Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 7
... matter of founding , no matter how wise the founders or how prin- cipled their deliberations . The acceptance of a constitutional text which must be in its nature incomplete or open - ended requires the develop- ment of interpretative ...
... matter of founding , no matter how wise the founders or how prin- cipled their deliberations . The acceptance of a constitutional text which must be in its nature incomplete or open - ended requires the develop- ment of interpretative ...
Page 9
... matter ) . Perhaps even more controversially , the constitutionality of regulations might also depend on a consideration of their consequences for the political system more generally . Brutally put , a campaign regula- tion might be ...
... matter ) . Perhaps even more controversially , the constitutionality of regulations might also depend on a consideration of their consequences for the political system more generally . Brutally put , a campaign regula- tion might be ...
Page 14
... matter less than the idea that statutes and executive orders need this kind of justification . In a constitutional culture , it is not enough that a gov- ernmental action has generally good consequences ; the action must plau- sibly be ...
... matter less than the idea that statutes and executive orders need this kind of justification . In a constitutional culture , it is not enough that a gov- ernmental action has generally good consequences ; the action must plau- sibly be ...
Page 16
... matter of fact , enter into the choice of higher - order rules . When choosing a constitutional provision , drafters appropriately try to anticipate the consequences that alternative higher - order rules would have for the production of ...
... matter of fact , enter into the choice of higher - order rules . When choosing a constitutional provision , drafters appropriately try to anticipate the consequences that alternative higher - order rules would have for the production of ...
Page 19
... matter of construction , give interpretative priority to one or the other . For example , John Hart Ely's ( 1980 ) influen- tial theory of the U.S. Constitution sees it largely ( though not completely ) in procedural terms , as aimed at ...
... matter of construction , give interpretative priority to one or the other . For example , John Hart Ely's ( 1980 ) influen- tial theory of the U.S. Constitution sees it largely ( though not completely ) in procedural terms , as aimed at ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |