Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 3
... constitutional regimes take hold even when their 2 For some examples , see McDonald 1974 , 68–81 ; Elkins and McKitrick 1993 , 79–92 . establishment immediately gives way to periods of intense partisan com- Editors ' Introduction 3.
... constitutional regimes take hold even when their 2 For some examples , see McDonald 1974 , 68–81 ; Elkins and McKitrick 1993 , 79–92 . establishment immediately gives way to periods of intense partisan com- Editors ' Introduction 3.
Page 4
... periods of intense partisan com- petition . What do Madison's reconsiderations reveal about the process of converting the textual Constitution of 1787 into a working set of practices and understandings ? Let us begin by stating the ...
... periods of intense partisan com- petition . What do Madison's reconsiderations reveal about the process of converting the textual Constitution of 1787 into a working set of practices and understandings ? Let us begin by stating the ...
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... period of oper- ation ; and , second , the need to deploy existing traditions within a culture or even invent new ones to provide the formal mechanisms of governance with deeper sources of popular support and attachment . The first of ...
... period of oper- ation ; and , second , the need to deploy existing traditions within a culture or even invent new ones to provide the formal mechanisms of governance with deeper sources of popular support and attachment . The first of ...
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Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |