Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 65
Page 6
... issues like the assumption of state debts and the establishment of a national bank , it is possible that Madison's original hope for constitutional gradualism would have been fulfilled . But the French Revolution created a host of more ...
... issues like the assumption of state debts and the establishment of a national bank , it is possible that Madison's original hope for constitutional gradualism would have been fulfilled . But the French Revolution created a host of more ...
Page 13
... issue , most commentators regard them as constitutional norms , or principles of interpretation , rather than as rules that either have or could have legal effect . Some also take a similar view of some aspects of the Fourteenth ...
... issue , most commentators regard them as constitutional norms , or principles of interpretation , rather than as rules that either have or could have legal effect . Some also take a similar view of some aspects of the Fourteenth ...
Page 14
... issues it prefers to avoid . Even in America , the Court has not claimed - in fact , it has often disclaimed - a monopoly on constitutional interpretation . American constitutionalism , rather than being an extreme example of judicially ...
... issues it prefers to avoid . Even in America , the Court has not claimed - in fact , it has often disclaimed - a monopoly on constitutional interpretation . American constitutionalism , rather than being an extreme example of judicially ...
Page 24
... issues are deeply political in that their resolution fixes much about the nature of the polity itself . We think it important to stress that a constitution serves as much to create and empower governmental institutions as to place ...
... issues are deeply political in that their resolution fixes much about the nature of the polity itself . We think it important to stress that a constitution serves as much to create and empower governmental institutions as to place ...
Page 26
... issues are resolved , there remains the question of how an original bargain , however it is described , is relevant for us today . Why should a historicist theory of a constitution , any more than a text , have any normative force for ...
... issues are resolved , there remains the question of how an original bargain , however it is described , is relevant for us today . Why should a historicist theory of a constitution , any more than a text , have any normative force for ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |