posed to be contained in the law of nations. I will merely observe now, that the reasons of public policy, of convenience, and of self-protection, which would render the establishment of such a rule at all necessary, would also furnish its limitations; and the fact that it never has been extended to other offences than those of an atrocious or heinous description, and such as were recognised to be of that character by the nation upon which the demand was made, affords the best evidence that there is no good reason for its extension to any other crimes.

But it is in the relations of the states to each other, and in the duty of a state government to its own citizens, that the most cogent reasons are found for denying the unlimited extent of the right to demand fugitives from justice. I have dwelt on this point at large in my former communications; and from the circumstance that the views thus presented have not been made the subject of reply either by your excellency or by the committee of the house of delegates, I am constrained to believe they have not been distinctly understood.

The proposition for which your excellency contends, the right to demand a fugitive from justice, charged with any crime known to the laws of the state making the demand, would so fatally disturb the relations of the states, as to defeat the principal object of the constitution, a more perfect union. There are laws now in force in some of the states, which would appear to the citizens of other states very absurd. Several months previously to the application of the lieutenant-governor of Virginia, which is the subject of this correspondence, a formal demand was made upon me by the governor of Pennsylvania, for the delivery of a fugitive charged with the offence of fornication, for which he had been indicted under a statute of that state. An application has also been made to me by the executive of New Hampshire to surrender a fugitive charged with adultery. These applications rendered it my duty to give the constitutional provision the most deliberate consideration, and that consideration has resulted in the adoption of the principles heretofore maintained in this correspondence. The requisition from Virginia came so clearly within these principles, that I could not grant it without departure from the course thus adopted. There is a law of our nature which would forbid the execution of any statute hostile to all our habits, opinions, and policy, and the attempt to execute it

would be fruitless, or would result in the dissolution of the Union, and instead of enjoying the more perfect union designed by our forefathers, we should become aliens and enemies. I shall not complain that, in every view of the case presented by Virginia, the personal security of the citizen is overlooked. As I have before contended, it is essential in the constitution of the United States and in that of this state, and indeed in the theory of republican government, that the personal security of every citizen is guarantied except in cases of treason, felony, or other crime. While the ground I assume seems to you to involve the principle that one state may, upon the plea of the universal law of civilized countries, excuse itself from surrendering for offences deeply injurious to the public welfare, or affecting the social condition of another state, by reason of its peculiar domestic institutions, it appears to have been altogether forgotten that it follows, from your position, that any state may declare any act, however harmless, to be a felony, and that every other state would thus be bound to acknowledge that act to be a crime, although by the provisions of its own constitution or laws, it may have declared the same act to be a duty. The legislature of any state might declare it a crime to omit to pay a debt, or to neglect to go to church, or to look upon a magistrate, or to instruct a slave, or to shelter or clothe a free negro. Even the crime of the fugitives in the present case may be, and if the report of the recorder of New York be true, is a constructive one. By the report of the committee of the house of delegates, I learn that the following are the provisions of the statute of Virginia, under which the present requisition was issued: "Whoever shall hereafter carry, or cause to be carried, any slave or slaves out of any county or corporation within the same, without the consent of the owner or owners of such slave or slaves, or of the guardian of such owner or owners, if he, she, or they, be a minor or minors, and with the intention to defraud or deprive such owner or owners of such slave or slaves, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and subject to prosecution, as in other cases of felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine, not less than one hundred, nor more than five hundred dollars, and shall also be imprisoned in the jail or penitentiary-house, for a period not less than two nor more than four years, which fine and imprisonment shall be fixed and ascertained by a jury." And it is further enacted, "that not

only all those who shall willingly and designedly carry away slaves as aforesaid, but all masters of vessels, who, having a slave or slaves on board their vessel, shall sail beyond the limits of any county with such slave or slaves on board, shall be considered as carrying off or removing such slave or slaves within the true intent and meaning of this act." The committee, commenting upon this law, observe: "This statute was passed as early as 1753, and the only change which has been made in it, consists in the substitution in 1799, of confinement in the penitentiary in place of death without benefit of clergy, as the punishment for the felony created by it. Let it not be said that these laws are harsh. They are less sanguinary than they were at the adoption of the constitution. But if they be so, citizens of other states need not come, unless they choose, into Virginia, and if they do, they need not violate her laws, and incur their penalties." I certainly shall not violate the injunction of the committee, by asserting that these laws are harsh; for I freely admit, as I have repeatedly done, that the people of Virginia have sovereign power to establish any code of laws they deem proper. Courtesy, if no other consideration, would prevent me on this occasion from questioning the necessity or usefulness of laws so repugnant to the sentiments of the people of this state. I admit, moreover, most fully, that our citizens need not go to Virginia unless they choose; and that if they do, they need not violate her laws nor incur their penalties. But it will be conceded, that citizens of this state have the right to go to Virginia or elsewhere if they choose; and I must be allowed to insist that, although when in Virginia, they are liable to be tried, convicted, and punished, according to the laws established there, yet that according to the principles of morality and justice, recognised here, a criminal intent is essential to every felony, and that this state never could have intended, when adopting the constitution, to bind herself to surrender her citizens to be carried beyond her own jurisdiction and tried for constructive felonies created by law, and involving no moral guilt, contravening none of the principles of moral justice, and exempt from censure by the universal laws of civilized states. The power to enact such laws is equally possessed by all the states; the temptations and inducements to its exercise may arise in other states as well as in Virginia, and in that case the principle now asserted by your excellency might be made a most VOL. II.-31

effectual instrument of assailing those very domestic institutions and interests you are so solicitous to guard. In one state it has already been declared that, by its fundamental laws, no human being can be held as a slave within its boundaries. The same principle is established in this state, except so far as the constitution and laws of the United States require the surrender of a fugitive slave, held to labor or service in another state by the laws thereof, when demanded and upon proof that he is a slave. Suppose the principle should be enforced by a statute of any state, declaring that any person who should claim or pretend to hold another in involuntary servitude, should be guilty of a felony, and then suppose a citizen of Virginia travelling with his slave in the state having such laws and incurring this penalty, should be demanded of your excellency, on his return to Virginia, as a fugitive from justice. A refusal, it is presumed, would be immediately pronounced; a collision would ensue, if the state making the demand were to insist upon the principle you now maintain, and this would probably bring on measures of restriction, inspection, and reprisal, which might soon involve the whole confederacy in a general conflict.

I can not but think that a fair and candid review of these considerations will induce your excellency's concurrence in the opinion, that the constitutional provision in question is to be construed by the same general rules which are applicable to all laws, treaties, and compacts; that it is to receive a reasonable construction; that it is to be considered not singly, but in connection with all the other provisions of the same instrument; that full and fair effect is to be given to each of them, so that no one shall be so applied as to destroy any other, and much less to defeat the main object of the instrument itself, but that all shall be satisfied and reconciled as nearly as possible; and if it is found impracticable to give the full effect which the utmost latitude would allow to any one stipulation, that then the more important shall prevail. These maxims, rendered necessary by the imperfections of human language, and sanctioned by the wisdom of ages, if applied to the constitution in the spirit in which it was framed, will enable us to fulfil all its obligations, and enjoy all the blessings it promised and has bestowed.

In giving to the particular provision under examination a reasonable construction, such as will fulfil the general design of

all the states at the time of its adoption, instead of affording protection to peculiar interests, without violence to moral sentiments, the civil policy or settled principles of any state, it seems to me that all is accomplished that can be expected of any human ordinance. You ask, who is to decide whether the crime charged in a requisition is against the state, or of such a heinous nature as to bring it within my definition; and you suggest that the doctrines for which I contend would establish a very inconvenient and totally impracticable rule. I can not admit that the science of jurisprudence is so imperfect and vague as you suppose. The principles of a moral law were written by the hand of God in the heart of man. The light of revelation brings them out in bolder relief, and I apprehend that on examination of the common law, the civil law, and the statutes of all civilized and Christian countries, it will be found not only that murder, treason, arson, burglary, forgery, perjury, rape, incest, bigamy, and the like, are crimes," but also that they are neither "lesser faults," nor ordinary transgressions," while adultery, petty stealing, libels, trespasses upon lands, and the like, are not regarded as "crimes of great atrocity, or deeply affecting the public safety."

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Your excellency observes, that there are domestic interests of a peculiarly delicate nature involved in this question, and that Virginia can not admit the right of New York, or of any other state, to call in question either the legality or policy of her domestic institutions. I trust I have sufficiently showed, that however the interests alluded to may have become involved in this discussion, it has happened through no act or design on my part. The principle I have maintained was asserted upon a conviction, yet unshaken, that it was necessary for the protection of the domestic rights of the citizens of this state, and from no desire to invade or assail the institutions of other states. If, therefore, those interests have become involved, it is because a constitutional provision, intended for general purposes, without reference to them, is sought to be extended so as to furnish an additional guaranty and safeguard for their protection, beyond those expressly established by the constitution.

The committee of the house of delegates in their report, refer to the terms in the constitution, "treason, felony, or other crime," as common-law terms, and very properly remark, that they must be taken to have been used in a common law sense.

I am