Constitutional Culture and Democratic RuleJohn A. Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy. |
From inside the book
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Page 26
... arrangements on their merits . Good results can be understood in two ways : substantively or proce- durally . A constitution may command its political creatures to produce substantively just outcomes , however understood , and that it ...
... arrangements on their merits . Good results can be understood in two ways : substantively or proce- durally . A constitution may command its political creatures to produce substantively just outcomes , however understood , and that it ...
Page 29
... arrangements can be altered at the will of a simple majority after suitable discussion and deliberation . He argues that the legal requirements of Article V are an appealing part of " the prag- matic , justice - seeking quality of our ...
... arrangements can be altered at the will of a simple majority after suitable discussion and deliberation . He argues that the legal requirements of Article V are an appealing part of " the prag- matic , justice - seeking quality of our ...
Page 30
... arrangements , and , ultimately , with the choice of an appealing constitutional structure . The perspective adopted is essentially that of the constitutional designer - the interested citizen as much as the lawgiver - who attempts to ...
... arrangements , and , ultimately , with the choice of an appealing constitutional structure . The perspective adopted is essentially that of the constitutional designer - the interested citizen as much as the lawgiver - who attempts to ...
Page 31
... arrangements had been established , the federal judiciary would not have any legitimate claim to have final say over the meaning of the constitutional text . Riley's comparative analysis provokes us to consider the possibility that such ...
... arrangements had been established , the federal judiciary would not have any legitimate claim to have final say over the meaning of the constitutional text . Riley's comparative analysis provokes us to consider the possibility that such ...
Page 32
... arrangements must be checked as well , possibly by the application of legal rules enforced by an independent judiciary.24 The necessity of this condition is illustrated by the case of Canada after 1949 , when the termi- nation of the ...
... arrangements must be checked as well , possibly by the application of legal rules enforced by an independent judiciary.24 The necessity of this condition is illustrated by the case of Canada after 1949 , when the termi- nation of the ...
Contents
Constitutional Problematics circa 1787 | 41 |
Inventing Constitutional Traditions The Poverty of Fatalism | 71 |
The Birth Logic of a Democratic Constitution | 110 |
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN | 145 |
Constitutional Democracy as a TwoStage Game | 147 |
Imagining Another Madisonian Republic | 170 |
One and Three Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution | 205 |
A Political Theory of Federalism | 223 |
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND STABILITY | 269 |
Designing an Amendment Process | 271 |
Constitutional Theory Transformed | 288 |
Constitutional Economic Transition | 328 |
Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation | 361 |
393 | |
399 | |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John A. Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley Limited preview - 2001 |
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule John Ferejohn,Jack N. Rakove,Jonathan Riley No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
Ackerman agrarian amendment procedures argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority Bosnia-Herzegovina Bruce Ackerman Cambridge choice citizens claim Commerce Clause conflict Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional democracy constitutional interpretation constitutional theory constitutionalism context convention council culture Deal debate decision democratic doctrine Eastern Europe economic effects elected electoral enact establish ethnic nationalism example expectations Federalist framers future historicist important institutions interests issue judges judicial review judiciary justice Law Review legislative legislature liberal liberal democratic limits Madison Madisonian median ment moral national government norms originalist Parliament parliamentary parties Philadelphia Convention popular possible post-Communist postconstitutional preferences president problem proposed provincial question Rakove ratification reason regime republic republican restorationism Senate separation of powers simple majority rule social society sovereignty stitutional strategy structure substantive supermajority Supreme Court tion tional tradition transition U.S. Constitution United University Press veto vote York
References to this book
Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism Adam Czarnota,Martin Krygier,Wojciech Sadurski No preview available - 2005 |