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wagons, large and small. There was abundant transportation if they could have had it there at that time.
Question. The transportation was with General Lyon at Springfield instead of at Rolla?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Answer. I have no recollection of any such thing, and know no reason why any should have been so ordered.
Question. Either from Rolla or from any other point from which it might have gone to Rolla to have aided those two regiments to have moved to the support of General Lyon ?
Answer. I have no recollection of that. Bear in mind the transportation was very deficient at that time. We had very little in the department compared with our requirements.
Question. Were you fully advised in relation to the situation of General Lyon for some days prior to the battle of Wilson's Creek?
Answer. I was advised as to his condition, I think; perhaps fully-I cannot say how fully. I knew generally of his condition; and you will see from his letter of the 9th of August what his condition was. And I had understood his condition to be about as he states it there. I knew he was in need of supplies and in need of re-enforcements, and we were doing everything it was possible to do to send him both. Bear in mind, in going along over this subject, that the first necessity had been to re-enforce Cairo. In the interim between arriving at St. Louis and the defeat of General Lyon I had gathered a force and taken it to Cairo to relieve General Prentiss. Question. Did
deem it more advisable that Cairo should be strengthened than that General Lyon should be re-enforced ?
Answer. Clearly so.
Answer. Cairo, as you are aware, is a permanent post, necessary to be held for the safety of St. Louis. It was occupied by General Prentiss with a force that was being disbanded, and was threatened by a largely superior force of the enemy: The danger to Cairo, therefore, was exceedingly imminent. General Lyon had something near 7,000 men with him, as I then estimated his force; and it was supposed that in case of extreme difficulty he would fall back. The whole point, in my mind, was whether General Lyon would choose to remain at Springfield or to retreat. General Prentiss could not retreat, and therefore I took the first relief to Cairo; went down with it myself. General Prentiss told me I was just in time. He said he had felled trees and barricaded the roads, and was hourly expecting an attack. In fact he said, I remember, that General Pillow was just forty-eight hours too late. Why he used the expression “fortyeight hours ” I do not know That was the expression he and his officers used. At all events, he had but 1,200 men under arms there, and informed me then, and has since told me, that the place would have been taken if I had not arrived in time. I considered the first necessity was to re-enforce Cairo. That was done, although with a very inadequate force. Still it was sufficient, as it proved. About 3,000 men was all I could take there.
By Mr. Odell :
Answer. I left St. Louis on the 1st day of August, and was back again on the 4th of August, having before I got back sent orders to re-enforce General Lyon with the two regiments of Stephenson and Montgomery. As soon as I reached St. Louis I went to work to get what force I could in order to send it to General Lyon. I think it is very clear that if General Lyon had decided to fall back upon Rolla, instead of engaging the enemy, there would have been no disaster, except losing that part of the State.
By Mr. Gooch: Question. You considered it in the power of General Lyon to have fallen back to Rolla?
Answer. General Lyon so says in his letter of August 9. It is always supposable that an officer will not allow himself, if he can avoid it, to get in a situation where he cannot fall back.
Question. Did you receive any despatch or communication, or intelligence in any way, that led
you to suppose
that it was not in General Lyon's power to fall back upon Rolla?
Answer. No, sir: on the contrary, our information was to the effect that General Lyon had had a successful skirmish with the enemy. General Lyon undoubtedly acted as he judged was best under the circumstances.
Question. Did you send any men to Cape Girardeau ?
Answer. A regiment, I think. I am not clear, however, when I re-enforced that place.
Question. You say you regarded the obstacles in the way of Colonel Stephenson were so great as to excuse him in not going to the relief of General Lyon, although you think if you had been in command yourself there you would have pursued a different course? Answer. Yes, sir; I think I might have done so.
By Mr. Odell:
Answer. No, sir; Stephenson's and Wyman's regiments were at Rolla; that is, after Stephenson had arrived there from Boonville, Wyman had for some time previously been at Rolla, and I ordered him to go to General Lyon after I reached St. Louis. Colonel Montgomery I had previously ordered from Kansas.
Question. You only refer to Colonel Stephenson as disobeying orders?
Question. I suppose so. The order was directed to be communicated to him. But the distance was considerable between St. Louis and Montgomery's position in Kansas; and the 10th of August came very quickly. I think you will find in the documents I have submitted all the circumstances under which Cape Girardeau was re-enforced. It seemed to be especially the object of attack of Jeff. Thompson, who was near there with 5,000 men, and Hardee was between there and Cairo with 7,000 or 8,000 men. You will see by that the exigency under which Prentiss and Marsh, commanding at Girardeau, supposed themselves to be. You will find all these matters fully set forth in the papers I have submitted.
By Mr. Gooch : Question. Did you re-enforce Pilot Knob about this time—the 1st of August Answer. Yes, sir. Question. With what force ? Answer. I think with a regiment.
Question. Will you state your reasons for strengthening Girardeau and Pilot Knob at that time?
Answer. They were the outposts of St. Louis. Cape Girardeau was one of the few high lands on the river-one of the points considered necessary to be held. It was a point which the enemy had endeavored to gain possession of; they directed their special attention to that object. And if the enemy had obtained the possession of that point upon the river they could have interrupted communication, by river, between St. Louis and Cairo. Question. Did
send re-enforcements to Rolla, after the news of Lyon's defeat reached you?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Could that force have been sent before and in season to have reenforced General Lyon?
Answer. No, sir; we had sent before all we could.
Question. Did you order Colonel Mulligan to occupy and hold Lexington; if not, what order did you give him in relation to his movements ?
Answer. It is difficult for me to recollect the orders I did give, without my order-book, which has been retained by General Halleck at St. Louis, contrary to my request.
Question. Those orders will not appear in the documents you have submitted to the committee?
Answer. No, sir. If any order of that kind was given to Colonel Mulliganwhich I cannot now recollect-it will be in
order-book. Colonel Mulligan was more especially under the command of General Davis, who was acting brigadier general, and holding Jefferson City with a large body of our force, and controlling that part of the State. Colonel Mulligan was subject to the command of General Davis, and the command of General Pope. The county in which Lexington lies belonged to General Pope's command. General Pope had been assigned to the command of North Missouri, including the counties on both sides of the Missouri river, except St. Louis. General Davis had been sent to Jefferson City with a considerable body of troops, increased to 9,000 men, when Lexington fell. Colonel Mulligan would be more immediately under his order. General Davis was also in direct communication with him, General Pope being actively employed in the northwestern part of the State. That was the condition of affairs when Colonel Mulligan was at Lexington. Colonel Mulligan had been sent, I think, to some of the Osage towns to take the money from the banks at those places, to prevent it falling into the hands of the secessionists, and he was then returning from that expedition, when Price followed him up so closely and so rapidly that I think he reached Lexington nearly as quickly as Mulligan did—not much difference of time between them.
Question. Then you cannot state now, from recollection, whether you gave any order, either through General Davis or General Pope, or directly to Colonel Mulligan, for Colonel Mulligan to take and hold Lexington until he should receive re-enforcements ?
Answer. Not any more clearly than you will see set forth in the telegraphic despatches and communications which I have laid before you. They comprise all the orders and all the despatches relating to that subject which I have in my possession. Whatever others there may be will be found in the order-book which General Halleck has. I think you will find these despatches here will carry on the account very connectedly and very clearly.
Question. Can you state how many troops you had under your command, and where they were stationed at the time that Colonel Mulligan was at Lexington ?
Answer. No further than I have already given it in the statement I have submitted to the committee.
Question. Have you in that statement given the reasons for not re-enforcing Colonel Mulligan?
Answer. I have stated there that Davis was supporting him, and that re-enforcements were sent to him, but part of them failed to reach him.
Question. You have stated there all that was done towards re-enforcing: Colonel Mulligan, and that the re-enforments sent failed to reach him?
Answer. I have stated the efforts made to re-enforce him, and what the result was.
Question. Were all the efforts made that could be made ?
Question. Had you made any preparations at the time Price was at Lexington to cut off his retreat ?
Answer. I was organizing a force to move south with the intention of occupying Springfield, and at the same time cutting off his line of retreat, when his sudden advance upon Lexington rendered different arrangements necessary. As I have said we were there in a state of preparation all the time. The case would have been vastly different if I had had a disposable force there. If I could have found on my arrival there a disposable force of 30,000, there would have been a very different account rendered of the condition of affairs there. When I reached St. Louis, 30,000 men would have enabled me to re-enforce Lyon, sustained Prentiss, and taken New Madrid and Memphis. But the wholedifficulty consisted in the fact that while we were talking about re-enforcing we had nothing to do it with. It was impossible to do anything more towards reenforcing General Lyon than was done. I do not think it was possible, except by means that I did not then see, and which nobody there saw, to re-enforce Lyon, sustain Cairo, or assist Mulligan. A great deal must depend upon the officer himself who is to be re-enforced. When an officer is two hundred miles: in advance of his supports, he must do a great deal for himself. Fully as much depends upon his judgment
upon his action as upon those who are to re-enforce him. That was our case. Had General Lyon been able to retiremhad Colonel Mulligan been able to preserve his boats, we could, of course, have reenforced him. Had Colonel Mulligan retired towards Sedalia instead of entering Lexington, we could have re-enforced him. But nothing could possibly have enabled re-enforcements to have reached him any sooner under the circumstances than they did, from the time it was known to us that that was the point of attack, and that that was the place to be re-enforced. General Davis telegraphed to me several points that he said were threatened. And up to a very late hour, I think, several days after Price's march down towards Lexington, General Davis telegraphed to me that Boonville appeared to be the point threatened, and. not Lexington. And he was a great deal nearer than I was.
Question. Was Colonel Mulligan acting under any instructions from you that rendered it imperative upon him to take and hold Lexington ?
Answer. He may have been. I do not bear in mind whether he was or not.. I have not seen my order-book since that date.
Question. Was any order given by you at any time to General Lane to fall back from Kansas City to Leavenworth and destroy his baggage trains, stores, &c.?
Answer. Destroy his baggagge trains ? No, sir.
Answer. No, sir; I perceive to what transaction your inquiry refers. It became at one time a matter of expediency, so it was thought, to retire our force, which was cut off from our main body, and throw it around to St. Joseph, and on the railroad to Chillicothe, which formed a part of our line. I wished to withdraw the force at Kansas City and throw it on the north side of the Misthe enemy
souri river, on the line of the railroad to Chillicothe, where it could be connected with our army.
Our army was stretching, and intended to stretch, at that time from the Osage river across the State to Chillicothe. We were occupying a sort of crescent-shaped line, intended to enclose General Price; and we were separated from these small forces by the Missouri river. Such as General Sturgis's command. The intention was to throw General Sturgis and his force from his position at Kansas City around to Chillicothe, and bring him upon the extreme right of our line, and connected with the rest of our force, so that there might be no more of these surrenders of small detached bodies of troops. It was doubtful whether or not they had any stores at Kansas City; the result of the best inquiries we could make was that there were none; but in directing General Sturgis to fall back and come around to Chillicothe I directed him, if he had any stores there to destroy them, rather than have them fall into the hands of
It was considered better, after a great deal of deliberation, to throw General Sturgis around, and have him in connexion with us, than to leave him there. General Lane I did not succeed in having much communication with. He was very difficult to communicate with. I never gave him any orders to destroy his baggage or provisions; and I think I gave none to him in regard to Kansas City
By Mr. Odell: Question. You do not remember to have authorized bim to destroy the city ?
Answer. To destroy the city! no, sir; I do not think I communicated with him, for General Sturgis was his superior officer. No order was given to destroy the city, but only any stores which might belong to us which were there. As I have already stated, it was very doubtful whether there were any stores there, but if there were any such General Sturgis was directed to destroy them rather than they should fall into the hands of the enemy. The order was not obeyed, however, because it did not reach General Sturgis. Our force was so scattered at that time that I frequently took the trouble and precaution to duplicate, and even triplicate the orders, to send different despatches, as they were very frequently intercepted by the enemy. Sometimes despatches reached General Lane, and sometimes they did not.
By Mr. Gooch: Question. Were these orders given to destroy stores at any other point, or to burn any place on the retirement of our troops ?
Answer. No, sir. It was after a great deal of discussion that this order to General Sturgis was determined upon. It was one of those cases in regard to which doubt existed. It was doubtful whether we should risk General Sturgis there, instead of ordering him to move around to the other position. But finally, as one disaster, as it was considered, had been suffered, it was decided to move him around.
Question. In regard to the suppression of newspapers in your department, will you
state to the committee what was done in that respect ? Answer. I think there were three or four suppressions. Question. For what reasons ?
Answer. Because they were considered detrimental to the service there. We had but little of that to do. The most of that that was done was upon the declaration of martial law. It was generally acceded to, generally considered to be right. We gained over some papers. We treated the St. Louis Republican, having a large circulation, with a great deal of consideration, and it finally became, earnestly and emphatically, one of the supporters of the administration. I have always considered that one of the most important papers in Missouri. It was a hostile paper when I got there, but afterwards became a friendly paper.