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THE CASE OF ALEXANDER M'LEOD.

ALBANY, MAY 19, 1841.

TO THE ASSEMBLY:

In compliance with a resolution of the honorable the assembly, I communicate a copy of all the correspondence which has taken place between this department and the executive authorities of the United States, concerning Alexander M'Leod.

I have the honor, also, to inform the assembly that no arrange. ment whatever, of any kind, or for any purpose, has been entered into by this department with the executive of the United States concerning that individual.

The assembly is further informed that the prisoner is now before the supreme court of this state, on a writ of habeas corpus, sued out, as is understood, by himself, with a view to his discharge from custody. This department has no knowledge nor information concerning the application for said writ, the issuing the same, or the action of the court, except such as has been obtained from the public newspapers, and is presumed to be in the possession of the assembly. The proceeding first became known to this department when the prisoner passed through this city, on his way to the city of New York, in custody of the sheriff, in execution of the writ of habeas corpus. The attorneygeneral of this state was thereupon immediately instructed to resist the motion for a discharge of the prisoner, and at the same time the president of the United States was respectfully informed that the appearance of the district attorney of the United States, as counsel for the prisoner, was deemed incongruous with official duties, and injurious to this state. The attorney-general is now engaged in the duty assigned him.

An incidental correspondence on the subject of the imprisonment of Alexander M'Leod having arisen between his excellency the governor of the Canadas, and the executive of this state, a copy of the same is also laid before the assembly.

The assembly is respectfully assured, that under no circumstances will any arrangement or proceedings be entered into, or permitted, with the consent of this department, the effect of which might be to compromit in the least degree the rights, dignity, or honor of this state.

RECEIVERS OF MONEYED INSTITUTIONS.

TO THE SENATE:

ALBANY, JANUARY 22, 1842.

(EXPUNGED BY THE SENATE.)

I HAVE received a bill which originated in the senate, entitled "An act to repeal an act, entitled 'An act respecting the appointment of receivers of moneyed institutions, passed April 27, 1841,' and to limit the compensation of receivers."

The law thus proposed to be repealed was approved by me, not simply from an accustomed deference to the representatives of the people, but under a belief that its provisions would have a salutary effect in relieving the court of chancery from the duty of conferring appointments, which had come to be regarded as constituting no inconsiderable official patronage, and thus, in accordance with the spirit of my previous recommendations, abridging the aristocratic and overshadowing power of that court.

It seemed to me peculiarly proper, also, to vest the power of designating receivers in the bank commissioners, on account of their intimate acquaintance with the affairs of insolvent corporations and the general financial interests of the country, while it was believed that the amendment of the law, so as to permit receivers to compromise and compound doubtful claims and demands, would be at once humane and beneficial in securing creditors and corporations against losses by delays and litigation.

NOTE. The constitution of New York rendered the "approval" of the governor necessary to the passage of every bill passed by the legislature, unless, after a veto, it received the votes of two thirds of both houses. The executive message of approval, if expressed in general words, left the governor responsible for all the principles and details of the law. Governor Seward claimed the right to assign the grounds of his approval. The Senate denied this, and hence arose the conflict exhibited in these proceedings.-Ed.

Not at all doubting that the legislature have examined the subject in all its relations, and with better information than I possess, I may nevertheless be permitted to observe that nothing has come to my knowledge, during the nine months which have elapsed since the law went into effect, to induce a belief that it it has operated injuriously.

But the general responsibilities of making laws rest with the legislature, while on the executive are devolved only the duties of recommending measures, and of rejecting, for sufficient causes, bills originated and perfected by the representatives of the people. Although the executive might reluctantly feel himself obliged to interpose objections in a case where a proposed law should have hastily and inconsiderately passed the legislature, or should contravene the letter or spirit of the constitution, or infringe individual rights, or impair the necessary efficiency of the executive administration, or invade the constitutional or appropriate powers of any department of the government, or threaten any pervading or lasting injury to the public welfare, should tend to produce inequality or injustice, or deeply compromise any recognised principles of republican institutions, yet the person administering the government could not interpose objections to less important bills upon the mere ground of a difference of opinion concerning their expediency, without assuming an undue share of legislative responsibility.

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Applying these principles to the present case, I have not thought it my duty to embarrass the action of the legislature; but, cheerfully confiding in their superior wisdom, have approved and signed the bill, availing myself of this occasion to submit an explanation, inasmuch as the proceeding involves an apparent inconsistency which might lead to misapprehensions concerning my views of the policy of the measure.

THE RIGHTS OF THE EXECUTIVE.

TO THE SENATE:

ALBANY, JANUARY 26, 1842.

(REJECTED BY THE SENATE.)

On the 22d day of January instant, I transmitted to the senate a message in writing, according to an immemorial usage, informing them that I had approved and signed a bill which had originated in that house, and had passed the legislature. The bill repealed a law which had been only nine months in force, and had received my approval. That law was regarded by me (with all due deference, nevertheless, to the legislature) as one of so benign and useful a tendency, that I could not but regret that it was thought necessary to take it from the statute-book. At the same time the occasion seemed not to be one of those important exigencies which justify the interposition of the executive power, to embarrass the action of the legislature. Under these circumstances it seemed to be my duty to make known to the legislature, and, by the customary form of communication to them, to make known to the people, the special ground of my acquiescence in the action of the legislature, to the end that whether now or hereafter, the subject should be reconsidered by the representatives of the people, or by the people themselves, that acquiescence should not be construed into a sanction of the policy of the act. In making that communication I was governed by what I trust was a just sense of official responsibility.

Although the message was transmitted to the senate, it was, as all such communications are, designed for the information of the legislature. The constitution requires that each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and in that journal it has been customary to enter all the proceedings not only of both houses, but also all communications from the executive touching such pro

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