Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 2
... legislatures to embark on a campaign to oppose the offensive Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Over time , these resolutions , along with the even more militant Kentucky Resolutions drafted by Vice- 1 Madison to Washington , April 16 ...
... legislatures to embark on a campaign to oppose the offensive Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Over time , these resolutions , along with the even more militant Kentucky Resolutions drafted by Vice- 1 Madison to Washington , April 16 ...
Page 4
... legislatures . If that was the case , it seemed unlikely that the people at large could be expected to protect the land- marks of constitutional government against disequilibrial encroachments . Fourth , and somewhat more synthetically ...
... legislatures . If that was the case , it seemed unlikely that the people at large could be expected to protect the land- marks of constitutional government against disequilibrial encroachments . Fourth , and somewhat more synthetically ...
Page 5
... legislatures , the institutions Madison had once been so quick to condemn , could in turn be prevailed upon to protest Federalist misrule ? That , of course , was the political strategy to which Madison and Jefferson turned in 1798 ...
... legislatures , the institutions Madison had once been so quick to condemn , could in turn be prevailed upon to protest Federalist misrule ? That , of course , was the political strategy to which Madison and Jefferson turned in 1798 ...
Page 7
... legislatures in 1798 , Federalists by packing an expanded federal judiciary in 1801. American constitutionalism does not require one set of political actors to be con- sistent in favoring one forum of decision over another ; indeed it ...
... legislatures in 1798 , Federalists by packing an expanded federal judiciary in 1801. American constitutionalism does not require one set of political actors to be con- sistent in favoring one forum of decision over another ; indeed it ...
Page 25
... legislatures , or agencies - may have a great deal of latitude to change the meaning of the text through interpretation . In that case , there may be no great difference between a system with a text and one without . If , on the other ...
... legislatures , or agencies - may have a great deal of latitude to change the meaning of the text through interpretation . In that case , there may be no great difference between a system with a text and one without . If , on the other ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |