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Mr. EAST, from the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany S. 158]

The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill, S. 158, to recognize that the life of each human being begins at conception and to enforce the fourteenth amendment by extending its protection to the life of every human being, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

I. AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

Strike out the enacting clause and all after the enacting clause and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That title 42 of the United States Code shall be amended at the end thereof by adding the following new chapter:

CHAPTER 101

SECTION 1. (a) The Congress finds that the life of each human being begins at conception.

(b) The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects all human beings.

SEC. 2. Upon the basis of these findings, and in the exercise of the powers of Congress, including its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to the

(1)

Constitution of the United States, the Congress hereby recognizes that for the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the States under the fourteenth amendment not to deprive persons of life without due process of law, each human life exists from conception, without regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency, and for this purpose "person" includes all human beings.

SEC. 3. Congress further recognizes that each State has a compelling interest, independent of the status of unborn children under the fourteenth amendment, in protecting the lives of those within the State's jurisdiction whom the State rationally regards as human beings.

SEC. 4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior Federal court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the Constitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment in any case involving or arising from any State law or municipal ordinance that (1) protects the rights of human persons between conception and birth, or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abortions or (b) the provision at public expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or other assistance for the performance of abortions: Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive the Supreme Court of the United States of the authority to render appropriate relief in any case.

SEC. 5. Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United States regarding the enforcement of this Act, or of any State law or municipal ordinance that protects the rights of human beings between conception and birth, or which adjudicates the constitutionality of this Act, or of any such law or ordinance. The Supreme Court shall advance on its docket and expedite the disposition of any such appeal.

SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected by such determination.

II. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED ACT

The purpose of S. 158 is first, to recognize the biological fact that the life of each human being begins at conception; second, to affirm that every human life has intrinsic worth and equal value regardless of its stage or condition; and third, to enforce the fourteenth amendment by ensuring that its protection of life extends to all human beings.

IȚI. NEED FOR THIS LEGISLATION

To protect the lives of human beings is the highest duty of government. Our nation's laws are founded on respect for the life of each and every human being. The Declaration of Independence holds that the right to life is a self-evident, inalienable right of every human being. Embodied in the statement that "all men are created equal" is the idea of the intrinsic worth and equal value of every human life. The author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, explained in later years that "[t]he care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government."

1

Today there is a strong concern among many citizens that government is not fulfilling its duty to protect the lives of all human beings. Since 1973 abortion has been available on demand nationwide, 2 resulting in more than one and one-half million abortions per year. Yet this abrupt and fundamental shift in policy occurred without any prior inquiry by any branch of the federal government to determine whether the unborn children being aborted are

1Speech to the Republican Citizens of Washington County, Maryland (March 31, 1809) reprinted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 472-73 (14th ed. 1968).

2 The state of the law allowing abortion on demand is explained at pp. 5-6, infra.

living human beings. Nor has any branch of the federal government forthrightly faced the question whether our law should continue to affirm the sanctity of human life-the intrinsic worth and equal value of all human life or whether our law should now reject the sanctity of life in favor of some competing ethic. Only by determining whether unborn children are human beings, and deciding whether our law should and does accord intrinsic worth and equal value to their lives, can our government rationally address the issue of abortion.

A government can exercise its duty to protect human life only if some branch of that government can determine what human life is. It can afford no protection to an individual without first ascertaining whether that individual falls within a protected class. The principal author of the fourteenth amendment, Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio, recognized this truism when he stated that, in order to decide whether an individual is protected under the law of our land, "the only question to be asked of the creature claiming its protection is this: Is he a man?" 3 Since the fourteenth amendment expressly confers on Congress the power to enforce the protections of that amendment, including the protection of life, it is appropriate for Congress as well as the Supreme Court to ask whether a particular class of individuals are human beings.

Some branch of government, as a practical matter, must have power to answer this basic question. Otherwise, the government would be unable to fulfill its duty to protect each individual that is a human being. When the individual under consideration is an unborn human child, the basic question becomes, "When does the life of each human being begin?" Only by examining this question can the government determine whether unborn children are living human beings. Only after addressing this issue can a government intelligently decide whether to accord equal value to the lives of unborn children and whether to protect their lives under the law. In its hearings on S. 158, the Subcommittee has exhaustively addressed all questions relevant to the protection of lives of unborn children under the fourteenth amendment. Through these hearings we have also come to recognize that the fundamental question concerning the life and humanity of the unborn is twofold. Not only must government answer the biological, factual question of when the life of each human being begins; it must also address the question whether to accord intrinsic worth and equal value to all human life, whether before or after birth.

These two questions are separate and distinct. The question of when the life of a human being begins-when an individual member of the human species comes into existence-is answered by scientific, factual evidence. Science, however, is not relevant to the second question; science cannot tell us what value to give to each human life. This second question can be answered only in light of the ethical and legal values held by our citizens and expressed by the framers of our Constitution.

The two congressional findings contained in section 1 of S. 158 correspond to these two distinct questions. The congressional finding in section 1(a) of the bill addresses the first question and rests on a factual, scientific determination. The congressional finding in section 1(b) of the bill reflects the conclusion of the Subcommittee

3 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1867).

that the fourteenth amendment answers the second question by affirming the intrinsic worth and equal value of all human lives. Much confusion has arisen in the Subcommittee's hearings and in public debate over S. 158 because of the failure to distinguish between the two basic questions. Those, on the one hand, who claim that scientific evidence can resolve the abortion issue ignore the significance of the second question. They fail to see that even if unborn children are human beings, government must decide whether their lives are of such value that they should be protected under the law. Those, on the other hand, who deny that science has any relevance to the abortion issue generally focus only on the second question and refuse to acknowledge the possibility of answering the first. They ignore the role science plays in informing us that a particular individual is a member of the human species, a separate individual whose life we must decide either to value or not. 4

The Subcommittee has taken pains to separate its consideration of the two questions. In this report we shall often refer to the "scientific question" and the "value question" as a convenient shorthand. We have analyzed the testimony of various witnesses and sources of public record as they relate to each question separately. And we report separately our conclusions on each question. We emphasize that both questions must be answered by some branch of government before the abortion issue can be fully and rationally resolved. The need for Congress to investigate both questions stems partly from the self-professed institutional limitations of our federal judiciary. The Supreme Court, in its 1973 abortion decision, declared itself unable to resolve when the life of a human being begins: "When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). The Court went on to explain that a "wide divergence of thinking" exists on the "sensitive and difficult" question of when a human life begins, id. at 160; hence, the judiciary is not competent to resolve the question.

As a result of its self-professed inability to decide when the life of a human being begins, the Supreme Court rendered its 1973 abortion decision without considering whether unborn children are living human beings. And because the Court did not consider whether unborn children are living human beings, it was able to avoid an explicit decision on whether our law accords intrinsic worth and equal value to the life of every human being regardless of stage or condition. The Court thus declined to address either of the crucial questions relevant to protecting unborn children under the law: the Court addressed neither the scientific question nor the value question. The Court's entire 1973 opinion concerning the power of states to protect unborn children-including the Court's

4 For instance, the medical and scientific witnesses who testified against S. 158 universally argued that the question when human life begins is a "moral, religious or philosophical" question rather than a scientific one. In context, it is clear that they were interpreting the question, "Is it a human being?" not as an inquiry about whether a certain being is an individual member of the human species, but as a value question concerning what rights ought to be given to such a creature. See pp. 10-15, infra. Similarly, the doctors who responded to a questionnaire sent by Senator Baucus tended to regard "human being" as a semantic construct presupposing a conclusion that the being in question is entitled to certain rights, rather than as a designation for all individual members of the human species.

ruling on personhood of the unborn-must be read in light of this failure to resolve the two fundamental questions concerning the existence and value of unborn human life.

That a judicial decision addressing neither of these fundamental questions has led to a national policy of abortion on demand throughout the term of pregnancy is a great anomaly in our constitutional system. It is important to examine the judicial reasoning that led to this result. The Court held that "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision," but added that "this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." 410 U.S. at 154. Because it did not resolve whether unborn children are human beings, the Court could not make an informed decision on whether abortions implicate the interest and duty of the states to protect living human beings. Still, without purporting to know whether unborn children are living human beings, the Court stated by fiat that they are not protected as persons under the fourteenth amendment. 5

Then the Court created judge-made rules governing abortions. 410 U.S. at 163-65. During the first three months of an unborn child's life, the states may do nothing to regulate or prohibit the aborting of the child. In the next three months of the unborn child's life, the states may regulate only the manner in which the child is aborted; but abortion remains available on demand. In the final three months before the child is born, the states may prohibit abortions except when necessary to preserve the "life or health of the mother." Id. at 165.

The apparently restrictive standard for the third trimester has in fact proved no different from the standard of abortion on demand expressly allowed during the first six months of the unborn child's life. The exception for maternal health has been so broad in practice as to swallow the rule. The Supreme Court has defined "health" in this context to include "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). Since there is nothing to stop an abortionist from certifying that a third-trimester abortion is beneficial to the health of the mother-in this broad sense-the Supreme Court's decision has in fact made abortion available on demand throughout the pre-natal life of the child, from conception to birth.

5 The Court devoted very little analysis to its holding that the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment does not include the unborn. Justice Blackmun noted first that of the other uses of the word "person" in the Constitution-such as the qualifications for the office of President and the clause requiring the extradition of fugitives from justice-"nearly all" seem to apply only postnatally, and "[n]one indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application." 410 U.S. at 157. As Professor John Hart Ely has pointed out, the Court might have added that most of these provisions were "plainly drafted with adults in mind, but I suppose that wouldn't have helped." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 925-26. (1973). Justice Blackmun also noted that "throughout the major portion of the nineteenth century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today...." 410 U.S. at 158. This statement seems not to reflect an awareness that the relatively permissive attitude toward abortion prior to quickening that prevailed in the early nineteenth century was overwhelmingly rejected by the very legislatures that ratified the fourteenth amendment. It was these same legislatures which adopted strict anti-abortion laws. These laws in turn resulted from the consensus in the medical profession, based on recent scientific discoveries, that the unborn child was a human being from the moment of conception. See pp. 10, 24-25, infra. Although Justice Blackmun mentioned these political and scientific developments in an earlier portion of his opinion, 410 U.S. at 138-142, he did not discuss their relevance to an understanding of the consensus at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth amendment on whether the word "person" includes the unborn.

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