I also saw a similar appointment given to an individual on General Frémont's staff, as director of music, with the rank and commission of captain of engineers. This person was a musician in a theatre in St. Louis. Colonel Andrews was verbally instructed by me not to pay him, the person having presented the two papers and demanded pay. Colonel Andrews also stated that these appointments bore one date, but directed payment, in some cases, a month or more anterior thereto. He was then without funds, except a small amount. The principal commissary, Captain Haines, had no outstanding debts, and expected funds soon. Major Allen, principal quartermaster, had recently taken charge at St. Louis, but reported great irregularities in his department, and requested special instructions. These he deemed important, as orders were communicated by a variety of persons, in a very irregular manner, requiring disbursements of money. These orders are often verbally given. (See paper No. 4, asking for instructions.) He was sending, under General Frémont's orders, large amounts of forage from St. Louis to the army at Tipton, where corn was abundant and very cheap. The distance was 160 miles. He gave the indebtedness of the quartermaster's department in St. Louis to be $4,506,309 73.—(See paper No. 5.) In regard to contracts, without an examination of the accounts it would be difficult to arrive at the facts. It is the expressed belief of many persons that General Frémont has around him, in his staff, persons directly and indirectly concerned in furnishing supplies. The following is a copy of a letter signed by Leonidas Haskell, captain and aide-de-camp. He, though on General Fremont's staff, is said to be a contractor for hay and forage and mules; the person named in his note, Colonel Degraf, being his partner. "HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, "Camp Lillis, October 2, 1861. "SIR: I am requested by the commanding general to authorize Colonel Degraf to take any hay that has been contracted for by the government, his receipt for the same being all the voucher you require. "Respectfully yours, "LEONIDAS HASKELL, (See Exhibit No. 6.) What does this mean? Contractors deliver forage direct to quartermas ters, who issue the same; but here another party steps in, and, if a contractor, or the partner of one, to fill his own contract. This double transaction, it is difficult to suppose, is done without a consideration. The accounts should be examined, and the price paid to Degraf compared with that paid to the contractors whose forage was seized. This same Captain Haskell, aide-de-camp, was a contractor for mules. He desired Captain Turnley to receive his animals, good, bad, and indifferent, as Captain Turnley said. This he would not do, and stated his prices for dif ferent classes, wheel, lead, &c. Besides, he had more mules than he could possibly send to the army. Notwithstanding all this, he received an order to inspect and receive Mr. Haskell's mules as rapidly as possible. Captain Turnley very soon received orders from General Frémont to leave St. Louis and proceed to the interior.-(See paper No. 7, showing his great labor and heavy responsibility.) By direction of General Meigs, advertisements were made to furnish grain and hay, and contracts made for specific sums-28 cents per bushel for corn, 30 cents for oats, and $17 95 per ton for hay. In face of this, another party at St. Louis, Baird, or Baird & Palmer, (Palmer being of the old firm in Cal ifornia of Palmer, Cook & Co.,) were directed to send to Jefferson City, (where hay and corn abound,) as fast as possible, 100,000 bushels of oats, with a corresponding amount of hay, at 33 cents per bushel for grain, and $19 per ton for hay. (See paper No. 7-Captain Turnley's letter.) Captain Edward M. Davis, a member of his staff, received a contract, by the direct order of General Fremont, for blankets. They were examined by a board of army officers, consisting of Captain Hendershott, 4th artillery, Captain Harris, commissary of subsistence, and Captain Turnley, assistant quartermaster. The blankets were found to be made of cotton, and to be rotten and worthless. Notwithstanding this decision, they were purchased, and given to the sick and wounded soldiers in hospital. These facts can be ascertained from the report of the board or the officers themselves, and the bill of purchase. Amongst the supplies sent by General Fremont to the army now in the field may be enumerated 500 half barrels, to carry water, in a country of abundant supply, and 500 tons of ice. We examined the barracks in course of construction in St. Louis, near and around the private house occupied by him as quarters-the Brant House, rented at $6,000 per annum. These barracks have brick foundations and brick outer walls, weatherboarded, and are sufficient as quarters and stables for 1,000 men. Like those of Camp Benton, these barracks were not built by contract or proposals; they are certainly more expensive and more permanent than the quarters of a temporary army would require; and the exact expense, though perhaps difficult to ascertain, should be discovered. A pontoon bridge has been thrown across the Ohio river at Paducah. A ferry boat, in a region where such boats are readily procured, would be just as efficient and much less expensive. Contracts, it will be seen, were given to individuals without resorting to advertisements for bids, as required by law and regulations. Having received an intimation from another quarter of an impropriety, I called on Captain McKeever, assistant adjutant general, for the facts, which he gave me as follows: One week after the receipt of the President's order modifying General Frémont's proclamation relative to the emancipation of slaves, General Fremont, by note to Captain McKeever, required him to have 200 copies of the original proclamation and address to the army of same date printed and sent immediately to Ironton, for the use of Major Gavitt, Indiana cavalry, for distribution through the country. Captain McKeever had the copies printed and delivered. The order is as follows: "Adjutant general will have 200 copies of proclamation of commanding general, dated 30th August, together with address to the army of same date, sent immediately to Ironton for the use of Major Gavitt, Indiana cavalry. Major Gavitt will distribute it through the country. "SEPTEMBER 23, 1861. "J. C. F., Commanding General. "A true copy: "CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER, We left St. Louis, October 12, for General Frémont's headquarters, at Tipton, 160 miles distant, passing the night at Jefferson City, the capital of Missouri, 125 miles from St. Louis; General Price was in command of the place with a force of 12,000 men. The 8th Iowa was there en route for Tipton. At this place there were accumulated a large quantity of forage landed from steamboats, and some wagons and mules for transportation; also the half barrels for carrying water, and a number of mules, which Captain Turn ley said he could not get forward, having no control over the transportation by railroad. Leaving Jefferson City on the 13th, we arrived at Tipton at 9 o'clock a. m. The Secretary of War was called upon by General Frémont, and upon the general's invitation accompanied him to Syracuse, five miles distant, to review the division under General McKinstry, nearly eight thousand strong. This body of troops is said to be the best equipped and best supplied of the whole army. They certainly are, so far as means of transportation are concerned. At Tipton, besides General Frémont and staff, his body-guard, &c., I found part of General Hunter's 1st division, and General Asboth's 4th division. The force designed to act against Price consists of five divisions, as follows: First division, Hunter's, at Tipton.... Sixth division, McKinstry's, at Syracuse. Total..... 9,750 9,220 7,980 6,451 5,388 38,789 As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton, I expressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw General Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that there was great confusion, and that Frémont was utterly incompetent; that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present defective in many respects; that he required one hundred wagons, yet he was ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms, (indifferent,) but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their pockets; consequently, on their first day's march from Jefferson City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were destroyed. This march to Tipton (thirty-five miles) was made on a miry, heavy earth road parallel to the railroad and but a little distance from it. The troops were directed by General Frémont to march without provisions, knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rain storm came up, and the troops were exposed to it all night; were without food for twenty-four hours, and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled. General Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one of his colonels, informing him that but twenty out of one hundred of his guns would go off. These were the guns procured by General Frémont in Europe. I may here state that General Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Colonel Swords, assistant quartermaster general, at Louisville, just from California, he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with General Frémont, wrote to some friend in San Francisco that his share of the profits of the purchase of these arms was $30,000. When General Hunter, at Jefferson City, received orders to march to Tipton, he was directed to take forty-one wagons with him, when he had only forty mules, which fact had been duly reported to headquarters. At this time, Colonel Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment was, without General Hunter's knowledge, taken from him, leaving him, when under marching orders, with only one regiment at Jefferson City fit to take the field.-(See paper No. 9.) General Hunter showed me the order for marching, dated October 10, which he only received the 12th.-(See paper No. 10. See Hunter's reply, showing the great wants of his command, marked No. 11.) The same day the order was changed to one day's march.-(See paper No. 12.) When General Pope, at Georgetown, twenty-five miles distant, received this order of march, he wrote a private letter to Hunter, which I read. It set forth the utter impossibility of his moving for the want of supplies and transportation, and asked whether General Frémont could mean what he said. All of the foregoing goes to show the want of military foresight and soldierly judgment on the part of General Frémont, in directing the neces sary means for putting and maintaining in the field the forces under his command. General Hunter stated that, though second in command, he never was consulted by General Frémont, and knew nothing whatever of his intentions. Such a parallel, I venture to assert, cannot be found in the annals of military warfare. I have also been informed that there is not a Missourian on his staff-not a man acquainted, personally, with the topography and physical characteristics of the country or its people. The failure of General Frémont to re-enforce General Lyon demands brief notice. General Frémont arrived at St. Louis July 26, called thither from New York by telegraph, stating that General Lyon was threatened by 30,000 rebels. At this time General Pope had nine regiments in north Missouri, where the rebels had no embodied force, the confederate forces in the State being those under Price and McCulloch, near Springfield, southwest Missouri, and those under Pillow, Jeff. Thompson and Hardee, in southeast Missouri; two regiments held Rolla, the terminus of the southwestern branch of the Pacific railroad, whilst Jefferson City, Boonesville, Lexington and Kansas City bad each a garrison of three or four hundred men, behind intrenchments. Cairo and Bird's Point were fortified and defended with heavy artillery. (Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau were fortified after General Frémont's arrival.) All these places could be re-enforced by railroad and river from St. Louis and the northwestern States, and could hold out until re-enforced, even if attacked by superior forces. On his arrival in St. Louis, General Frémont was met by Captain Cavender, 1st Missouri, and Major Farrar, aidede-camp to General Lyon, with statements from the latter, and asking for re-enforcements. Major Phelps, member of Congress from Springfield, Doctor Miller, of Omaha, and many other citizens, having ample means of information, made the same representations and urged the sending of re-enforcements. To Governor Gamble he said: "General Lyon is as strong as any other officer on this line." He failed to strengtheu Lyon, and the result, as is well known, was the defeat of that most gallant officer. The two regiments at Rolla should have been pushed forward, and the whole of Pope's nine regiments brought by rail to St. Louis and Rolla, and thence sent to Lyon's force. Any other general, in such an emergency, would have pursued this obvious course. The battle of Springfield, (or more strictly Wilson's creek,) one of the most desperate ever fought on this continent, took place August 10, when the brave Lyon fell, and the troops, borne down by greatly superior numbers, were obliged to fall back, but unpursued by a badly beaten foe General Frémont called four regiments from North Missouri and went with them to Cairo. It is evident that he had no intention of re-enforcing General Lyon, for the two regiments at Rolla, 125 miles only from Springfield, received no orders to march, and were not supplied with transportation, and thirty or forty hired wagons, just returned from Springfield, were discharged at Rolla August 4, seven days before the battle, and returned to St. Louis. After the news of the battle reached St. Louis, four other regiments were drawn from Pope in North Missouri and sent to Rolla. Better to have called in these troops before the battle, as after the battle the whole revolutionary elements were called forth. The six regiments accomplished nothing, and were not ordered to advance and cover the retreat of Lyon's army, although it was supposed in St. Louis that Price and McCulloch were following it, and that Hardee had moved up to cut off its retreat on the Gasconade. An advance of these regiments would have enabled the army to retrace its steps, and to beat the forces of Price and McCulloch so badly that they would have been unable to follow our forces in their retreat. It is said that every officer in Lyon's army expected to meet re-enforcements, and to return with them and drive Price and McCulloch from the southwest. General Hunter arrived at St. Louis from Chicago, called thither on a suggestion from Washington as an adviser. General Frémont submitted to him, for consideration and advice, a paper called "Disposition for retaking Springfield." It sets out out with a statement that Springfield is the strong strategical point of that wide elevation which separates the waters of the Osage from those of the Arkansas; the key to the whole southwestern Missouri, commanding an area of nearly 60,000 miles. Why did not this enter the brain of the major general before the fall of Lyon, and he strain every nerve to hold that important key when in his possession? General Hunter, in answer to the paper, replied: "Why march on Springfield, where there is no enemy and nothing to take? Let me take the troops and proceed to Lexington," in which direction Price was marching, and where he expected to be joined by 40,000 rebels. Instead of this he was sent to Rolla, without instructions, and remained there until ordered to Jefferson City, still without instructions, and thence to Tipton, where we found him. (See Exhibit No. 13.) No steps having been taken by General Frémont to meet Price in the field, he moved forward his line of march, plainly indicating his intention of proceeding to Lexington. When within some thirty-five miles of the place, he remained ten or more days, evidently expecting that some movement would be made against him. None being made, he advanced and, with his much superior force, laid siege to Lexington, defeated by Mulligan with 2,700 men September 12, and captured it the 21st, nine days thereafter. Now for the facts to show that this catastrophe could have been prevented, and Price's army destroyed before or after that disastrous affair. Before Price got to Lexington the forces to resist him were as follows: Jefferson City, 5,500; at Rolla, 4,000; along the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, about 5,000; western line of Missouri, under Lane, down near Fort Scott, 2,300; Mulligan's force at Lexington, 2,700; a large force in Illinois, along the Mississippi river, and on the Iowa line; outside of St. Louis, some 17,000; in St. Louis, 18,000, but say 10,000. Hunter's plan, up to Sunday, 22d September, was to concentrate from St. Louis, Jefferson city, and Rolla; also from the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, 20,000 men, and relieve Mulligan. He said that if Price was a soldier, Lexington had then fallen, but he could, with energy, be captured with all his baggage and plunder. The objection that there was no transportation is idle. The railroads and river were at command, and the march from Sedalia was only forty-five miles. The force could, General Hunter supposed, be thrown into Lexington by Thursday, as it appears, before it was taken. General Frémont ordered Sturgis, in North Missouri, to Lexington, and by crossing the river to re-enforce Mulligan. Sturgis had only 1,100 men, and, on reaching the river opposite the town, found it commanded by Price, and, of course, was compelled to fall back. Hunter's plan of moving these |