Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 9
... on procedural tests that identify as constitutional norms those which have entered the text according to accepted higher - order rules of ratification and amendment . But such a formal test cannot Editors ' Introduction 9.
... on procedural tests that identify as constitutional norms those which have entered the text according to accepted higher - order rules of ratification and amendment . But such a formal test cannot Editors ' Introduction 9.
Page 10
... rules that govern constitutional development are themselves in need of interpretation . Procedural tests are probably not sufficient either . Again , the American example contains numerous proce- durally legitimate clauses that seem ...
... rules that govern constitutional development are themselves in need of interpretation . Procedural tests are probably not sufficient either . Again , the American example contains numerous proce- durally legitimate clauses that seem ...
Page 11
... rules of interpretation as well as the institutions and practices of the government . But we do not insist on a sharp distinction and , indeed , wish to emphasize how blurry any line must be . A constitutional theory seeks to explain or ...
... rules of interpretation as well as the institutions and practices of the government . But we do not insist on a sharp distinction and , indeed , wish to emphasize how blurry any line must be . A constitutional theory seeks to explain or ...
Page 12
... rules must be interpreted on a continuing basis . But the interpretative norms and practices composing the culture also have bite to some extent , and no group of officials has all the author- ity to resolve conflicts . In contrast , a ...
... rules must be interpreted on a continuing basis . But the interpretative norms and practices composing the culture also have bite to some extent , and no group of officials has all the author- ity to resolve conflicts . In contrast , a ...
Page 13
... rules that either have or could have legal effect . Some also take a similar view of some aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment , seeing in ( parts of ) it aspirational welfare " rights " that are not fully legally enforced but retain ...
... rules that either have or could have legal effect . Some also take a similar view of some aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment , seeing in ( parts of ) it aspirational welfare " rights " that are not fully legally enforced but retain ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |