Abstract of payments made by P. M. Febiger, paymaster United States army, for the months of Question. What is your rank in the army? Answer. My rank in the old army is that of captain. I am colonel of the 11th regiment of Missouri volunteers. Question. Where have you served during the present war ? Answer. In Missouri entirely. Question. Under whose command? Answer. Under the general command of General Frémont for a portion of the time, and subsequently under the general command of General Halleck; under the immediate command of General Lyon, and also of General Grant, who now commands the district in which my present post is situated. By Mr. Chandler: Question. You were in the battle at Springfield? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. At what time did you join General Lyon's column; or did you go under his command at that time? Answer. We arrived in the neighborhood of Springfield-12 miles from Springfield-on the 13th July. I joined General Lyon on Grand river about a week before that time. Question. You joined him early in July? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. You then marched with General Lyon's column to Springfield? Answer. Yes, sir; after joining him. The column I was with was Major Sturgis's column, that left Kansas City on the 23d of June, and joined General Lyon early in July on Grand river. We proceeded from there to Springfield in pursuit of Price's army. We arrived 12 miles from Springfield on the 23d of July. I remember that date, but not all the others. Question. Will you give us, as briefly as may be, the movements of General Lyon's column until the battle of Springfield was fought? Answer. We lay there from the 13th of July until the 1st of August, waiting for re-enforcements. Question. What was the strength of your army at that time? Answer. It was about 5,500, as was stated by General Lyon in a council of war in which I was present. It was about that in round numbers-it fell a little short of that. General Lyon was satisfied that the enemy was too strong to pursue with the force he had, and he waited there for re-enforcements and supplies. He was short of supplies. We commanded the mills for some ten or fifteen miles about, and got flour in that way. The last two weeks of the time before the first of August we were without sugar and coffee, and what we call in the army "small rations," such as beans, rice, &c. We had fresh beef, and salt beef, and bread. On the 1st day of August the army moved in pursuit of Rains, leaving a force in Springfield to guard the train and town. We marched between twenty-five and thirty miles south of Springfield. We had a little skirmish with the enemy the second day out, at a place called Dug Springs, gave them a few shots, and there was a charge of cavalry there. On the morning of the 4th of August General Lyon called a council of war, at which I was present; all the commanding officers of battalions, regiments, and corps were present. I was at the time in command of a battalion of regulars. He stated to the council our force; that we had no rations-we knew before that we were out of small rations that we had only about one day's ration of bread; that we would necessarily lose the command of the mills where we had obtained supplies of bread if we moved on; we would be reduced to salt and fresh beef, of which we could get a sufficient quantity; and that Rains had been retreating before us, apparently luring us on. The question he proposed to the council was whether we would pursue further, or fall back upon Springfield and wait for re-enforcements and supplies, or after we got back to Springfield act according to circumstances. The unanimous vote of the council was that we should fall back; that as we had no supplies it would be folly for us to pursue Rains further, who was retreating before us constantly. General Lyon stated the force of the enemy to be about 15,000 men, as near as he could ascertain from his spies, which, I would remark here, fell far short of their actual numbers. Question. Was this council of war at Dug Springs? Answer. It was beyond Dug Springs. We went one day's march beyond Dug Springs. We commenced the march back, and I think we arrived at Springfield either on the morning of the fifth or the sixth. We commenced the march back on the fourth. I have been trying to recall whether we were two days or three days in making our march back, but I will not be positive. The enemy, at the same time, were moving on a different road south of us towards Springfield. I commanded the rear guard of six companies the day of our starting back, and I could see the dust raised by the enemy's troops three or four miles on our left. They were evidently moving up towards Springfield on another road. I think it was the morning of the fifth that we reached Springfield. The question then arose, that morning, whether we would remain at Springfield and defend ourselves until we received re-enforcements, or whether we would continue our retreat right on towards Rolla or towards Fort Scott. Arriving at Springfield tolerably early-about 10 o'clock in the morning-we could have made some ten or fifteen miles further that day. General Lyon consulted several officers in regard to that among the number was myself. Those whom he had known intimately he consulted. There were a great many prominent citizens of the neighborhood came around him, good Union people, urging him to remain. My own opinion was that we ought to remain a few days. We could defend ourselves; or, at least, we did not anticipate an immediate attack, probably not in four or five days. But my opinion was that we should wait at least two or three days for re-enforcements. He stated that he had repeatedly written for re-enforcements and was not expecting any. That he stated in the first council. He made the remark to me-on one occasion in private conversation-that he had written and telegraphed for re-enforcements; that he was aware that regiments had been sent out of Missouri after he had applied for re-enforcements, for what reason he did not know. And he did not know why he had not received any re-enforcements. Whether that be the case or not, I cannot say. I merely state what he said in conversation with me. By the chairman: Question. Did he say where they had been sent? Answer. No, sir. Only they had been sent out of Missouri. The day we returned to Springfield our troops remained under arms, and waited some three or four hours while this matter was being considered. After the consultation was concluded in regard to our movements, General Lyon ordered the troops into camp; a decision which I believe was approved by all the officers. We lay there until the evening of the 9th, making one or two lit excursions out during the time in pursuit of detached parties of the enemy. I think about that time we received a few wagon loads of supplies from Rolla, which gave us some five or six days rations. On the afternoon of the 9th we received marching orders. In the conversations of General Lyon with his officers the only questions that arose were, whether we should intrench ourselves at Springfield and wait for re-enforcements, or retreat upon Rolla; or rather, if we retreated, whether we would retreat upon Rolla or upon Fort Scott, the distance to each place being about the same. Fort Scott lay just on the other side of the Missouri line, in Kansas: Rolla was at the end of a railroad. The determination to fight the battle of Springfield was his own-at least he did not consult me. I do not know whether he consulted other officers or not. But I would remark here, that I was afterwards notified that General Lyon adopted the wisest course. We had a valuable train, estimated at over half a million of dollars. There was aboard that train between $200,000 and $250,000 in specie. Had we retreated at once upon Rolla we would probably have had to fight every day on our retreat. It was a bad road of 110 miles, and being encumbered with a very large train our retreat might have resulted in the loss of a large portion of that train. To have intrenched ourselves in Springfield, being in doubt whether or not we should get any re-enforcements, and being in want of provisions, was a matter of perhaps rather doubtful policy. He es On the afternoon of the 9th of August we marched out to fight the enemy. I do not think that General Lyon was aware of their real strength. timated them at 15,000 men. Our force with which we left Springfield was about 4,800 men. We had about 5,500 men there; but we had to leave a guard for the train in town, and then there were many of the men sick, and on extra duty, &c., which reduced our marching force to about 4,800. Of that number General Sigel had about 1,500: the two German regiments, one battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. And in the consideration of the battle itself, General Sigel's force should be thrown out entirely, because his whole force was dispersed and his battery captured within a half an hour after the fight commenced. So that the battle itself was fought with about from 3,300 to 3,500 men against 23,000; for we ascertained afterward that to have been their numbers. Of our forces there were seven companies of regular infantry, and two batteries of artillery-I suppose altogether not over 600 regulars--and the rest were volunteers: the two Kansas regiments, the 1st Missouri, and the 2d Iowa, whose time had expired at that time. I have but little more to say in regard to the battle, except that we whipped them. I was with my battalion in the advance that morning; we marched out the night before, and just laid down in the bushes about 12 or 1 o'clock. It rained upon us, and we had nothing to eat the next morning. I think very few of us had anything to eat that day-at least I did not. The battle commenced about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was a complete surprise; we surprised their camps. I drove in one of their pickets not more than a half a mile from their camp, and they had not even time to give the alarm in the camp before our guns opened upon them. The battle lasted from 5 o'clock until about half-past 11. They came up four distinct times to attack us, bringing up fresh troops each time. By Mr. Chandler: Question. Each time in force? Answer. Yes, sir; each time in force, bringing up fresh troops. By the chairman: Question. Why did General Lyon pursue Rains when you first started if he had not a force sufficient? Answer. McCulloch and Rains had not united, and the object was to prevent their doing so. By Mr. Chandler: Question. Will you give us the particulars of that fight? Answer. I cannot particularize it. I was on the left myself, and carried forward the left attack. I was separated, with my battalion, from the main portion of the army by a creek. I was a quarter or a half a mile from the main portion of our army. I fought, for upwards of an hour, with 250 regulars, over 2,000 of the enemy, and was forced to retreat. I was severely wounded, and in the course of an hour and a half was myself in an ambulance. Question. You did not see the latter part of the action? Answer. No, sir. I can only state what officers have told me. My battalion was saved by Dubois's battery on that occasion. I found that I had overwhelming forces against me, and that my left flank was going to be turned. I had a creek behind me, with a dense chapparal bordering it on both sides, which was almost impenetrable except in one or two places. I came to the conclusion to fall back. I lost 49 men, in the course of an hour, out of 250. Question Can yon state the casualties in our army? Answer. I have Major Sturgis's official report. The casualties I can state to be over 1,200-I think over 1,300 killed and wounded. There were not certainly over 3,500 men of ours in action in the first place. Question. Can you give a description of those four charges of the enemy from hearsay; that is, from the accounts of the officers engaged; particularly the last one? Answer. I do not know that I could give you a description of it. I have heard officers speak of it; but in ordinary conversation each one describes the particular part of the field where he was himself; and it requires considerable reflection to put those different things together to connect properly the different incidents in the different parts of the field. Question. I will say that Major Schofield stated to me that after the last repulse it was a perfect rout; that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion. Answer. Yes, sir; everybody says that. Question. And he also stated that in attempting to ride forward to reconnoitre and see where the enemy were, their dead was piled up so thick that he could not ride over them, but had to make a considerable detour. Answer. There was a flag of truce sent out after our return to Springfield, as I heard. A young doctor of the army went out with it, with a few men and some wagons, to obtain the body of General Lyon, and to look for our wounded left on the field. He told me that General McCulloch remarked to a non-commissioned officer-a sergeant-who attended the party, "Your loss was very great, but ours was four times yours;" and I think it but a fair estimate to put their loss at least as high as four thousand men killed and wounded. Question. After this battle you retired? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Can you give us the particulars of that retreat? Question. It was conducted in good order, and you were not pursued? Answer. Yes, sir; we were not pursued. The fact was the enemy was completely crippled. We gained everything that General Lyon proposed to gain. Question. How many additional troops, in your estimation, would have given you a victory and enabled you to have driven the enemy out of Missouri? Answer. My opinion is that our victory would have been perfect and complete with two additional regiments. They were running at the time. They burned their trains-we saw them burning-so that they should not fall into our hands. They did not burn the whole, but what they could conveniently. If we had known it, we could have held the field as it was, for afterwards we heard that they were out of ammunition; that is, they had but a few rounds left. By the chairman: Question. How long did General Lyon wait at Springfield before he undertook his expedition against Rains? Answer. He waited from the 13th of July till the 1st of August. Question. Still his army was inferior to that of the enemy? Answer. Constantly inferior. Question. Vastly inferior? Answer. Yes, sir; vastly inferior. |