Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 79
Page 2
... establish . On the other , to advance the policies they favor , they have strong incentives to treat the constitution instrumentally , typically by stressing the authority of whichever branch or department seems most conducive to their ...
... establish . On the other , to advance the policies they favor , they have strong incentives to treat the constitution instrumentally , typically by stressing the authority of whichever branch or department seems most conducive to their ...
Page 6
... establish a durable institutional framework of govern- ment . However sharply the former American revolutionaries divided over the interpretation of their Constitution , and however much these divisions might have sparked speculation ...
... establish a durable institutional framework of govern- ment . However sharply the former American revolutionaries divided over the interpretation of their Constitution , and however much these divisions might have sparked speculation ...
Page 7
... established , disagreements about a constitution may do as much to exacerbate con- troversy as to restrain it . In the context of the 1790s , the tendency of each party to view its antagonists as advocates of Anglo - monarchical or ...
... established , disagreements about a constitution may do as much to exacerbate con- troversy as to restrain it . In the context of the 1790s , the tendency of each party to view its antagonists as advocates of Anglo - monarchical or ...
Page 16
... establishing the juris- diction and powers of governmental departments and agencies ( including the judiciary ) might be called higher - order rules ( or rules about rules ) . In constitutional government , the determination of higher ...
... establishing the juris- diction and powers of governmental departments and agencies ( including the judiciary ) might be called higher - order rules ( or rules about rules ) . In constitutional government , the determination of higher ...
Page 17
... establishing governmental agencies , specifying their limited jurisdictions , establishing how these agencies may take authorita- tive action , appointing and removing their officers , and specifying how conflicts among constitutional ...
... establishing governmental agencies , specifying their limited jurisdictions , establishing how these agencies may take authorita- tive action , appointing and removing their officers , and specifying how conflicts among constitutional ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |