but the particular theory from which his work starts out, is not thrust forward nearly as often, nor in such offensive form, as we had been led to expect. It is impossible in few words to express his idea of Christianity in its essence and historical developement. The nearest illustration, and that imperfect, which we can invent, is this: Christianity is the union of the leavening and fermenting principles-cast into the heart of the world, and finding there materials on which to work-it gradually changes these into its own likeness or spirit; but, from the nature of the case, foreign and impure elements get mixed up with it-on these the fermenting principle begins to act, separating and throwing them off; until, at last, through the joint action of the two, the world is purified, and the human mind and heart renewed in the image of God. The history of this work, in all its manifold changes, is the history of the Christian religion. As to the theory, if it be so, though falsely presented in some cases, and overlaid by the author's peculiar notions of personal religion and experience, at bottom it seems to us very near the truth. The student will be careful, however, to discrimi nate between the great fact of Christianity as a regenerating element or spirit operating in the world and in the individual heart, and the author's apprehension of this fact, influenced as it is by his so-called evangelical position.

But brevity is our rule and necessity. Dr. Neander is a thorough student, as his work shows. He has studied, not read, the Fathers, and seems to have entered into all their peculiarities of faith and speculation; and with immense labor and thought has presented a view of their multiplied shades of opinion, and of their intermixing theological and philosophical systems. At the same time, while his principal aim is to set forth the origin and developement of doctrines, their influence on the inner spiritual experience and the daily life of the people, and of the action and reaction between these and the pagan philosophy and religion; he gives a faithful history of church constitution, discipline and worship, and of the external or outward life of Christianity in its influence on politics, laws and manners. If the student could have but one work, we should say, this above all others. But if he VOL. VII. 4

have this and Mosheim, he will be as well furnished for church history as he can be by American editions. Closing, we cannot refrain from saying the mechanical execution of these volumes is honorable to the publishers; especially when contrasted with the old Philadelphia edition.5

We ought to add, that we have omitted Gieseler's work, for the reason that the great body of it is wholly useless to the merely English reader. With the classical scholar it might displace Mosheim, and be of great service in the study of Neander.

Here we close the first part of our article, adding this remark, that the student should look over some reliable books of travel in the East, for notices of manners, superstitions, social condition, &c. In these respects, to a considerable extent, those regions have been stereotyped for three thousand years. Much of what is now, has been from early ages; or at least will furnish him with hints and data on which to base an opinion of what has been. Grant's Nestorians, Southgate's Travels in Turkey and Persia, Perkins' Residence in Persia and among the Nestorians, Olin's and Durbin's Eastern Travels, Harris's Highlands of Ethiopia, are among the best and safest; and furnish a great deal of information as interesting as it is instructive. We have already spoken of Layard's Nineveh in another department. It may be consulted under this head also with equal profit and pleasure.

T. B. T.

NOTE OF CAUTION.-Though we have given many hints, we add a few words in regard to several works referred to in the above article. Of course we do not intend to endorse the entire contents of any volume named; though it is impossible, in the limited space allowed, to give a list of exceptions. For example;

5 It is due to state that some say Neander's authorities do not always sustain his inferences. Of this we are not competent to judge; but his references will enable the scholar to decide, where the question is of sufficient moment to warrant an examination of the original sources. Indeed the authorities themselves are not always to be trusted without caution, as those acquainted with the credulous and gossiping character of some of the Fathers will allow. A specimen of hasty assertion respecting "eternal punishment," followed by paragraphs of fair statements, may be seen in vol. ii. pp. 676-678.

1850.]

Duty involving Destiny.

31

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we have referred to Rollin on one particular, but have not entered his work under any head, for the reason that he is not safe. So of Plutarch. He is somewhat given to gossiping, as his readiness to retail the anecdotes and stories he has picked up, will plainly show. But the writers cited as authority, as Niebuhr for example, give the student warning of these facts. So I have referred to Keith on the prophecies, but only for the historical matter he has collected. I would not be understood as accepting or commending his fanciful scheme of interpretation, making the prophecies, as some do the parables, to go on all fours." Under the reference to Babylon there is an abundance of examples of such ridiculously minute applications of mere words and sounds. My reference is to the facts, not to his application of them. See, as one specimen among many, pp. 141-147, on Idumea; the absurdity and error of which are plain enough, without words.

T. B. T.

ART. II.

Duty involving Destiny.

EVERY truth in the divine economy bears an intimate relation to every other truth, and can be rightly judged and fully estimated only by considering it in its more subtile relations. For example, a correct theology implies the divine precepts, and the divine precepts imply a correct theology. It will not follow, to be sure, that all who have perceived the one, have also perceived the other. Unquestionably, multitudes of Christians have acknowledged their moral obligations, who have had no conception of the root from which they spring. Nevertheless, there is such a root, and the failure to perceive it, no doubt impairs somewhat the power of the preceptive truth. When this relation of truth is perceived, and we come to feel, as we ought, that God will be obeyed, every command becomes a prophecy of coming good, and every reproof, a pledge of the overthrow of the powers of evil. By reason

of this internal relation of different portions of divine truth, it happens that the philosophy of the divine law, the nature of obedience, and the causes that can induce obedience, when considered together, indicate the consummation of the divine government. A brief discussion of the topics thus suggested, may serve to open to us a view of human duty and destiny.

I. There are few subjects upon which more has been written, and I will add much of it needlessly written, than upon the divine law. Religionists of a different school from ourselves, have laid great stress upon the declarations that "every government must have its laws, and every law must have its penalty," as though these were matters in controversy, or as though we did not perceive and maintain these truths. They adroitly put aside, or pass over, the real questions at issue-What is the divine. law? and what is its penalty?—and foist in others wholly uncontroverted. Now the fact undoubtedly is, that while we insist upon the necessity of law and of sanctions thereto, equally with themselves, there are certain other truths, which give soul and character to these, that they quite overlook. Having shown that every government must have its laws, and every law its penalty, they proceed to speak of the divine law and its penalty, as if they were arbitrarily given-as if the existing necessity for law could be adequately met by any law indifferently,-forgetting that if there are facts necessitating laws, the same facts must necessitate the character of those laws. For it must be manifest that if existing facts do not require any law in particular, they can require none in general; since all general truths are made up of particular truths. The same may be said of the sanctions of law. The nature and design of the law, together with the circumstances and temptations of its subjects, must determine in all wise legislation the nature of the appended sanctions. But overlooking these principles, the religionists referred to ostentatiously remark, "God is a sovereign, and governs according to his own pleasure, and none have a right to ask him, Why doest thou so?" Whatever, therefore, these reasoners allege to be the divine law and penalty, must be pronounced holy, and be received unchallenged and unexamined.

Now that the acknowledged rectitude of the divine character ensures the rectitude of the divine law with its penalty, there can be no question. But it by no means follows that a misinterpretation of the divine law becomes holy. On the contrary, the acknowledged rectitude of the divine character may require us to reject such interpretations, simply on the ground of unfitness or incompatibility. For example, the infinite love of God to all his children, compels us to deny that a merciless punishment can be the penalty of the divine law. A merciless punishment must exclude every measure or degree of the divine love. Such a penalty, therefore, is necessarily incompatible with the divine character. Nor is that incompatibility confined to the attribute of mercy alone. It extends equally to the divine justice. Both justice and mercy must conspire to affix such a penalty to the divine. law as will answer the purposes and requisitions of both. Now the requisition of the divine mercy must be the penitence and pardon of those to whom it extends, thus bringing them into obedience to the divine law. But the requisition of divine justice must be obedience to the divine law. These requisitions, therefore, must meet in the same thing. The penitence and pardon of the sinnerthe requisition of divine mercy-necessarily bring him into the condition of obedience to the divine law, which is the primary requisition of divine justice. And when man has transgressed and become amenable to the divine law, neither justice nor mercy changes its aim. The primary claims of both have reference, at least in part, to these very circumstances. Justice cannot, therefore, institute a penalty which would preclude obedience, or in any way hinder by its legitimate influence the attainment of obedience. This would frustrate its own aim. Hence it cannot institute a penalty which fixes man unalterably in wrong.

I freely grant that God is a sovereign; but he is not an arbitrary sovereign. He rules by law. He acts by law even in the establishment of law. God is a law unto himself. His own character necessitates the character of his law. A rule independent of principle, which should. be dictated by the mere capricious will of the ruler, would be tyranny and oppression, from whatsoever source it