To McClellan

February 3, 1862

66

[General McClellan had succeeded General Scott on November 1, 1861, as Commanderin-Chief (under the President) of all the armies of the United States. On January 31, 1862, the President had issued his Special War Order No. 1," directing a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac. This order conflicted with plans which McClellan had formed, and he remonstrated. Lincoln's reply is a good illustration of his power of compact statement, as well as of his mastery of the military situa tion.]

Executive Mansion, Washington, February 3, 1862. MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN :

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac-yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly

larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine ?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? Yours truly,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

To Seward

June 28, 1862

[This letter was written to W. H. Seward, the Secretary of State, shortly after the Union victories in Kentucky and Tennessee and upon the Mississippi River, in the spring of 1862.]

Executive Mansion, June 28, 1862.

HON. W. H. SEWARD:

MY DEAR SIR: My view of the present condition of the war is about as follows:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be

kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am conquered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.