indebtedness of the bankrupt community. As, moreover, the state no longer is regarded as assuming the personality of its predecessor, no difficulty need be found in explaining why the treaties of the latter state are not binding on the conqueror. There are two other leading theories which are more or less based on the idea of continuity in succession. The first is that of Gabba (Quistioni di diritto civile, Part X.), who distinguishes two personalities in the state, one political and one social. The territory and the men who occupy it are inseparably connected, and form a permanent social personality despite the alteration of the political personality of the state. The main merit of this theory is that it furnishes an explanation, at once simple and elegant, of the obligation of a state to recognise the public debts of a conquered territory, but it must be regarded as open to fatal objections on theoretical grounds. For though it is the social personality which explains the taking over of the obligations, yet, as a matter of fact, it is the political personality which determines that the obligation shall be met, and, however attractive the theory is at first sight, it really does no more than set the difficulty one step further back, for the question remains, Why should the political personality recognise an obligation to which, ex hypothesi, it is indifferent? The second of these theories is that of Appleton (Des effets des annexions de territoires sur les dettes de l'état demembré ou annexé et sur celles des provinces, departements, etc., annexés), who calls in the analogy of the Roman arrogatio. The conquered state suffers a capitis diminutio, but though it ceases to be a state it still has obligations and rights. But Huber has satisfactorily disposed of this theory by pointing out that it attributes a right to the community which is inconsistent with conquest. A conquered state has no right to become a province. It requires for that purpose a legislative act on the part of the conqueror before whom it has no rights whatever. There can therefore be little doubt but that Huber's theory of succession represents the strongest and most convincing form in which that doctrine can be put forward, and its practical acceptance, as modified, by Westlake, adds very greatly to its weight. It seems to me, however, that there exists grave doubts whether the theory of the passing over of rights and obligations together can be maintained. We may first take the case of cession as being the more favourable to Huber's theory, and consider a theoretical case-viz., in which a state should cede absolutely, and without any reservations whatever, a province to another state. What would be the position of that state with regard to the obligations of the ceded portion? Hall (p. 99) says that it carries over to the state which it enters the local obligations by which it would under such circumstances (i.e., independence) have been bound, and the local rights and property which it would have enjoyed. The latter part of the statement may be accepted without hesitation, and we may concede that for reasons of expediency, not necessarily connected with succession in any way, local servitudes of passage, etc., in favour of other states might be recognised by the state to which the cession was made. But can it be contended that the state receiving the cession would be bound to bear the burden of debts secured on local revenues? I do not think that this can fairly be held. The fact that the debt is secured on local revenues is not really relevant. The debt is a debt of the cessionary state, and the creditors can look to it for payment. The fact that it has lost the revenues whereby it used to make the payment is a misfortune of war. This view receives the strongest support from the action of the United States Commissioners in negotiating the Treaty of Paris in 1898 which terminated the war with Spain. The Spanish Government endeavoured to persuade the United States to admit all loans raised by Spain on hypothecation of Cuban domain or Cuban revenues, but the United States refused to admit that they were bound by any such principle, or that any such principle existed in International Law. The Spanish Commissioners cited several treaties in support of their contention, but the United States Commissioners refused to be bound by special treaties between individual states. The Spanish Government was compelled to give in, and if treaties are considered as precedents the latest and most authoritative precedent is in favour of there being no obligation on a state to recognise the debt raised on the security of the local revenues of a territory ceded to it. But if this be admitted we are driven to the conclusion that, in the case of cession, rights only, and not obligations, pass unless it is otherwise specially provided. The fact that most treaties provide that the state shall take over all the rights and obligations with regard to the ceded territory, on certain conditions, produces much the same result as if there were a true universal succession, and it is in this fact that we must trace the origin of the doctrine of state succession as it appears in the Jurists. But the fact remains that a contractual agreement for the purpose of creating a quasi-universal succession affords no justification for assuming a universal succession in cases where no contract can or does exist. It is submitted that cession, in itself, creates only a singular succession (cf. Sohm, p. 527), that is, a succession to rights and not to liabilities, and that it is only by contract that a universal succession in such cases arises. Such contracts can afford no satisfactory ground on which to base a theory of the results of annexation, and in any case in which the terms of the contract are not explicit the principle on which the question should be judged is that of a succession to rights and not to liabilities. Such a succession is really merely a substitution without any continuity. The rights obtain a new master and cease to be related to the obligations with which they were formerly allied, and there is no unity to enjoy a continuous existence. If the doctrine of continuity of succession is not applicable even to a case of cession it is much less so to a case of annexation. It may be as well here to point out that there is no analogy between a case of a change of government by revolution in a state and a change of government by annexation. In the former case International Law is based on the doctrine, without which, indeed, it is hard to conceive the possibility of the existence of a system of International Law, that the personality of a state is not affected by internal changes. On the other hand, it is obvious (on any conceivable theory) that the personality of a state is very much altered by annexation. It is impossible, therefore, to argue, as Calvo does (Le Droit international, ed. 4. i., 248), from the continuance of the personality in revolution to the continuance of the personality in annexation, but there can be little doubt that this argument has had much to do with the acceptance of the theory of state succession as a continuance in some form of a personality. But what are the facts? Another power attacks a state, defeats its armed force, occupies its seat of Government, appropriates its revenue, annexes it, counts its citizens as its nationals, and legislates for it. What takes place is a substitution of authority; there is a break with the past. The state seizes whatever thing of value it can obtain, but it certainly did not conduct the war for the sake of assuming onerous obligations. The right of conquest is fully recognised by International Law. On the other hand, it may be argued that there is something approaching a consensus of writers that a conquering state should recognise the public debt of the territory annexed. There is also a similar consensus that the private rights of individuals against the Government should be protected by the new Government, but I do not think that either of these rules can be elevated into principles of International Law. In the case of the rights of individuals this does not seem open to dispute. It must be admitted that Governments have a discretion as to the recognition of claims of individuals against their predecessors, and even those countries in which International Law is held to be part of the law of the land would never, and have never, it may confidently be asserted, regarded a municipal law in contravention to this "principle" of International Law as being ultra vires the municipal legislature. Nor can it, I think, be shown that in any case the courts of any country have permitted an action to be brought against the Government to declare it to be responsible for the debts of a country which it has conquered and annexed. It cannot, therefore, I think be held that these principles rank higher than maxims of international morality and expediency, which a Government can only disregard at its peril, but which cannot be said to be obligatory even in International Law. It is submitted that the true doctrine of International Law with regard to the annexation of states is that the annexing power seizes all the rights in the country which can be obtained by possession of the territory of the country and its material resources, but it does not succeed to the obligations of the conquered Government nor to such rights as were personal to that Government. On this theory, it seems to me, all the incidents of annexation can conveniently be accounted for, bearing in mind that the expediency and ethical considerations, which cannot be without their weight on any Government, frequently render it advisable for the Government not to insist on the full measure of its legal rights. It is worth noting that the most uncompromising supporters of the doctrine of the continuity of state succession argue frequently on grounds purely of expediency and what is fair, and I think it possible to show that the theory proposed above will account for the actual state of facts with regard to annexations, while avoiding the logical incongruities attendant on the continuance theory and the illogical devices adopted to avoid these incongruities. To apply the theory in brief to the main classes of facts in question :— (i.) Treaties of the conquered state, which are still executory, being personal to that state as an individual which has now disappeared cease to be binding. There is a very doubtful exception in the case of so-called transitory treaties, which, so far as it can be considered genuine, can be explained on the ground of expediency (see p. 22). (ii.) The political institutions and the administration of the country are completely altered. It is perfectly true that for convenience' sake it may be desirable to continue many of the officials in their offices, but their authority is derived from a new sovereign, and their past services are no protection against immediate dismissal. The authority of the previous Government is completely and absolutely departed, and acts done in virtue of that authority should not be recognised by any court. The courts now are altered, and administer the justice of the new sovereign, and even though the laws are unchanged they are no longer bound by the decisions of the previous courts. (iii.) The conqueror succeeds to all the public dominions and generally to all public property of the conquered state. (iv.) By the act of conquest all the subjects of the conquered become the subjects of the conqueror, to the exclusion, however, of such subjects as avoid the conquest, by leaving, before annexation takes place, the territory, and do not return to it. On the ordinary theory of state succession such subjects should become subjects, but it will be seen that this theory leads to great injustice. On the theory here put forward, however, as the conqueror has done nothing to obtain physical control over the persons who emigrate he is not their sovereign. (v.) With regard to the rights of subjects and foreign nationals as against the Government distinctions must be made according to the nature of the right claimed: (a) If the right is one in rem it is treated as subsisting under the new Government, unless that Government alters it by legislation. This follows immediately from the theory, because in conquest the conqueror does not war against private property but against the state which he overthrows; the right exists, and is good against all the world as well as the sovereign, and there is no reason why a change of sovereign should alter the right. (b) If the right is ex contractu the case is different. The change of government destroys one of the parties to the contract, and therefore the contract falls utterly to the ground, leaving it to the benevolence of the sovereign to deal out such relief to the parties on the other side as to it may seem fit. On the usual theory the State is regarded as a successor to the contracts of the territory annexed, but, owing to the absurdities which follow from a rigid adherence to this principle various illogical qualifications have to be made. (c) Obligations ex delicto clearly do not pass on our theory, and even on the theories based on the idea of succession the same rule is sometimes applied in accordance with the rule of Roman Law that delictual liabilities do not pass to the heir. (vi.) With regard to the rights of individuals among themselves as opposed to their rights against the state no alteration is made by conquest on either theory, but there is a difference in the view taken by the two theories as to the rights of the conqueror to alter the laws affecting private matters. On the succession theory, strictly speaking, the system of private law should be maintained without alteration except in so far as changes in public law may affect it, and should only be altered on principles similar to those on which the predecessor would have altered it. On our theory there is no obligation on the conqueror to respect the existing law, save in so far as it may be expedient to do so, but as his mere conquest does not alter private law, his will must be expressed in some legislative shape to affect such change. CHAPTER II. THE VARIOUS FORMS OF STATE SUCCESSION. It is now necessary to examine in some detail the different forms in which state succession presents itself. Huber (pp. 26-40) gives an elaborate and logically developed division which it will be necessary to consider. He classifies the cases of state succession in the following manner :— 1.-Partial Succession: A 1. Cession. A 2. Administrative Cession. B. Independence. 1. Full Independence. 2. Vassaldom. C. Entry into a Federal Union with Part of the State Territory. 2.-Universal Succession : (a) With one Successor. (i.) Complete Incorporation. (i.) Complete Breaking up. In But whatever the advantages of this elaborate system for the complete treatment of the subject it has the disadvantage of necessitating much repetition and endangers the clearness of the theory in a multitude of details. Nor does it appear to be really based on what is the most important principle of division. Even on Huber's own theory, which we have discussed in Chapter I., there is no fundamental difference between what he calls partial and universal succession. both cases his theory is (p. 25) that of a "Gesamtnachfolge in ein Vermögen als ganzes," and the only important difference lies not in the mode of succession but in the extent of the rights succeeded to. In the case of universal succession these are all the rights of the predecessor, in the case of partial succession only certain rights; but this difference once borne in mind the rules of partial succession run parallel with those of universal succession, as Huber's account itself makes perfectly clear. The principle of division which it is here preferred to follow is a different one. Accepting the theory that state succession is one and the same principle wherever it occurs, cases of state succession will be divided according as the question of the nature of the rules of state succession is left to be decided by the general principles of International Law or is regulated by treaty. The latter set of cases will be referred to as (6 cases of cession," using that term in a wide sense to include: (i.) Cases of cession proper where two contracting powers respectively cede and receive territory, and remain after the cession separate independent sovereign powers. (ii.) Cases where one sovereign state recognises another as a sovereign state which has formed itself out of part of its territories and agrees to it possessing |