Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 57
Page 2
... possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions " that a new constitution might make . The rejection of this proposal by the federal convention in Philadelphia was one reason why Madison initially believed that the Constitution would ...
... possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions " that a new constitution might make . The rejection of this proposal by the federal convention in Philadelphia was one reason why Madison initially believed that the Constitution would ...
Page 6
... possible that Madison's original hope for constitutional gradualism would have been fulfilled . But the French Revolution created a host of more pressing questions , rich with symbolic possibilities and ideological overtones , that ...
... possible that Madison's original hope for constitutional gradualism would have been fulfilled . But the French Revolution created a host of more pressing questions , rich with symbolic possibilities and ideological overtones , that ...
Page 12
... possible mechanisms is viewed as essen- tial to a constitutional government per se . We have argued that a constitutional government features constitu- tional norms and rules that are superior in force to ordinary laws . This ...
... possible mechanisms is viewed as essen- tial to a constitutional government per se . We have argued that a constitutional government features constitu- tional norms and rules that are superior in force to ordinary laws . This ...
Page 28
... possible . Leery of the capacity of the people at large to abide by the constitutional norms he valued most , fearful of the costs of energizing popular politics around constitutional controversies , and doubtful of the capacity of the ...
... possible . Leery of the capacity of the people at large to abide by the constitutional norms he valued most , fearful of the costs of energizing popular politics around constitutional controversies , and doubtful of the capacity of the ...
Page 30
... possible codes , by imagining them- selves behind a suitable veil of ignorance . The cultural norms that shape their constitutional consensus may be specified in a wide variety of ways . But Riley assumes ( for the sake of illustration ) ...
... possible codes , by imagining them- selves behind a suitable veil of ignorance . The cultural norms that shape their constitutional consensus may be specified in a wide variety of ways . But Riley assumes ( for the sake of illustration ) ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |