a coast over three thousand miles in extent. Then the Mississippi was to be seized, from Cairo to the Gulf, so that, with our gunboats, we could have the control of all the Western rivers. The energy and success with which this latter enterprise was commenced, in the storming of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the capture of New Orleans, we have also recorded. To the Army of the Potomac was intrusted the duty of driving the rebels out of Virginia, and wresting from them Richmond, their capital. These various yet united measures involved campaigns so distant from each other, and so distinct in their operations, that they could be carried on simultaneously.*

The conquest of Richmond, in consequence of the discouragement with which it would oppress the rebels, and the moral influence it would exert upon those foreign nations by whom we were menaced with intervention, was deemed certainly not less important than either of the other measures. Hence it was, that the inaction of the Army of the Potomac, month after month, caused such intense disquietude. The Prince de Joinville, one of the sons of Louis Philippe, of France, joined the Union army. He was the personal friend of General McClellan, and was on his staff. In some very able articles published by him in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," in Paris, in October, 1862, and subsequently translated and published in a pamphlet in this country, this inexplicable inaction is attributed to the natural want of energy of the American people. And yet his pen seems to falter in bringing against our countrymen a charge so unprecedented.

"And here I may point out," he says, "a characteristic trait of the American people—delay. This delay in resolving and acting, so opposed to the promptitude, the decision, the audacity, to which the American, considered as an individual, had accustomed us, is an inexplicable phenomenon, which always causes me the greatest astonishment."

The Prince was deceived. This amazing delay was not caused by want of energy in the soldiers, or by lack of zeal in the nation, but by the strategic plans of the Commander-in-Chief. At length the impatient nation, uninformed respecting General McClellan's plans, uttered remonstrances so united and so loud, that President Lincoln, on the 27th of January,

* The whole extent of the coast to be guarded by a blockading fleet, according to an official report made to Rear-Admiral Davis, was three thousand five hundred and forty-nine miles, without counting the indentations of the harbors and ports. There were one hundred and eightynine openings in this coast, either rivers, bays, harbors, inlets, sounds, or passes, through which vessels could run in and out. All the maritime enterprise of Great Britain seemed to be enlisted in endeavors to run the blockade. To the honor of France, it should be mentioned, that during the whole continuance of the war, scarcely a French vessel was known to make any effort to carry aid and comfort to the rebels.

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