opposed the recommendations, in a report insisting on the neces sity of taxation for the support of the treasury. This report was answered by Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles, chairman of the committee of ways and means in the assembly, who showed that the increase of tolls on the canals would sustain a loan of thirty millions of dollars, reimbursing it in twenty years, or of forty millions of dollars, reimbursing it in twenty-eight years. In accordance with this estimate, the legislature, in 1838, made an appropriation of four millions of dollars for the prosecution of the enlargement, and authorized the loan of eight hundred thousand dollars on the credit of the state, in aid of the Central and other railroads.

Such was the condition of internal improvements in the state, when Mr. Seward entered upon the executive office on the first of January, 1839. The state debt was then eleven millions of dollars; but there were four millions of dollars in the treasury available for the public works, reducing the actual debt to about seven millions of dollars. Gov. Seward vigorously followed up the legislative policy of 1838. He recommended that measures should be adopted to secure the enlargement of the Erie Canal, and the completion of the lateral canals, before the year 1845.

The report of Mr. Flagg, the comptroller, who retired on the coming in of the whig administration, presented an alarming picture of debt, taxation and bankruptcy, as the consequences of perseverance in the public works. Mr. Flagg was supported by the opposition party in the legislature and throughout the state, while Gov. Seward was sustained by the whigs with great unanimity.

To increase the embarrassments of the whig administration, and to shake the public confidence in the ability of the state to complete the system in which it was engaged, it was now discovered that the canal commissioners who had recommended the new enterprises had made too low an estimate of their cost, which, instead of fifteen millions three hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars, for the enlargement of the Erie and the construction of the Genessee Valley and the Black River canals, would amount to thirty millions four hundred and forty-four thousand dollars.

The people were alarmed by this unexpected announcement. Oppressed by pecuniary difficulties in every department of business, the public was divided in opinion. The whigs maintained the wisdom and necessity of completing the public works in spite of the errors of the estimate. But the opposing party condemned

the policy in very decided terms. They predicted an insupportable burden of taxation, and ultimate repudiation as its inevitable consequence. This was the great issue between the two parties during the whole of Gov. Seward's administration.

A crisis at length came. The failure of Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Mississippi, Maryland, and other states which had largely engaged in schemes of internal improvement, produced in 1841 a general depreciation of American credit in Europe. The stocks of New York, which had been pledged abroad, were returned, glutting the market in our commercial cities. The capitalists became alarmed. With a view to prevent a further decline in securities, they combined with the opposition party against the prosecution of the public works. Their measures were met by Gov. Seward with decided resistance. In his messages to the legislature, he forcibly remonstrated against suspending the improvements already commenced. Maintaining that, in spite of the fall of public credit abroad, the true policy of the state was unchanged, he clearly set forth the evils that would ensue from the abandonment of the enterprise. But it was all in vain. Political managers took advantage of the prevailing panic to counteract the policy of the governor. The moneyed interest chimed in. His sagacious admonitions were unheeded, and the legislature in 1842, put a stop to the progress of internal improvement.

Such was the condition of public affairs on the 1st of January, 1843, when Gov. Seward resigned the administration of the state into the hands of his successor. A convention was called in 1846 to revise the constitution, containing a large democratic majority; it incorporated provisions in the constitution, prohibiting the enlargement of the public works, except under stringent, and as it was thought at the time, impracticable conditions. Still the canals, exceeding the largest estimates of the late whig administration, furnished the means for a gradual prosecution of the contemplated improvements until 1850. The whigs being in power at that time, it was ascertained that the sum of $9,000,000 would suffice to complete the public works on the original plan. It was also ascertained that this object could be accomplished without pledging the credit of the state, by a simple transfer of the surplus tolls of the canals for a short term of years. Daniel Webster, John C. Spencer, and other eminent jurists, to whom the question had been submitted, expressed the opinion that such a measure would be in

accordance with the provisions of the constitution. After a vehement party struggle, the legislature of 1851 decided on its adóption. The adverse party brought the question before the state courts, which finally declared that the law was unconstitutional. Still, few can now doubt the wisdom of the policy maintained by Gov. Seward.* It only remains to determine how the constitutional prohibitions of 1846, as expounded by the court of appeals, shall be modified so as to allow the speedy attainment of the great object.

The agency of Gov. Seward in behalf of internal improvements was by no means limited to the canal system. Upon his accession to the executive office, railroads were a recent invention. They had been adopted only to a comparatively small extent in any part of the United States. They still met with a strenuous opposition from many of the leading New York politicians. The only railroad in the state were the Harlem, eight miles in length, and Albany and Utica, ninety-five miles in length. Great efforts had been made to extend the latter road from Utica towards the West; but popular prejudice and pecuniary embarrassment were too strong for the corporations. The construction of the New York and Erie railroad had been abandoned; but Gov. Seward from the first was an earnest advocate of the improvement. With almost prophetic sagacity, he constantly predicted the success of this new mode of locomotion. His zeal in its behalf excited alarm in the conservative, commercial and political circles.

In his annual message in 1839,† he expressed himself in the following words:

"This wonderful agent (steam) has achieved, almost unobserved, a new triumph, which is destined to effect incalculable results in the social system. This is its application to locomotion upon the land. Time and money are convertible. Husbandry of the one is economy of the other, and either is equivalent to the economy of labor. Railroads effect a saving of time and money; and notwithstanding all the incredulity and opposition they encounter, they will henceforth be among the common auxiliaries of enterprise. Hap pily it is not in our power to fetter the energies of other states, although we may repress our own. This useful invention, like all others, will be adopted by them, although it gain no favor from us; and they who are willing that New York shall have no railroads, must be ready to see all the streams of prosperity seek other channels, and our state sink into the condition of Venice, prostrate and powerless, among the monuments of her earlier greatness. A glance at the map would render obvious the utility of three great lines of communication by railroads, between the Hudson river and the borders of the state. One of these would traverse several of the northern counties, and reach with its See Vol. II. p. 153.

*See Vol. II p. 183-212.

branches to lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence. A second, keeping the vicinity of the Erie canal, would connect Albany and Buffalo. A third would stretch through the southern counties, from New York to Lake Erie."

These confident predictions have since become magnificent realities. In his messages and speeches, Gov. Seward also urged the construction of a railroad on the banks of the Hudson, from New York to Albany. Indeed, they often manifest not a little impatience with the skepticism and want of public spirit which discouraged the undertaking of such an important enterprise.

Nor has the devotion of Gov. Seward to the cause of internal improvements been confined in its operation to the state of New York. He has never failed to cherish a deep interest in what ever was adapted to increase the business advantages, and promote the permanent welfare of the people in every portion of the Union.

In a speech delivered at Elmira in 1850, on the completion of the New York and Erie railroad, Gov. Seward related some curious personal reminiscences, in regard to the progress of internal improvements. The chef d'œuvre of his college life, he remarked, was an essay prepared in 1820 against the Erie canal, then in course of construction under the auspices of De Witt Clinton. He attempted to prove that the canal could never be completed, or if completed, that it would be the ruin of the state. In five years from that time the canal was finished, and boats placed on its surface, from tide water to Lake Erie. Just nineteen years after the production of that essay he found himself in the place of De Witt Clinton, urging the enlargement of the canal to double its original capacity, and the construction of three lines of railroad between substantially the same termini to supply the deficiency of the canal for transporting the commerce of the state. These recommendations were regarded by the public as even still more visionary than the schemes of Gov. Clinton had been in his estimation. But notwithstanding the popular incredulity, on retiring from office at the end of four years, he had the satisfaction of seeing the aggregate length of the railroads of the state increased from one hundred to eight hundred miles.

As we write these lines (1852) we see the whole stupendous scheme recommended by Gov. Seward on the eve of completion, in spite of commercial and political obstacles.

The directors of the New York and Erie railroad company, in

token of their appreciation of Gov. Seward's services, presented him with a formal vote of thanks on his retirement from office, with a ticket elegantly engraved on silver, for the free passage of himself and family on the road during life.

We have already alluded to the exercise of the pardoning power by Gov. Seward. As the subject is one of such deep interest, we will here more fully illustrate the principles which guided his course in this respect.* Combining a natural generosity and tenderness of feeling with a lofty sense of justice, he could not permit his sympathy with the unfortunate to weaken his energy in the execution of laws, which were intimately connected with the order and safety of society. He allowed no conviction, ascertained to be unjust, to stand on any pretence.

An insane man who had committed homicide in Rensselaer county, under circumstances of revolting cruelty, was induced by the court, the public prosecutor and his own counsel, to plead guilty to an indictment for murder. He was sentenced to be executed, under an arrangement between them, that in consequence of thus pleading, the sentence of death should be commuted to confinement in the state prison for life. The court and counsel urged the governor to adopt that course, on the ground that the public safety and public opinion both required the confinement of the offender. The governor answered that a man too insane to be executed, was too insane to be imprisoned for life, and discharged the offender

at once.

No woman, not abandoned to vice and crime, was suffered to endure the full punishment prescribed by the law. And it must be a pleasant recollection to Gov. Seward, that in no instance was a woman so pardoned ever afterwards convicted of crime. Juvenile delinquents were pardoned for first offences not very atrocious. But in these cases, preliminary arrangements were made through the agency of their friends, for their removal from the scenes of their temptations, and their establishment in pursuits favorable to their reformation.

The possession of social advantages, instead of aiding offenders to procure pardon, was always regarded as an objection. On the other hand, great allowance was made for ignorance, orphanage, or social neglect, as presenting incentives to crime.

In the well known case of Benjamin Rathbun,† whose forgeries + See Vol. II. p. 630

*See Vol. II. p. 615.