Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 7
... claim can be made for the defensive strategies that both parties had to pursue in their bleaker moments : Republicans by turning to the state legislatures in 1798 , Federalists by packing an expanded federal judiciary in 1801. American ...
... claim can be made for the defensive strategies that both parties had to pursue in their bleaker moments : Republicans by turning to the state legislatures in 1798 , Federalists by packing an expanded federal judiciary in 1801. American ...
Page 11
... claim that every legal system presupposes a " rule of recognition " by which valid laws in that system are identified by the courts and others , for example , it would not follow that every legal system is a constitutional system in our ...
... claim that every legal system presupposes a " rule of recognition " by which valid laws in that system are identified by the courts and others , for example , it would not follow that every legal system is a constitutional system in our ...
Page 12
... claim by some offi- cials that they have unlimited authority to pass statutes and regulations or to dictate constitutional meanings when conflicts arise . Granted , officials may have some room for maneuver . After all , they do have a ...
... claim by some offi- cials that they have unlimited authority to pass statutes and regulations or to dictate constitutional meanings when conflicts arise . Granted , officials may have some room for maneuver . After all , they do have a ...
Page 16
... claim to be a part of our constitutional system . Each must be taken account of in any adequate explanation of how power is actually allocated among institutions and of which liberties are or are not securely held by individuals . Each ...
... claim to be a part of our constitutional system . Each must be taken account of in any adequate explanation of how power is actually allocated among institutions and of which liberties are or are not securely held by individuals . Each ...
Page 18
... claim to be an excep- tion to this observation . Such theories seek to identify the constitutional with what is in the canonical text , using only the contemporary under- standings available to its adopters to parse clauses . Textualist ...
... claim to be an excep- tion to this observation . Such theories seek to identify the constitutional with what is in the canonical text , using only the contemporary under- standings available to its adopters to parse clauses . Textualist ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |