Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
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... Judiciary in the Italian Constitution 205 Pasquale Pasquino 7 A Political Theory of Federalism 223 Jenna Bednar , William N. Eskridge Jr. , and John Ferejohn PART THREE . CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY 8 Designing an Amendment ...
... Judiciary in the Italian Constitution 205 Pasquale Pasquino 7 A Political Theory of Federalism 223 Jenna Bednar , William N. Eskridge Jr. , and John Ferejohn PART THREE . CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY 8 Designing an Amendment ...
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... judiciary in 1801. American constitutionalism does not require one set of political actors to be con- sistent in favoring one forum of decision over another ; indeed it should benefit from circumstances that force political competitors ...
... judiciary in 1801. American constitutionalism does not require one set of political actors to be con- sistent in favoring one forum of decision over another ; indeed it should benefit from circumstances that force political competitors ...
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... judiciary ) might be called higher - order rules ( or rules about rules ) . In constitutional government , the determination of higher - order rules is dis- tinguished from that of first - order rules . A constitutional culture recog ...
... judiciary ) might be called higher - order rules ( or rules about rules ) . In constitutional government , the determination of higher - order rules is dis- tinguished from that of first - order rules . A constitutional culture recog ...
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... judiciary ) to act as their agents for this purpose . Alternatively , a constitution may be conceived of as a contract between the people and their government , indicating what powers the people " agreed " to delegate to government ...
... judiciary ) to act as their agents for this purpose . Alternatively , a constitution may be conceived of as a contract between the people and their government , indicating what powers the people " agreed " to delegate to government ...
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... judiciary to with- stand the " impetuous vortex " of legislative encroachments , Madison would certainly have welcomed cultural veneration of the founding as an essential component of constitutional stability . A recognition of the ...
... judiciary to with- stand the " impetuous vortex " of legislative encroachments , Madison would certainly have welcomed cultural veneration of the founding as an essential component of constitutional stability . A recognition of the ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |