shape the capacities of these people. To those who are concerned in the great experiment of folk-making which is going on in our country the question is one of exceeding interest. Without overmuch confidence in the results of inquiries as to what goes to the making of men we may essay one answer.

It is well to note, in the first place, that, imperfect as is our knowledge as to the origin of the Lowland Scotch, it is yet evident that the people are of very mixed blood. Upon an indigenous population, probably of Celtic stock, there has been engrafted a body of Scandinavian folk of a kind selected by circumstances for their strength. To this hy brid stock have been added contributions from time to time of southern English who have sought refuge from the religious and political disorders of past centuries. The long and intimate relations between Scotland and France, which are marked in the vocabulary of the firstnamed country, doubtless led to a considerable importation of Gaelic blood; and the endless wanderings of the soldiers of fortune in war and trade may have brought about a like though lesser resort to Scotland of people from many other European countries. Thus, before the modern quality of the Lowlander began to make its great mark in history, conditions favored the gathering into his country of a varied lot of men, who, by the circumstances of their coming, were probably subjected to a considerable measure of selection. Celt, Northman, Saxon, French, and whatever else, were there, united by an intense local life into which there entered a wide range of political, religious, and social loves and hatreds, in a neat little pot of a state that could be › conveniently kept boiling by the crackling of abundant thorns.

If

lad the ways into the broad world, and we have the assemblage of conditions which, so far as we can discern, brought forth this admirable variety of man. Scotland had been a wide realm instead of a little cradle-place for a race, it would probably have become dominant in Great Britain, if not in northern Europe. With a very small area of tillable soil, the people have had to send forth. unending swarms to win chances in other fields. In a way the eastern part of the United States repeats the conditions for the nurture of men which exist in Scotland. During the generations down to the beginning of this century there was here a like mingling of races, with a free though less tumultuous life to bring them into association; less of strife and of personal loyalty, but enough, perhaps, for the quickening of wits which comes therefrom; education has had a like place. The result is that, all things considered, the average American of the older States is in his general quality more nearly like the Scotch than like the people of southern England, though the latter are his closer kinsmen. The facts are clearly in favor of the view that the best the world can afford in the way of human product is obtained by mixing the blood of strong, related, but varied peoples.

It is interesting, from this point of view, to compare the mixed race of Scotland with the relatively pure-blooded children of Judea. Those two stocks are clearly the ablest that come into competition in this country, if not in the world at large. They are both very successful in almost all callings; they ring alike well to all the tests we apply. Yet it seems to me evident that the Scotch are distinctively the stronger men. Even in commerce they are prepotent. Going through the streets of Edinburgh, I found no Jew names on the signs. Making an excuse to talk with an old bookseller, I asked him to explain the lack. His answer was, "Jews do not do well in Scot

get cheated." So, too, in those parts of this country where the Scotch and their descendants abound the Hebrew people are absent or seldom found. In higher politics, the Scotch are likewise successful with us in a degree not attained by the Semitic folk.

A comparison of the Irish in this country with the Scotch here again the Lowlanders has been ably made by the writer of the paper which treats of the Irish in American Life.1 There remain, however, some matters of contrast, which it was not in his purpose to touch upon, that may find a place here. It is an important point that the Celtic Irish are an unmixed race, perhaps the purest blooded in western Europe; their geographic isolation having kept them from the intermixture due to the Germanic and other migrations. Along with the Highlanders, the Celtic Irish have dwelt in substantially the same physical conditions as the Lowland Scotch. Like as are these two bodies of Celts to each other, their unlikeness to their neighbors of southern Scotland cannot well be exaggerated. Measured by results, it may be said that the mixed Lowlander succeeds just where the Irishman fails, and fails where he succeeds. As far as civilized men may be so, they are the antipodes of each other, both in their virtues and in their vices. The pure Celt has, to those who know how to take him, the value and charm which belong to a rather primitive man of a high order. The rich fund of simple human nature; the keen, uncalculating sympathy, with its attendant sportive wit; the immediate joy in living, at its best in the moment, with a scant sense of the morrow; and an honesty that

1 See The Atlantic Monthly for March, 1896. 2 It should be observed that it has been found impossible in this paper to treat the question of the Scotch element in America with any profit in a statistical way; figures could have been presented, but these confound under one

makes him the least furtive of men, are combined with a remnant of the old manslaying brutality which greatly inclines him to violent deeds. For all his admirable qualities, the Irishman fails to fit into the complex of our civilization, ap parently for the reason that his talents are too little inwoven with the capacities which go to make up the modern successful man. On the other hand, the Lowland Scot has his original quality, whatever that may have been, - presumably it was Celtic, overlaid by motives of thrift and forelooking, — qualified by a body of impulses which exactly fit the machinery of our civilization and enable him to command all its great engines. He is a much less likable fellow than his primitive neighbor, for the reason that he rarely appeals in so direct a way to the ancient and common body of understandings. His wit and humor- for all said to the contrary, he has a large share of each are rarely of the fresh, sympathetic character, but relate to a deeper insight; they are apt to be sardonic. The touchstone of his capacity is his business power, that capacity which is the product of civilization, and in a rough way the best gauge of its development; in this characteristic the Scotchman is clearly the first of his kind. In his ability to win success he has the leading place among men. Against these elements of strength we have only to set the vices of strong men as a whole the Scotch have the reputation of being addicted to drink, and of being less continent than their neighbors. These qualifications are but general, though they seem to be supported not only by public opinion, but by statistics as well.2

Nathaniel Southgate Shaler.

designation the people of the Highlands and the Lowlands, of tolerably pure Celtic and of very mixed blood, with the result that the data have no indicative value. It has therefore seemed best to deal with the question in the very general manner adopted in this essay.

session of the great territory whose purchase he so ably advocated the United States would find itself involved, a quarter of a century later, in two controversies, both with Great Britain, one of which should concern what he then declared to be "clear and beyond question." What is generally known as the "Bering Sea controversy," but which might be called with greater propriety the "fur seal controversy," has had its beginning, unfortunately not its end, within the last decade. In Sumner's day nothing was known which indicated the possible existence of conditions such as have given rise to this dispute. It is a little difficult to understand, however, that so able a diplomat as Sumner could have studied the definition of the boundaries of the new territory as found in the treaty of cession without seeing therein the seed of future complications with the English nation. That he began by assuming the boundaries to be "beyond question" must have been due in large measure to the fact that, as far as related to the land lines, they were turned over to us exactly as they had been agreed upon by treaty of Russia with Great Britain more than forty years earlier, during which period no controversy over them had arisen. He was aware, of course, of the controversies between Russia and both the United States and Great Britain, in the first quarter of the century, regarding territorial and maritime rights and privileges, but the vagueness, in certain important respects, of the English-Russian treaty of 1825 does not seem to have impressed itself upon him. As a matter of fact, the superior importance of southeast Alaska, which is the only part whose boundary is likely to be in controversy, was not generally recognized at that time, and reliable information about the whole was so scanty that little attention was likely to be given to mere "metes and bounds." Since the occupancy of this part of the territory by Americans and its fairly full exploration by government officers, its

importance has been admitted by us and recognized by the English to the end that the boundary line dividing it from British Columbia and the Northwest Territory bids fair to become a matter of dispute between the two nations, and one of no mean proportions. Though not of such a nature as to demand immediate settlement, it is not unlikely that it may be involved with two or three other questions at present pending, and about which not only diplomats, but the people generally have been, and are, deeply concerned. The Alaska boundary line is quite worthy of separate consideration on its own account, and it will be a misfortune if any ill-considered act shall result in its being merged with other questions of really less importance, and subjected to the by no means uncertain chances of arbitration.

In the treaty which determined the cession of the Russian possessions in North America to the United States, concluded March 30, 1867, the geographical limits (on the east) of the territory transferred are defined as follows:

"The eastern limit is the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British possessions in North America as established by the convention between Russia and Great Britain of February 28, 1825, and described in Articles III. and IV. of said convention in the following terms:

"Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54° 40' north latitude, and between the 131st and 133d degree of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude (of the same meridian), and finally, from said

"1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia (now, by this cession, to the United States).

"2d. That whenever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned (that is to say, the limit to the possessions ceded by this convention), shall be formed by a line parallel to the winding of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom."

Nearly all boundary-line treaties have been found more or less faulty in construction when subjected to rigorous tests such as are sure to come sooner or later. This is doubtless to be attributed in a great degree to the fact that they are usually framed by politicians rather than by geographers; the advice of the latter being often ignored. The political diplomat is generally possessed by a single dominant idea in entering into a convention, to which all others must be subordinate, and to the realization of which all other features of the treaty must lead.

The convention of 1824 between the United States and Russia, and that of 1825 between Russia and Great Britain (in which are to be found the boundaryline articles quoted above), were the result of a determination on the part of the two English-speaking nations to break down the Russian Emperor's ukase of 1821, in which territory extending as low as 51° north latitude was claimed by Rus

sia, as well as complete jurisdiction over nearly all water north of this line, thus threatening the fishing and whaling interests and the carrying-trade of both nations. The limitation of Russian possessions to that part of the coast above 54° 40′ north latitude and the granting of certain maritime privileges for a limited time were the principal results sought after and accomplished, and unquestionably little thought was given to the definition of a boundary line which traversed a region esteemed to be of little value, either present or prospective. In consequence of this indifference and the apparent absence of geographical instinct in framing the treaty, we have an agreement through which it is now proposed to "drive a coach and six" in the interests of the ever aggressive and persistently expanding British Empire.

It is therefore important for intelligent Americans to understand the weakness of the articles of agreement upon which our Alaska boundary claims are assumed to rest. They can best be considered in the order of definition in the treaty.

In the first paragraph is found the not uncommon but always unfortunate error of "double definition," or rather, in this particular case, of attempting to fix an astronomical position by international treaty. It could not be known in 1825, and, as a matter of fact, it is not now known, that the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island is on the parallel of 54° 40' of north latitude, for it is almost absolutely certain not to be on this parallel. No harm comes from this, however, as in a subsequent article (IV.) the possibility of this definition resulting in a divided jurisdiction over the lower extremity of that island is prevented by the provision that the whole island shall belong to Russia (now to the United States). The incident is quite worthy of note, however, as illustrating the claim that the dominant idea was the 54° 40' line. The prominence of this idea, in