were understood to have amounted to the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars, pardon was earnestly demanded on the ground of extenuating circumstances, and the social position of the criminal. His case was warmly pressed. Petitions for a commutation of punishment were signed by more than two thousand persons, of all parties and ranks. But closing his eyes to every considera tion but the claims of justice and the integrity of the law, and believing their vindication in such a case, to be highly important, Gov. Seward steadfastly refused all entreaties to extend pardon, although urged by strong political and personal friends. At the same time, pardons were granted to ignorant and obscure persons who had committed forgeries and larcenies for trivial amounts, under the excuse of absolute want, in their own case, or that of their families. The discrimination against John C. Colt,* whose case excited deep interest at the time, proceeded upon similar grounds.

Nor did Gov. Seward allow the pardoning power in his hands, to become converted to purposes of oppression. It is gratifying to know, that while the popular approbation of his administration in other respects, owing generally to political rancor, was delayed until the prejudices and passions of the day had subsided, no such delay occurred in regard to his conduct in the matter of pardons. His acts in this department of his duty, generally received immediate and wide-spread commendation. But what probably was esteemed by him as more important, was the approving testimony of his own mind. We can hardly conceive of a higher pleasure than he must have experienced in writing to Catharine Wilkins,† (a convict he had pardoned,) unless it was surpassed by his satisfaction in learning how effectual the letter had been in saving her to whom it was addressed. He no doubt enjoyed a similar pleasure in the surprise exhibited by a southern slaveholder, who applied for the pardon of his slave, convicted of crime in New York, and sent to the state prison at Sing Sing. The master urged his petition on the ground that it would relieve the state of the expense of the slave's imprisonment; and he presented the record of a case where a slave had been thus pardoned by one of the governor's predecessors. Gov. Seward answered that notwithstanding the precedent, he did not think it right to pervert a

* See Vol. II.

p.

646.

See Vol. II. p. 618.

power entrusted to him for purposes of humanity, to accomplish an act of oppression.

The same independence of character was manifested in the caso of James Watson Webb.* Col. Webb had fought a duel with Hon. Thomas F. Marshall, in the state of Delaware, and was convicted under a law of this state, passed as early as 1817, and sentenced to the state prison. There had been no attempt to enforce this law, except in two cases which occurred immediately after its passage, and in these instances, the offenders were pardoned by the governor who then filled the executive chair. Afterward the law became obsolete, for want of public opinion to sustain it. Duelling was still practiced in the state of New York, notwithstanding this law was on the pages of the statute-book, and that too by men enjoying the highest distinctions and honors, including De Witt Clinton himself. It is easy to see that if the offender in the duel with Marshall, had been a political editor opposed to Gov. Seward, the enforcing of the conviction under such circumstances, would have been regarded as an act of personal and political retaliation. No one can suppose he would have enforced it under such circumstances. But Col. Webb, the offender in this case, was a personal and political friend of Gov. Seward's, and his editorial controversies had made many relent less enemies. Col. Webb having, like many others, made himself liable to the penalties of this law, probably without being aware of its existence, those enemies, unconscious, without doubt, of the motives which influenced them, demanded the rigorous applica tion of the obsolete statute. The governor showed, in this instance, that he was not afraid to do in the case of a friend, what all men who knew his impartiality and magnanimity, would have expected him to do towards an adversary. He pardoned Col. Webb. In the case of Rathbun, he would not pardon, because, among other principal reasons, the offender had moved in high circles and had powerful friends. In the case of Webb, he pardoned notwithstanding he occupied an elevated position and was surrounded by influential friends. In both instances he showed his coolness and courage in resisting popular clamor, when satis fied that justice demanded such resistance.

Gov. Seward's principles in the exercise of the veto power, may be learned by reference to his messagest delivered on the several

*See Vol. II. p. 661.

† See Vol. II. pp. 374, 379, 426, &c.

occasions when he assumed its exercise. The D'Hauteville case will serve as an illustration.

A lady of large wealth, a resident of Boston, while travelling in Europe, had married a French gentleman, by the name of D'Hauteville, of greater respectability than of fortune. One child was the fruit of this connexion. She separated from her husband, and returned to America, in 1846, bringing her child with her. D'Hauteville appeared in Boston, and demanded her return to Europe, insisting, in case of refusal, on the custody of his child. The friends of the lady, designing that she should take refuge in the state of New York, procured a hurried passage of an act by the legislature of this state, then in session, providing that where an American woman should be married to a foreigner who should propose to require her with his children, to remove to Europe, the Court of Chancery should have power to interpose and take charge of the children and their fortune. A veto from Gov. Seward arrested the passage of this bill,* upon the ground that no nation could wisely or justly make a discrimination in its laws regulating parental or other domestic relations, on the ground of the alienage of either of the parties-a decision the wisdom and soundness of which few can doubt.

With the return of an opposition to the legislature, came, of course, a desire for the benefits to be derived from the enjoyment of the state printing. An act was passed removing Thurlow Weed from the office of state printer, which he held, under a contract authorized by law. Gov. Seward interposed his vetot promptly, on the ground of the inhibition in the Constitution of the United States of the passage of laws by the states, impairing the obligation of contracts.

But while he thus exercised the veto power to arrest inconsiderate and unconstitutional legislation, he declined interfering in cases of pure legislative discretion, as has been seen in his action on the New York registry bill, and in his consent, against his own opinions, to the act of 1842, suspending the public works. In such cases, however, he insisted on the right of stating the grounds of his qualified approval of bills, in the message communicating the executive assent. It must be left to impartial public opinion, free from the bias of temporary excitement, to decide between * See Vol II. p 374. + See Vol. II. p. 426.

him and the legislature, on their refusal to receive such messages and enter them on their journal.*

In his administration of the state government, Gov. Seward took a firm and dignified attitude against the institution of slavery. He labored to clear the statute-books of every provision which authorized holding a man in slavery, in any form, or on any pretext. His devotion to the principles of freedom at length accomplished the work, which had been so nobly commenced by the admirable statesman, John Jay, in 1795. The law, which permitted a master travelling through the state with his slaves to retain them for the space of nine months, was repealed through his influence. It was this repeal by which the slaves in the recent Lemon case, who had been brought from Virginia to the city of New York in order to be shipped to Texas, were saved from perpetual bondage.

Gov. Seward also procured the passage of an act by the legislature, allowing the benefit of a jury trial to persons claimed as fugitive slaves. He defended this right with his usual fervid eloquence, and it was mainly through his efforts that it was incorporated in the policy of the state. At a subsequent period, when the fugitive slave bill was debated in the United States Senate, he labored to have a similar provision engrafted in its details.

An act was also passed, at his instance, prohibiting state officers from participating in actions for the recovery of fugitive slaves, and denying the use of the public jails for their detention. He held that these were actions under the constitution and laws of the United States, and should, therefore, be executed only by the United States marshals and judges in United States courts, and that imprisonments they might order should be in United States prisons, if such could be found. Although the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced these laws to be unconstitutional, they were clearly founded on the eterna principles of right and justice. They will form an enduring memorial of the wise humanity of Gov. Seward, and of his heart-felt devotion to the spirit of freedom, as embodied in the declaration of independence.

It was through his agency, moreover, that a law was enacted in 1840, for the recovery of free colored citizens of New York, who should be kidnapped into slavery. This law authorized the gov* See Vol. II. p. 411.

ernor to employ an agent for the aid of such persons, securing their restoration to liberty. It was under the provisions of this act, that H. B. Northrup, Esq., of Washington county, N. Y., in Jan., 1853, procured the liberty of Solomon, a colored man, long a member of his family, who twelve years ago had been inveigled to the city of Washington and there kidnapped and sold into slavery.

Among Gov. Seward's last official recommendations to the legislature, was an amendment of the constitution of the state, by which the freehold qualification required of citizens of the African race, as a condition of exercising the right of suffrage, should be abolished. He based this recommendation on the principles of natural justice. And he urged the necessity of granting the right of suffrage to every class of persons subject to the laws of the state, and the safety with which it could be thus extended where a system of universal education had already been established. It is to be regretted that on the revision of the constitution, in 1846, this recommendation was found to have anticipated public sentiment for an indefinite period of time. But that Gov. Seward's recommendation on this point will yet be adopted and incorporated into the constitution of the state, there cannot be a doubt.

The course of Gov. Seward in regard to these measures was an agreeable surprise to the abolitionists, who had failed to obtain any pledge from him during the preliminary canvass. His noble position in the "Virginia Case," was adapted to win the admiration of every lover of freedom.*

The outlines of this case may be briefly given as follows. In 1839, a vessel from Norfolk, Va., on arriving near the port of New York was found to contain a slave, who had secreted himself in the hold. He was taken and conveyed back to bondage. Three colored seamen belonging to the vessel, who had expressed their sympathy with the fugitive, were charged with having conveyed him out of the state by stealth. Affidavits were made to that effect in Norfolk. A requisition, based on these affidavits, was made by the lieutenant governor of Virginia upon the governor of New York, for the surrender of the accused, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress of 1793, concerning fugitives from justice. Before the requisition was presented to Gov. Seward, the parties had been * See "Virginia Controversy," Vol. II. pp. 449-516.