THE ARMIES ON THE NORTH ANNA.

325

and better way, for the Nationals, in order to flank the former, were compelled to make a more circuitous march over indifferent roads.

The departure of the corps of Hancock and Warren (Second and Fifth), left those of Wright and Burnside (Sixth and Ninth) at Spottsylvania CourtHouse, where they were confronted by A. P. Hill's. Burnside's left on the afternoon of the 21st, after a sortie, as a covering movement, by General Ledlie's brigade of Crittenden's division, and Wright's was preparing to follow, when it was attacked by Hill's. The assailants were easily repulsed, and that night the works at Spottsylvania Court-House were abandoned by both parties, and the entire army of each was moving as rapidly as possible toward the North Anna. Torbert had captured Guiney's Station, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway, on the night of the 20th and 21st, without very serious opposition, and opened the way for the army, which reached the North Anna on the morning of the 23d, at three fords, known respectively as Island, Jericho, and Chesterfield, or Taylor's Bridge-the latter near where the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway crosses that river.

Lee, marching by the shorter route, had outstripped his antagonist in the race, and was found strongly posted and intrenched on the opposite side of the North Anna, in close communication with the Virginia Central railway, over which Breckinridge, who had beaten Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley,' was hastening with re-enforcements. There Lee had evidently determined to make a stand. Grant took immediate measures to dislodge him. His left, under Hancock, was at the Chesterfield bridge, a mile above the railway crossing. Warren was at Jericho Ford, four miles above, where no formidable opposition appeared, for Lee was engaged in holding the more important passage in front of Hancock. So Warren prepared to cross and take the Confederates in reverse. Bartlett's brigade waded the stream, armpit deep, and formed a battle-line to cover the construction of a pontoon bridge. This was quickly done, and early that afternoon the whole of Warren's corps passed over to the south side of the river, and formed a line of battle. Cutler's division was on the right, Griffin's in the center, and Crawford's on the left. They took position at a piece of woods, where, at five o'clock, the divisions of Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's corps, fell upon Griffin's division. They were repulsed, when three Confederate brigades, under General Brown, struck Cutler's division a sudden blow, which threw it into confusion and uncovered Griffin's right. The Confederates pushed quickly forward to attack it, but the danger was avoided by a refusal of that flank. Bartlett was hurried to its support, and in that movement a volley of musketry, given at close quarters by the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy, on the flank and rear of the Confederates, threw them into utter disorder, and caused their rout, with a loss of their leader and almost a thousand men made prisoners. In this encounter Warren lost three hundred and fifty men. He then proceeded to establish a line and intrench it,

without further resistance.

1 See page 814.

2 The Eighty-third Pennsylvania swept close by the Confederate flank in its advance to the support of Griffin, when McCoy suddenly wheeled his forward companies into line, and delivered the fatal volley. One of the men caught General Brown by the collar, and dragged him into Warren's lines.

326

BATTLE OF THE NORTH ANNA.

Hancock, in the mean time, had been preparing to force a passage of the stream at Chesterfield bridge, where he was confronted by McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps. These troops were mostly on the south side of the river, but held a tête-du-pont, or bridge-head battery of redan form, on a tongue of land on the north side. This, after a brief cannonade by three sections of field-pieces, planted by Colonel Tidball, the chief of artillery, was stormed and carried at six o'clock in the evening by the brigades of Pierce and Eagan, of Birney's division. They lost one hundred and fifty men, and captured thirty of the garrison. That night the Confederates tried in vain to burn the bridge; and before morning they abandoned their advanced works on the south side of the stream, and withdrew to a stronger position a little in the rear. Hancock passed over the bridge in the morning which his troops had preserved, without feeling the enemy, and at the same time Wright's corps crossed the river at Jericho Ford, and joined Warren's.

May 24, 1964.

The Army of the Potomac was now in peril. Its two powerful wings were on one side of a stream, difficult at all times to cross, and liable to a

ing on Little River; and the right, covering Sexton's junction of the two railways running into Richmond, rested on the marshes of Hanover. The powerful center, at the point of the wedge, was near the river, and menaced Grant's center. And so it was, that when Burnside's (Ninth) corps, of that center, attempted to cross between the two wings of the Army of the Potomac, his advance division (Crittenden's) was quickly met, and repulsed with heavy loss. And when Warren, on the right, attempted to connect with Burnside, by sending Crawford's division in that direction, an overwhelming force fell upon him with almost fatal weight.

Grant paused, and for more than two days he studied the position of his adversary, and came to the conclusion that Lee could be dislodged only by a flanking movement, which he proceeded to make. He secretly recrossed the river on the night of the 26th, and going well eastward, so as to avoid a blow on his flank, resumed his march toward Richmond, his objective being the passage of the Pamunkey, one of the affluents of the York, formed by the junction of the North and South

May.

THE ARMIES ACROSS THE PAMUNKEY.

327

Anna rivers, which would force Lee to abandon the line of those streams, and give to the Army of the Potomac an admirable water base of supplies, at White House.'

a

* May 25, 1864.

⚫ May 27.

Sheridan, who, as we have seen,' had just returned to the army after his great raid toward Richmond and across the head of the Peninsula, now led the flanking column with two divisions of cavalry, immediately followed by Wright's corps, leading Warren's and Burnside's. Hancock's remained on the North Anna until morning, to cover the rear, at which time the head of the column, after a march of more than twenty miles, was approaching the Pamunkey at Hanovertown, about fifteen miles from Richmond. Wright's corps crossed that stream at once, and early on Saturday, the 28th, the whole army was south of the Pamunkey, and in communication with its new base at White House.

e

• May.

Grant's movement summoned Lee to another compulsory abandonment of a strong position, and he again fell back toward Richmond. Having, as usual, the shorter and better way, he was already in a good position to confront the Army of the Potomac before it had reached the Pamunkey. He had taken a stand to cover both railways and the chief highways leading into Richmond, and to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy.

The only direct pathway to the Confederate capital, for the Army of the Potomac, was across the Chickahominy. Before its passage could be effected, Lee must be dislodged, and to that task Grant and Meade now addressed themselves. Reconnoissances to ascertain the strength and exact position of the Confederate army, were put in motion. Sheridan was sent out southward on the afternoon of the 28th, with the brigades of Davis, Gregg, and Custer. At Hawes's store, not far from the Tolopatomoy Creek, they encountered and vanquished cavalry under Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Both parties were dismounted and fought desperately. The Confederates lost nearly eight hundred men, and the Nationals about one half that number. This success inspirited the army, and it was followed by a reconnoissance in force," in which Wright moved on Hanover Court-House; Hancock marched from Hawes's store in the same direction; Warren pushed out toward Bethesda Church, and Burnside held a position to assist either Hancock or Warren. The right and rear were covered by Wilson's cavalry. This movement quickly developed Lee's position, which was in front of the Chickahominy, and covering the railway from well up toward Hanover Court-House, southward to Shady Grove and the Mechanicsville pike, with pickets toward Bethesda Church.

May 29.

• May 30.

Wright reached Hanover Court-House without much opposition, but the march of both Hancock and Warren was arrested by strong forces in advance of Lee's line. The former was checked at Tolopatomoy Creek, after a sharp encounter, by intrenched troops; and the latter encountered Rodes's division of Ewell's corps, with cavalry, reconnoitering near Bethesda Church. These struck the flank of Colonel

1 The chief base of the army, while it was at Spottsylvania Court-House, was at Fredericksburg; while it was on the North Anna that base was Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

2 See page 313.

Hardin's brigade, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, and compelled it to fall back to the Shady Grove road, when General Crawford brought up the remainder of the Reserves, and Kitching's brigade, and effectively repulsed an impetuous assault by Rodes, who attempted to turn Warren's left. This repulse enabled the Nationals to establish the left of their line on the Mechanicsville pike, not much more than seven miles from Richmond. To relieve General Warren, when first assailed by Rodes, Meade had ordered an attack along the whole line. Only Hancock received the order in time to act before dark. He moved forward, drove the Confederate pickets, and captured and held their rifle-pits. Meanwhile, Wright had formed on the left of Hancock and Burnside on his right; while Lee strengthened his own right, now menaced by Warren.

June 1, 1864.

Grant was now satisfied that he would be compelled to force the passage of the Chickahominy River, and he was equally satisfied that it would be folly to make a direct attack upon Lee's front. So he planned a flank movement, and prepared to cross the Chickahominy on Lee's right, not far from Cool Arbor,' where roads leading to Richmond, White House, and other points diverged. That important point was seized by Sheridan on the afternoon of the 31st, after a sharp contest with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry and Clingman's infantry; and toward it Wright's corps, moving from the right of the ary, in its rear, marched that night, unobserved by the enemy, and reached it the next day." At the same time, and toward the same place, a large body of troops under General W. F. Smith, which had been called from the Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred, were moving, and arrived at Cool Arbor just after Wright's corps reached that place, and took position on the right of the latter. General Smith had left Bermuda Hundred on the 29th, with four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, sixteen thousand in number, which had been taken in transports around to White House. The two armies were now upon the old battle-field of Lee and McClellan two years before. The Confederate line, which had just been re-enforced by troops under Breckinridge, extended, with its cavalry on its flanks, a short distance from Hanover Court-House, down nearly to Bottom's Bridge. A. P. Hill's corps occupied its right, Longstreet's its center, and Ewell's its left.

On the morning of the first of June, an attempt was made by Hoke's. division to retake Cool Arbor. Sheridan had been ordered to hold it at all

hazards, and he did so. His men dismounted, and fought desperately with their carbines. The assailants were repulsed, but were quickly re-enforced by McLaws's division. Wright's corps arrived in time to meet this new danger; and when, at three o'clock in the afternoon, General Smith came up, after a march of twenty-five miles,' he was met by an order to form on the right of the Sixth Corps,3 then in front of Cool Arbor, on the road leading to Gaines's Mill, and co-operate in an immediate attack upon the Con

1 See note 2, page 386, volume II.

2 He had been erroneously directed to march to New Castle, instead of New Cool Arbor, and he had, by that means, made the journey from White House, more than ten miles further than was necessary.

3 General Martindale commanded Smith's right; General W. H. Brooks his center, and General Devens, nis left. General Rickets commanded the right of the Sixths Corps, General Russell the center, and General Neill the left.

BATTLE OF COOL ARBOR.

329

federates. These were now in heavy force and in battle order, in that vicinity, for when Lee discovered the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps from Grant's right, he suspected its destination, and had sent the whole of Longstreet's corps to strengthen his own right, which was then partially concealed by thick woods.

June 1, 1864.

Between the two armies was a broad, open, gently undulating field, and a thin line of woods, beyond which, and in front of the thicker forest, the Confederates had lines of rifle trenches. Over this open field the Nationals advanced" at four o'clock, with great spirit, the veterans of Smith seemingly unmindful of their fatigue, and in the face of a murderous fire, quickly captured nearly the whole of the first line of rifle trenches and about six hundred men. They pushed on and assailed the second and much stronger line, but the Confederates gallantly held it until night fell and the struggle ceased. In these desperate encounters, the Nationals lost full two thousand men,

but they held the ground they had gained, and bivouacked upon it that night, partly in the shelter of the thin wood, where some of the troops constructed rude bullet-proofs, that they might repose in safety. But they found little opportunity even for rest, for during the night the Confederates made desperate efforts to retake the lost rifle trenches, and greatly annoyed the troops by an enfilading fire. The assailants were repulsed; and the result of the day's work on the part of the Nationals was the

firm occupation of Cool Arbor, which commanded the road to White House, and was the chosen place from which to force a passage of the

Chickahominy.

That night Grant ordered important but dangerous movements.

cock was

Han

directed to move from the right, and take position on the left of Warren was ordered to extend his line to

the Sixth Corps, at Cool Arbor.

the left, from Bethesda Church, so as to connect with Smith; and Burnside withdrawn entirely from the front to the right and rear of Warren.

was

These

movements were nearly all accomplished, but not without some

trouble and loss. The Confederates observed that of Burnside, which took place on the afternoon of the 2d, and following up his covering skirmishers,

captured

some of them. Then striking Warren's flank they took four hun

June 2.

dred of his men prisoners. But so satisfactory were all arrangements that night, that Grant and Meade, then at Cool Arbor, determined to attempt to force the passage of the Chickahominy the next day, and compel Lee to seek shelter within the fortifications around Richmond. Grant was now holding almost the position of Lee in the battle of Gaines's Mill, two years before, and Lee had the place of McClellan on that occasion.

1 See page 423, volume II.