THE

HE beginning of the third year of the war disclosed Germany in the process of undergoing an entirely new experience the experience of being attacked simultaneously on all sides, so that she could not concentrate against any single one of her foes.

THE FRENCH FRONT

FROM the beginning of the conflict Germany has had one great advantage-the advantage of position. Operating from the center of a circle against the circumference, with relatively short lines of communication, Germany has been enabled, whether on attack or defense, to throw to any given point the maximum number of troops in a minimum time. There is only one way to neutralize such an advantage, and that is by exerting pressure simultaneously at many widely separated points on the circle, and so prevent any point from receiving strength at the expense of any other. But this implies unity of control, a single directing force which would guide every move. This the Allies did not have. On the contrary, each of the Allied powers was conducting the war almost independently, attacking when and where it saw fit, without any comprehensive, cooperative plan. The result was that Germany was permitted to fight each of the Allies separately, without ever feeling the full force of their concerted action. fortunately for themselves, for the United States, and for democracy itself, the Allies perceived this error before Germany could obtain a decision.

But

In February, 1916, there was formed an Allied general staff composed of representatives of all of the Allied powers. This body had its first meeting in March

of that year, and immediately began the work of formulating a general plan by which the operations in every field might be conducted with maximum effect. So radical a change in the scheme of things took time to work out, and delayed somewhat activities that had previously been scheduled. It was not, therefore, until early summer that the plans laid in March gave evidence of fructification. These plans involved one central idea-continuous pressure at as many points as possible on the circle by which the Central powers were circumscribed.

Russia began operations on June 1, with an overwhelming attack against the Austrian line in Volhynia and Galicia. This was followed by an Italian offensive in Trentino against a line weakened by withdrawals made to bolster up the Russian front; and finally, on July 1, by the opening guns of the Battle of the Somme. August 1, 1916, the beginning of the third year of the war, saw, therefore, the Central powers contending for the first time. against the full strength of the Entente on every important front-saw their lines in Russia, in France, and in Italy under such extreme pressure that any transfer of troops from one front to reinforce another could be made only in the face of possible disaster. The Allies had at last adopted the only way by which Germany's initial advantage could be neutralized.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

THE Battle of the Somme was the great effort of the western Allies of the third year of the war. It was really not a single battle, but a series of major efforts, one following the other in quick succession, and each one directed against a particular

objective. It was entirely different from any other offensive campaign of the war. There was no dominant point or area of military or political importance to the capture of which the effort was directed. Nor was the object to break through the German lines. The possibility of such an accomplishment had been dispelled a year before in the battles of the Artois and in Champagne. It was rather an incident in the campaign of attrition, of wearing down the German strength and of thinning out the German ranks until the time came when there would not be sufficient strength left to prevent a decisive action.

There was, however, a strategic objective as well, though it was subordinate to the idea of depletion of man power. This latter object can be seen by a brief survey of the battle-line between Arras and Noyons. Coming south from Arras, the line traced a deep curve with a western convexity, then straightened out toward the south, turning westward on the arc of a great circle from the vicinity of Noyons. The fighting was directed against both of these curves. The plan was to press into this line at the point where the first curve turned south, straddling the Somme River in the advance, while at the same time moving along the radius of the curve from Albert to Bapaume; to seize Péronne, Bapaume, and Chaulnes, and so threaten the great supply lines running through La Fère, St. Quentin, and Douai. In brief, the idea was one of continuous nibbling into the German positions until some great connecting link was reached, the cutting of which would force a large section of the German line to recoil as the only measure of safety.

By an unprecedented use of artillery the French and British pressed on, each attack biting deeper into the German lines than did its predecessor. The Germans were absolutely unable to hold back the ad

through farther south along the Somme. Line after line of German intrenchments was passed until the Germans were forced to dig overnight their defenses for the next day. A deep wedge was pushed in between Péronne and Bapaume, and it seemed that both cities must be evacuated. But an unusually early autumn, accompanied by heavy rains, made it impossible for either artillery or infantry to move, and the attack had to be suspended. In this fighting the Germans lost over seventy thousand prisoners and suffered a total loss of not less than half a million men. Their positions were penetrated to a depth of approximately ten miles, and the entire Noyons salient was thrown into danger.

An

While the fighting on the Somme was in progress, the French made two attacks in force at Verdun. As if to demonstrate how well their plan was being carried out, they caught the German lines weakened, and in the first attack recaptured forts Douaumont and Vaux, restoring most of the important positions that had been taken from them earlier in the summer. other attack toward the close of the year was still more successful, and resulted in the recovery of almost all of the ground on the east bank of the Meuse which had been lost in the six-months' battle. These operations closed the fighting, and all the belligerents in this field settled down in their trenches for the winter.

The real fruits of the Battle of the Somme were not garnered until the spring. The German high command had seen that his line was not sufficiently strong to resist the pounding of the Allies' artillery, and he was faced with the dilemma of either withdrawing his forces to a new line voluntarily or of having them driven back. In the latter case the retreat would have to be made under constant pressure.

The former method was adopted, and about the middle of March the movement was under way. The northern pivotal point was just south of Arras, and the entire line from Arras to Soissons was affected. The object was not alone to escape the danger which the Allied successes in