4

retreat on the bridge over the Assanpink. The other division, under General John Cadwalader, was to cross the river lower down, from Bristol over to Burlington.* The only unfortunate part of the whole affair was that Washington's plan was not executed as he proposed, for, had it been carried out in all its details, the whole line of British cantonments would undoubtedly have been captured. Washington selected Christmas Eve as the time for the attack, under the belief that the British troops would be more than ordinarily given up to festivity and indulgence, and consequently would be more or less off their guard. The night proved to be intensely cold; the river was filled with masses of floating ice; the current was strong and the wind was keen and sharp. The encumbered state of the river prevented the passage of Washington's division until long after midnight, and it was not until four o'clock that the whole body was in marching order on the opposite side of the river. A heavy fog had also arisen, the road was rendered slippery by a frosty mist, and to further add to their discomfort, the whole march was conducted through a heavy storm of snow and hail. Because of the delay in transporting the troops over the river, it would be daylight before the troops could reach Trenton, and consequently

Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 289-290; Stryker, Battles of Trenton and Princeton, pp. 8182, 113, 344-347.

Brooks, Life of Knox,
p. 79.

a surprise of the Hessians at that place was impossible. There was now no alternative but to proceed according to the plan.* Accompanied by Generals Stirling, Greene, Hugh Mercer, and Adam Stephen, Washington proceeded by the upper road, while Sullivan took the lower.† About 8 o'clock in the morning, the pickets of the enemy were encountered. The latter opened a brisk fire on the Americans from behind the houses, and gradually fell back upon the town where they aroused their sleeping comrades. comrades. But the Americans followed the pickets so closely that before the Hessians could offer any effectual resistance, a battery had been opened up at the end of the main street of the town. Upon being called to arms, the Hessians attempted to form a battery in King Street, but William Washington and James Monroe (afterward President), with a small party, drove the artillery men from their post and captured the two cannon.‡

Washington was now in a critical position, for the intended attack had been made known to Grant at Princeton and the latter had warned Rall to be on guard;|| accordingly, Rall was on the alert. About dusk on the 24th, a party of Americans had fired on the

Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. i., pp. 559-560; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 99-101.

Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii.,

p. 20.

Ibid, pp. 20-21.

Trevelyan, p. 102; Irving, Life of Washington,

vol. ii., p. 514.

picket, but were soon driven off.* As no further attack seemed imminent, Rall supposed that the attempt on the post had been abandoned, and, as the night was cold and stormy, allowed his troops to retire to quarters and lay aside their arms. Rall was very much mistaken in his surmise, however, for at this very moment Washington was crossing the Delaware.† By many it is said that Rall spent the night prior to the attack in a disgraceful carouse, and that even when the attack began he was still at the card table. When aroused by the roll of the American drums and the sound of the musketry, he hurried to his quarters, mounted his horse, and in a few moments was at the head of the troops, vainly endeavoring to atone for his fatal neglect by making as effectual a resistance as was possible under the circumstances. His attempt to rally the Hessians was cut short, however, when he was mortally wounded and carried to his quarters in a dying condition. All order was now at an end, and, bewildered and panic-stricken, the Hessians gave way and endeavored to make good their retreat by the road to Princeton. They were cut off, however, by a body of American troops which had been placed there for that special purpose, and about 1,000 men surrendered. Washington

* Gordon (vol. ii., p. 153) states that Captain William Washington was in command of a scouting party of about 50 soldiers, and performed this exploit without being aware of the advancing force under the commander-in-chief. See also Trevelyan, p. 103.

† Lowell, Hessians in the Revolution, pp. 90-91.

also captured six cannon, about 1,000 stand of arms, and several colors.* Upon the termination of the battle, Washington, accompanied by Greene, visited the dying Hessian soldier and expressed his sympathy for Rall, even though he was engaged in an entirely opposite cause.†

Meanwhile, the divisions under Ewing and Cadwalader had been unable to cross the river according to the plan, because of the ice floes, and for the same reason it was impossible to land the artillery.‡ Had the operations of these two divisions been successful, undoubtedly the party of light horse that fled from Trenton would have been intercepted and captured, and Cadwalader would also have been able to do good. service at Burlington. As it was, however, these divisions were of little service to Washington. In this attack upon tack upon Trenton, the Americans. lost only four or five men, while the Hessians lost, in addition to prisoners, 22 killed and 84 wounded. Two of the Americans reported as lost were frozen to death. On the night of December 26, Washington recrossed

* See Stryker, Battles of Trenton and Princeton, pp. 218-220; Lowell, Hessians in the Revolution, pp. 92-99; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 89-99; Thacher, Military Journal, pp. 70-71; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 270-275; Stedman, American War, vol. i., pp. 230-234; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 166-167; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 104–124; Brooks, Life of Knox, pp. 80-81. Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 522

523.

See Cadwalader's letter to Washington in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. i., pp. 309-310; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 213. || Stryker, pp. 194-195.