In the case of federation, Huber (p. 166) says that these separate states of a federal union (Bundestaat) remain, doubtless, international persons, bearers of international rights and duties, though such rights and duties are limited by the union. This is hardly, however, an accurate description of the greater number of the German States which have no rights of legation, and it is certainly not a correct description of the United States or of the Argentine Republic. Huber, indeed, seems throughout to over-estimate the position of a state in a federation, an overestimation not unnatural when it is remembered that the German Confederation of 1820 to 1866 did leave its members states of International Law, and that traces of this fact remain even in the present German Confederation. But, in the case of a federation, it is impossible to maintain that the states are states of International Law. Doubtless before the federation they may be such states, though they are not necessarily so, for many of the newer states of the American Federation are, historically, merely provinces created as states on the anology of the original thirteen states. But by the federation they lose their international position, and, as Westlake says, they would not be considered as having a right to separate, or if they did separate, as resuming their international existence as a continuous possession, merely limited by treaty for the period of the federation. The state formed by the separation would be considered a new state, as is shown by the fact that foreign powers refused to recognise the seceding states of the United States in 1861 to 1865. They were only entitled to do so if, from the point of view of International Law, the seceding states had no international existence. Similarly the European powers declined to recognise the freedom of Hungary, in 1849, on the ground that Hungary was not a state of International Law, a real union being, as we have seen above, for international purposes, similar to a federal union. On the other hand, it is probable that on the break-up of a confederation proper it would be necessary to recognise that the several states were resuming their full position as sovereign international states, free from the restrictions of the confederation.

It is significant that Huber admits that (i.) all treaties of alliance and guarantee fall to the ground; (ii.) all treaties affecting matters within the competence of the confederation disappear as soon as the federation exercises its power. This has been decided by the Imperial Court of Germany in a criminal case (Decisions, 4, 274), which also in a civil case (Decisions, 24, 13) laid it down that, if not expressly altered by the federation a treaty remained unaltered. This case was one in which it was decided that a treaty between Saxony and Austria concerning bankruptcy remained in force, in view of the fact that no legislation of the empire had yet dealt with the question. But this merely illustrates the fact that, in some respects, the existing German Confederation retains its confederate nature, and it cannot be quoted as applicable to the case of a federation pure and simple. Further, Huber admits that the only remedy of a third party aggrieved through the disappearance of a treaty with a state which enters a federation is for it to decline to recognise the federation, and that, if it does not do so, it recognises that entrance into the federation can alter the effect of a treaty. Moreover, Huber lays down (p. 167) that the whole burden of rights and duties, as far as federal matters are concerned, passes over to a federation on its formation, and adds (p. 16) that the separate states preserve all their international rights and duties so far as they are not removed by the federation, in which case no denunciation of treaties is necessary, as they fall without such denunciation. One may fairly claim that this amounts to an admission that treaties disappear, except in so far as the nature of the union permits the state to maintain an international position, so that in the case of a federation proper all treaties disappear-in the case of a confederation those inconsistent with its terms.

Rivier (ii., 142) has a dictum which amounts to the same thing: "In cases of real, confederate or federal union, treaties only lose force if, by the union, they have

lost their object or use or are opposed to the constitution or federal agreement. Those remaining may be denounced on either side owing to the change of circumstances. On this theory if a state joins a federation, the constitution of which, like that of the United States, forbids its members to have treaties with other powers, all treaties disappear; if it joins one like the German Empire, all treaties disappear which are inconsistent with the constitution of the empire, though, of course, where the empire is only empowered to make treaties on the question, existing treaties persist until such power is exercised, which fact illustrates in a striking manner the confederate nature which still manifests itself in the German Union.

Heltzendorff (Encyclopädie, p. 1289) lays it down that in the case of a free union of formerly sovereign states into a federation, the treaties remain to be carried out by the federation, on the ground that a state can undertake obligations to foreign states with regard to a part only of its territories. Such treaties, however, fall to the ground which are incompatible with the general purpose-e.g., treaties of alliance of certain members of the federation with foreign states. This view is ingenious, but it does not appear to be supported by practice in the case of a federation, and it is not necessary to explain the recognition given by the Imperial German Court to the treaties between Austria and Saxony regarding bankruptcy.

Hall's view is that it is only in matters not covered by the treaty of federation that the "state retains its normal legal position" as an international state, which coincides with the view here put forward. Kiatibian (p. 170) holds that since the confederation of Germany, in 1871, the international conventions of the several states still bind them. Most of these, he says, have been replaced by Prussian treaties, but it required for that purpose a formal agreement with foreign powers. This is true, subject to the observation that the treaties which persisted, despite the confederation, were not those which were contrary to the federal constitution, but those which dealt with matters with which the constitution empowered the federal Government to deal, but with which it had not dealt. The remarks of Pradier-Fodéré (i., 278), who says that "confederate states must fulfil their prior obligations," may be justified in the same manner.

In diplomatic practice it may be noted that England and France (see Lawrence, Note 20 to Wheaton, Book I., Chapter XI., para. 2) protested against the theory that the union of Texas with the United States would cancel existing treaties, and held that "the stipulations would remain in precisely the same situation as if Texas had remained an independent power." But, as Westlake (i., 60) points out, the objection was not pressed, and he suggests that it may have been based on the failure of the powers to recognise a true incorporation through the veil of a quasi-federal union. That criticism, which in the terminology adopted above would read "a true federal union, through the veil of a quasi-confederate union," evidently rests on the principle here maintained. This view was clearly held by Mr. Fish, Secretary of State of the United States, who, in a note to Aristarchi Bey, of 18th September, 1876 (Wharton, i., 24), says: "The union between the United States and Texas, to which you refer, was effected by the legislation of the parties. It necessarily cancelled the treaties between Texas and foreign powers, so far, at least, as those treaties were inconsistent with the constitution of this country, which requires customs duties to be uniform throughout the United States."

The view appears, therefore, sound, that so far as a real cession of sovereignty takes place on the part of the federating state, so far do its international character and treaty obligations disappear, just as is the case on cession or annexation. Cases of union differ from cases of cession only so far as the union is incomplete, as in the case of a confederation, and does not completely merge the personality of the state. The difference in treatment of a confederation and a federation

is shown most clearly in the history of German state treaties, and the history of United States state treaties.

(b) The remaining point of importance in connection with federation is responsibility for the state debt. It appears to me that in a case of federation, such as that of the United States, the rule of cession exactly applies. The federation is legally liable if it is expressly stipulated in the treaty, while the state ceases in any case to be liable. If this works injustice the states to which the creditors belonged must remedy the matter by diplomatic pressure. Direct action against the state is prohibited by the federation; direct action against the federation is not legally possible, and so recourse must be had to war or diplomacy. The only example, apparently, on record is the famous case of the admission of Texas, an independent Republic, into the United States in 1845. The resolution of Congress of 1st March, 1845, which offered annexation to Texas, and which was accepted by Texas, and so constituted the treaty of cession, provided that all the public land in Texas should be kept by her for the payment of the liabilities and debts of the Republic, but that in no event were such debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the United States. Later on the United States took over part of the lands, agreeing to pay ten million dollars, half to be retained till holders of Texas bonds should release their claims on her customs duties. Later on the Government undertook to reserve seven and a half million dollars to be paid pro rata among the bondholders in consideration of their releasing their claims. The claims of one of the bondholders was submitted to the mixed American and British Commission, established under the Convention of 8th February, 1853, to settle outstanding claims, but no decision was arrived at because the commissioners disagreed, and the umpire apparently decided that the claim did not fall under the terms of the Convention. It is not clear on what grounds he rested his decision, whether it was merely because the question had not been raised before diplomatically, or whether, as appears to be the case, he held that there was no liability at all on the United States (cf. United States Arbitrations, iv., 3593 seq., with Wharton's account, i., 22, 23). The United States Commissioner said: "Whether the United States should be liable for this indebtedness I do not feel called on to decide. It is clear Texas is not exonerated from the debt, and the United States has manifested a strong disposition to bring about its adjustment." Further he stated: "Texas is still a sovereign state with all the rights and duties of Government, except that her international rights are controlled by the United States, and she has transferred to the United States her rights of duties on imports," and he seemed to consider any claim relative to the previous pledge to the bondholders of such duties to be limited to their value. The British Commissioner held that "the obligation of Texas to pay her debts is not in dispute, nor has it been argued that the mere act of her annexation to the United States has transferred her liabilities to the Federal Government, though, certainly, as regards foreign Governments, the United States is now bound to see that the obligations of Texas are fulfilled. It is the transfer of the integral revenue of Texas to the Federal Government that is relied on as creating the new liability."

These views are not exactly perspicuous, and different opinions have been taken of their effect. Huber (p. 169) concludes that the state remains undisturbed in its proprietary relations so far as the matters of the confederation are not directly concerned. Debts do not pass to the federation, and though the state loses its customs revenue it is usually saved a lot of expense in central administration. Debts for which it has given its customs as securities continue to be incumbent on it, but the creditors lose their security, as the federal customs are legally quite distinct from the customs which were pledged. Dana (Wheaton, para. 30, n. 18) holds that the United States were bound to pay up. It would not be sufficient to pay merely the proceeds of the customs, as the United States Commissioner had

suggested, since the proceeds were determined by the United States. "The truth is, by the annexation the United States changed the nature of the thing pledged, and is bound generally to do equity to the creditor." Westlake (i., 78) concurs in this view. Halleck (Part I., Chapter III, para. 28) says: "If one of the constituent parts, originally a separate state, should by the act of incorporation vest in the new sovereignty all its means of satisfying its debts and obligations, the new state would, even in the case of a new federal union, be bound to assume such debts and obligations to the extent of the means so transferred." On the other hand, he admits that if rights and obligations rest with the state the federation is not entitled to the one or responsible for the other.

The facts of the case remain that the United States did not pay Texas' debts, nor did they induce Texas to pay in full, nor did they ever consent to recognise any obligation on their part to pay. I do not think, therefore, that it is possible to maintain that, independently of treaty, any part of the debt of an incorporated state passes over to the federation. The situation is precisely the same as in the case of the cession by one state of itself to another state, resulting in incorporation. With regard to the state which joins the federation it does not seem possible to maintain that it has any legal liabilities in International Law. Despite the American Commissioner, no state can be sovereign whose international relations are in the hands of a federation, and if a state be not a sovereign it does not exist for International Law, and it is impossible to say that a debt is legally incumbent on that which has no existence. This will be seen more clearly by considering the case of cession, resulting in incorporation, where it is clearly impossible to say that the debt rests upon a unit which does not even maintain internal distinctness. The fact is that the duty resting on the federation to pay the debts of an incorporated state is a moral one, and cannot be elevated into a rule of International Law.

In the case of confederation, the state debt might very possibly continue to be incumbent on the confederated state, since that state remains to some extent an international personality.

In the case of the federation of groups of British colonies, which present features similar, though not identical, with those of federal unions of sovereign states, provision has always been made in the Imperial Acts authorising the federation as to the manner in which the existing debts of the separate colonies are to be met, and it need hardly be said that no British colony has made any effort to evade payment of her obligations. A question of some legal interest, however, arises in connection with the question how far the federation is bound by treaties which, prior to federation, had been adhered to by some or all of the members of the federation. For example, Queensland adhered to the Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, while the other colonies refrained, and the question may arise whether that adherence can still be deemed binding when Queensland is merely a state of the Commonwealth of Australia. The answer, if Queensland had been an independent state instead of a colony, would, on the grounds above urged, appear to be in the negative, but a distinction must probably be made in the case of a colony. For the legal position would appear to be that by adhering to the treaty on behalf of Queensland, His Majesty bound himself in respect of that territory, and that this obligation cannot be set aside by any mere alteration of the internal constitutional relations of the Australian colonies. There is also strong practical reason for upholding this view. In the case of an independent state which joins a federation, all the powers recognise that the federation will bear seriously on their interests by affecting treaty relations and modifying the balance of power, etc., and it is probably now, in view of the course of history, a rule of International Law that in the case of a proposed federation any power affected has a right to ask guarantees for its protection, without being deemed to have shown a hostile spirit

to the federation. If, therefore, it were held that by the federation of colonies the existing treaties to which the states were parties were abrogated, foreign powers with a fair show of right could claim guarantees whenever it was proposed to federate British colonies-an interference with the internal administration of the Empire, which must, if possible, be avoided. The reality of this danger may be proved, if need be, by the fact that one of the causes of the long delay in federating the Dominion of Canada appears to have been the jealousy felt by the United States to the prospect of a united body of states being substituted for the weak and divided Governments of the several provinces.