The gentleman from Oregon presents himself here claiming a seat as a Senator; he is met upon the threshold by representations from very respectable sources in his own State, declaring his disloyalty. The point is, whether we shall admit him without investigating that matter. It may be proper to attempt a definition of disloyalty, as it is called for by my colleague. If I shall say that it is unfaithfulness to the country and to the Constitution, he may require a definition of that; but substituting the word "unfaithfulness" for "disloyalty," he understands it every gentleman understands it. It is infidelity to the country, sympathizing with and adhering to and supporting its enemies, not by overt acts which constitute treason, but by open expressions of sympathy and adherence and support. We are not now trying the question of the loyalty of the Senator from Oregon; we are merely determining when we shall enter upon that question. My colleague, and other Senators here, say they will enter upon it, if ever, after he shall have been admitted to a seat; then they will try the question of whether he be a loyal man or whether he be not. If I understand, that is the position they take.

Now, sir, would it not be a farce to admit to a seat in this body an acknowledged disloyal man; a man that every one of us was ready to pronounce disloyal, unfaithful to the country and to his obligations as a citizen; to permit him to be sworn, and then to turn him out? It most certainly would, in my judgment. There can be no reasonable objection to trying the question of his loyalty or disloyalty here when he presents himself. This is not like the House of Representatives. That is a body that is disorganized every two years; for lengthy periods of time, it has no organized existence; and if every member of the House of Representatives were to be met by the same objection, and it were first to be tried, the House could never be organized. This body, however, is in permanent organization; it is never disorganized, and hence the distinction between the action of the two Houses is a clear one, and a very proper one. A gentleman presents himself here to be sworn as a Senator; he is met by representations of his disloyalty. Now, suppose the claimant to this seat were admitted to this floor, and he should, as a Senator in this body, assert what these respectable gentlemen say he asserted in Oregon, would you permit him to continue to sit here? I imagine not; I imagine that not a mem

ber of this body would permit him to sit here longer under such circumstances. The simple question is, when will you inquire into the fact? We do not by the vote on the pending proposition pronounce him disloyal; we know nothing about it, except from the representations which are made to us; and we propose now, in the very outset, to inquire into the fact; and if it turns out to be true that he is disloyal, that he is unfaithful to the country and to the Constitution, we then propose to refuse him a seat in this body. Certainly, it seems to me entirely proper that we should do so. If he were admitted here, and his disloyalty were made perfectly manifest and clear, if he declared here in the Senate the sentiments which it is represented that he proclaimed in Oregon, most certainly the Senate would expel him; there can be no doubt of it. Then are we to admit a man for the purpose of going through the form of his expulsion? My colleague says we do not try the religious qualifications of a man; we do not try his intellectual qualifications

Cowan interrupted to ask if there had been any motion made to expel Jefferson Davis, Robert Toombs, or "divers other gentlemen who talked infinitely more mischievous talk than all that was alleged against Mr. Bright?" Wilmot replied that the Senate had really no power then to enforce any such expulsion, and to Cowan's suggestion that it should have been the duty of somebody to try, he rejoined:

My impression is that some motion was made with that view; but it matters not. When the Senate was powerless to carry out its purpose of expulsion, the fact that it was not done furnishes certainly no argument that the Senate has no power to do it. Are we to be the victims of any and every man's disloyalty on this floor? Is every man here privileged to rise in the Senate and declare that in his judgment ours is not a Government, that the true Government of this country is the government of the Confederated States, that Jefferson Davis is its true President, and that he stands ready to sacrifice his life and his property in the maintenance and support of that government? Is any man at liberty to stand up here and say that? If he is I have miscon

strued entirely the organization of this body and the duty of its members.

Now, sir, as to the constitutional test. My colleague says that we do not try the intellectual capacity of the candidate. Surely not; neither at this nor any other time do we try it; we are never privileged to enter upon it. Nor do we subject him to any religious test either now or at any other time. For aught I know it may be made perfectly clear that the Senator from Oregon is entitled to his seat; but what I contend for is that if he be disloyal, if he be not entitled to his seat, or if there be any question as to this point, we may now enter upon the inquiry of his loyalty or disloyalty; that this is the proper time; that it would be a perfect farce to admit him to a seat on this floor, then institute an inquiry as to his loyalty, find out that he was disloyal, and then expel him.

Stark was admitted, February 27, on the resolution of the judiciary committee, to which Sumner's motion had been an amendment. Wilmot voted against the admission and for Sumner's demand for a preceding investigation; he also supported a resolution offered, on March 18, that the charges against Senator Stark be referred to a select committee of five. The committee (of which John Sherman was a member) reported, April 22, that the Senator from Oregon is disloyal to the Government of the United States, and, on May 7, Sumner returned to the attack, saying he had been waiting for some action, but as nothing had been done he submitted a resolution calling for Stark's expulsion. The Senate, however, refused by a vote of 21 to 16 to proceed to the consideration of Sumner's motion (Wilmot being of the sixteen who voted yea) and so Stark retained his seat." He seems, however, to have taken but a small and formal part in the business of the Senate (and that of the kind the committee's report would have led one to expect), and he did not reappear at the ensuing session. In the sixth case-that of Lazarus Powell, of Kentucky, accused of disloyalty and bitterly arraigned by the other sen

Cong. Globe, pp. 993, 994. 9 Cong. Globe, p. 2596.

8 Cong. Globe, p. 1266.

ator from his own State, the resolution of expulsion did not pass, and Wilmot does not appear as present or voting. The seventh senator to face charges was Simmons, of Rhode Island -not for disloyalty, but for alleged use of official influence in procuring a contract for breech-loading arms. These charges, brought by Senator Wright, of Indiana, were referred to the committee on judiciary, much against the accuser's wishes; and the report of that committee, when received, was ordered printed and never heard of again. Wilmot voted for the reference to the committee, in a company whose numbers and character suggested strong disbelief in the accusation against Senator Simmons.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE CONFISCATION BILL

SEVERAL attempts were made during the second session of the 37th Congress to pass a bill to confiscate the property and free the slaves of rebels. The President's message at the opening of the session referred to the results of the confiscation act approved at the preceding session, and especially to the accumulations of numbers of liberated slaves who were dependent upon the Government. He suggested the problems thus created, and their probable increase and acceleration through similar action, to be taken within certain States; the possibility of accepting these freed persons under some system of valuation in lieu of direct taxes, but above all, the need of steps toward a plan of colonization at places where the climate would be congenial. "On the whole proposition," he inquired, “including the appropriation of money with the adequate territory, does not the expediency amount to absolute necessity?"

The various measures offered for the consideration of the Senate, however, all went one course; consideration and postponement.1 The bill which received the most attention, and in which Wilmot showed the most active interest, was known as S. No. 151. It was reported from the committee on judiciary, read, and passed to its second reading, January 15, made the special order of business for February 19, and held before the Senate intermittently until the middle of May. Wilmot spoke on it rather late in its life, on April 30, 1862, addressing himself to the general legal questions and the broad considerations of expediency involved, rather than to the excellences or weaknesses of the particular instrument reported by the com

1 See Senate bills 26, 29, 78, 233; Senate Journal, Thirty-seventh Congress, 2nd session.