294

GRANT'S IDEAS ABOUT MAKING WAR.

accordance with a plan which his view of the necessity of the case suggested, and which he so clearly set forth in his final general report, saying:

"From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy, and his numeri

cal strength, were far inferior to ours; but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communication to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

"The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior line of communication, for transporting troops from east to west, re-enforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against, first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."

• 1864.

Grant felt encouraged to work in accordance with these views, for the loyal people everywhere evinced entire confidence in him, and a disposition to furnish him with all necessary materials for making a vigorous and decisive campaign. Volunteering was rapidly increasing; and on the 21st of April the Governors of the younger States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin, tendered to the President the services of one hundred thousand men, for one hundred days, without requiring any bounty to be paid or the service charged or credited on any draft. This patriotic offer was accepted, and the Secretary of War was directed' to carry the proposition of the Governors into effect.

April 23.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

295

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ON RICHMOND.

N the evening of the 3d of May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac was ready to advance, and at midnight it moved toward the Rapid Anna in two columns, the right from near Culpepper Court-House, and the left from Stevensburg. The right was composed of the corps of Warren (Fifth) and Sedgwick (Sixth); and the left, of the Second, under Hancock. The right was led by Warren, preceded by Wilson's cavalry division, and, on the morning of the 4th, crossed the Rapid Anna at Germania Ford, followed, during the forenoon, by Sedgwick's corps. The left, preceded by Gregg's cavalry, and followed by the entire army-train of wagons, four thousand in number, crossed at Elly's Ford at the same time.

The right column pushed directly into The Wilderness, and Warren, with Wilson's cavalry thrown out in the direction of Robertson's Tavern,' bivouacked that night at the Old Wilderness Tavern, while Sedgwick encamped near the river. The left column pushed on to Chancellorsville, and bivouacked the same night on the battle-field around it,' with Gregg's cavalry thrown out toward Todd's Tavern.3 Burnside's (Ninth) corps, which had been lying on the Rappahannock, intended, it was supposed, as a reserve for the defense of Washington City, had now moved rapidly forMay, 1864. ward, and, on the morning of the 5th, crossed the Rapid Anna at Germania Ford, and joined the Army of the Potomac, into which it was afterward incorporated.

Full one hundred thousand men, fresh and hopeful, with the immense army-train, were now across the Rapid Anna, and well on the flank of the Confederate army lying behind the strong intrenchments on Mine Run. In this advance the Nationals had met no opposition, and it was an achievement, Grant said, which removed from his mind the most serious apprehensions which he had entertained concerning the crossing of the river "in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army." He now felt confident that by another day's march the Army of the Potomac.

2 See map on page 37.

3 See page 24.

1 See map on page 111. Report of Lieutenant-General Grant of the Armies of the United States, 1864-5, page 6. General Grant took occasion at the outset of the report to refer to the anomalous position of General Meade, who was the commander of the Army of the Potomac. He says he tried to leave General Meade in independent command of the army. His instructions were all given through Meade. They were general in their nature, leaving all the details to him. "The campaigns that followed," Grant said, "proved him to be the right man in the right place." His commanding in the presence of an officer of superior rank drew from him much of the public attention.

296 THE CONFEDERATES MOVE TO MEET THE NATIONALS. might pass The Wilderness, using it for a mask, and, by advancing rapidly on Gordonsville, take a position in the rear of the Army of Northern Virginia. For this purpose Sheridan was directed to move with the cavalry divisions of Gregg and Torbert against the Confederate cavalry, in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing, near Fredericksburg, and, at the same time, Wilson's division was ordered to move to Craig's Meeting-House, on the Catharpin road, and to send out from that point detachments upon other highways to watch the foe. Hancock was directed to move to Shady Grove Church, and extend his right toward the Fifth Corps, at Parker's store, while Warren, marching to the latter place, should extend his right toward the Sixth Corps, at the Old Wilderness Tavern, to

JOHN SEDGWICK,1

which Sedgwick was ordered.

May, 1864.

So the advance was begun early in the morning of the 5th. Preparations for it had not been unobserved by the Confederates, who were standing on the defensive, with heavy forces at points, en echelon, between the Rapid Anna and Gordonsville, and were exceedingly vigilant. Lee's scouts, in the thickets of The Wilderness, and his signal officers on the lofty summit of Clark's Mountain, had carefully watched the movements of the Nationals, and when these had fairly developed Grant's intentions, the Confederate commander, with singular boldness and skill, changed his front, and proceeded to foil his antagonist. From Lee's center, near Orange Court-House, about twenty miles from the prescribed line of march of the Nationals, two roads running eastwardly, almost parallel to each other, penetrated and passed through The Wilderness. One (the more northerly) was an old turnpike, the other a plank road. Along these, when, on the 4th, the Army of the Potomac was passing the Rapid Anna and moving southward, a large portion of the Army of Northern Virginia was moving, leaving behind them the strong defenses on Mine Run as a place of refuge in the event of disaster. In two columns the Confederates were pressing along these roads, to confront the Nationals before they should reach the intersection of these highways with that from Germania Ford, and compel them to fight while in that wooded, tangled, and, to the latter, unknown region, so familiar to the former, where cavalry and artillery would be almost useless, and where the clouds of sharp-shooters belonging to Lee's army might ply their deadly vocation almost with impunity. General R. S. Ewell was leading the more northerly column along the turnpike, and A. P. Hill the other along the plank road; and that night Ewell's advance division, under Edward Johnson, bivouacked within three miles of the Old Wilderness Tavern, at the junction of the Orange turnpike with the Germania Ford road, near which Warren's corps was reposing. Neither party suspected the close proximity of the other.

This is from a fine photograph, from life, by Rockwood, of New York City.

WARREN'S ADVANCE ATTACKED.

a

297

May, 1864.

Warren was nearest the foe in the prescribed order of advance, and, early on the morning of the 5th," he had thrown out the division of Griffin on the turnpike, to watch in that direction, and prevent any interference with the march of Sedgwick's corps following the Fifth from the ford; while Crawford's division, forming Warren's advance, was set in motion along a wood-road toward Parker's store, near which Johnson had bivouacked. These movements were scarcely begun, when the foe was felt. Griffin's skirmishers on the turnpike were driven in, and some of Crawford's horsemen out on the plank road now came galloping back, with word that the Confederates were in front in strong force. Crawford sent forward a reconnoitering party of cavalry, which soon became warmly engaged, and asked for help, when he sent to their aid the Pennsylvania Bucktails, who reached the front in time to meet an attack of a Confederate infantry force which had arrived. The force in front of Crawford composed Hill's column, and that which attacked Griffin's skirmishers was the van of Ewell's column.

Such was the condition of affairs when, at near eight o'clock in the

morning, Grant and Meade came up from the ford, and took a May 5. position beneath the shadow of pine trees by the road-side, not

far from The Wilderness Tavern. They could not at first believe that Lee had been guilty of the rash

ness of sending the bulk of his army five or six miles in front of his intrenchments to attack his foe, already in strong force on his flank, and it was supposed that the assailing columns were only parts of a strong rearguard covering Lee's retreat. They were soon undeceived; but not fully, until after a battle was begun, and developed the fact that the bulk of Lee's army was there with the intention of fighting. With the impression that it was only his rear-guard, dispositions to sweep it away and seize the intrenchments on Mine Run were made. Perceiving that the heavier

portion of the Confederates

seemed to be on the turnpike, Crawford was directed to suspend operations on the plank road, while Griffin, with General Wadsworth's division on his left, and Robinson's division as a support, should attack the foe on their Crawford sent McCandless, with his brigade, to act on the left of Wadsworth, and then, with the remainder of his division, he withdrew, sharply followed.

front.

1 From a sketch made by the author, in June, 1866.

298

BATTLE IN THE WILDERNESS BEGUN.

Preparations were now made for the attack. The ground on which the struggle was to occur-a struggle not anticipated by the National leadersexhibited a little oasis in The Wilderness. Looking from Warren's quarters, near The Wilderness Tavern, was seen a little brook (Wilderness Run), and beyond it a gentle ridge, over which lay the turnpike. On the southern slope of that ridge was the house of Major Lacey, whose fine residence opposite Fredericksburg is delineated on page 19. Around it was a green lawn and meadows, and these were bounded by wooded hills, and thickets of pines and cedars-that peculiar covering of the earth which abounded in The Wilderness. On the right of the turnpike this thicket was very dense; and farther to the right was a ravine, which formed the dividing line of the forces of Griffin and Ewell on that eventful morning. The whole region, excepting the little opening around Lacey's house, was an irregular and broken surface, covered with small, thickly-set trees, and an almost impassable undergrowth, in the midst of which full two hundred thousand fighting men were now summoned to combat.

At noon, the Nationals, in force sufficient, it was thought, to set Lee's rear-guard flying, moved to the attack, on the turnpike, when the brigades of Ayres and Bartlett, of Griffin's division, the former on the right and the latter on the left of the highway, pressed rapidly forward, and bore the brunt of the first impetuous onset. The Confederates were easily driven, for only Johnson's division was in battle-line, with General Sam. Jones's brigade stretched across the turnpike. With the aid of a larger force then at hand, Ewell's corps might have been crushed. But its presence was unsuspected, and that force was not brought to bear. Ewell's column was saved by Stewart's brigade instantly coming up and taking the place of Johnson's shattered column, and the timely arrival of Rodes's division at the scene of strife. These fresh forces at once took the offensive. It had been arranged for the right of Warren's line to be assisted by the left of Sedgwick's, under General Wright; but so difficult was the passage through the thick wood, that the latter could not get up in time. Warren's right was thus left exposed, and against it the Confederates struck a quick and vigorous blow, by which Ayres and his regulars were hurled back, and so also was Bartlett's brigade. The fighting was desperate and sanguinary, during which the Confederates captured two guns and a number of prisoners, and gained a decided advantage. Meanwhile General Wadsworth, who had moved his division at the same time with that of Griffin, unable to co-operate with the latter on account of the tangled woods between them, had been somewhat misled, and found his flank exposed to a murderous fire, which caused his command to recoil in some confusion. At the same time the brigade of McCandless, sent by Crawford, found itself in an isolated position on the left of Wadsworth, where it was nearly surrounded, and escaped with great difficulty, after losing two full regiments. And so it was, that every rood of ground gained by the Nationals when they advanced was recovered by the Confederates, and Warren, with his corps bereaved of about three thousand men by this encounter, formed a new line a little in the rear, but still in front of The Wilderness Tavern.

At a little after one o'clock the head of the Sixth Corps was attacked by Ewell, while it was working its way into a position to support the Fifth,