Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 83
Page 3
... problem of adjusting constitutional intentions and expectations to the messy uncertainty of political life and the ... problems in the 1790s in pri- marily political and biographical terms , as the result , say , of his falling under the ...
... problem of adjusting constitutional intentions and expectations to the messy uncertainty of political life and the ... problems in the 1790s in pri- marily political and biographical terms , as the result , say , of his falling under the ...
Page 4
... problem to Jefferson than it did to Madison . In Federalist 49 and 50 , Madison had gone out of his way to criticize Jefferson's pro- posals for appealing to the people to correct errors in constitutional interpretation . " parchment ...
... problem to Jefferson than it did to Madison . In Federalist 49 and 50 , Madison had gone out of his way to criticize Jefferson's pro- posals for appealing to the people to correct errors in constitutional interpretation . " parchment ...
Page 17
... problem with this conception is that it imposes powerful conceptual limits on the capacity of a people to achieve constitutional change . Or Buchanan could adopt a normative argument that says that well - functioning constitutions ought ...
... problem with this conception is that it imposes powerful conceptual limits on the capacity of a people to achieve constitutional change . Or Buchanan could adopt a normative argument that says that well - functioning constitutions ought ...
Page 22
... problems involved in ascertaining the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution , see Rakove 1996 , esp . 7-22 , 94–160 . declare individual liberties or which specify how officials are required 22 Editors ' Introduction.
... problems involved in ascertaining the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution , see Rakove 1996 , esp . 7-22 , 94–160 . declare individual liberties or which specify how officials are required 22 Editors ' Introduction.
Page 25
... problem of con- stitutional design . Constitutional change can be effected in two ways : through formal amendment or through interpretation . If a constitutional text is difficult to amend , those officials in a position to interpret ...
... problem of con- stitutional design . Constitutional change can be effected in two ways : through formal amendment or through interpretation . If a constitutional text is difficult to amend , those officials in a position to interpret ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |