scribed it. "An infant country deep in debt, necessitated to borrow in Europe-without a land or naval force-without a competency of arms and ammunition-with a commerce connected beyond the Atlantic-with the certainty of enhancing the price of foreign productions, and of diminishing that of our own—with a constitution little more than four years old, in a state of probation, and not exempt from foes." No greater calamity than war could then have fallen upon the United States, nor could war, in any other case, ever have come in a form so fearful. It was not a fault of Washington, as it was of Cato, not to see that public affairs were incapable of perfection, and that states could not be governed without submitting lesser interests to greater. On the contrary, the measure of his duty was that of Cicero in the consulship-to take care that the republic should suffer no detriment. Well and wisely did he perform that duty. He could not aid France, but he saved his own country. Forever, then, let the justice and the wisdom of Washington, in that memorable crisis, stand vindicated and established.

But what does all this prove? Just this, and no more: That circumstances, affecting France and the United States equally, unforeseen and imperious, prevented the United States from even undertaking to perform their compact with France, in the way stipulated in a particular emergency. But the circumstances creating this impossibility were not alone the fault nor the misfortune of France, but arose in part out of their own condition: and the omission to perform their agreement assured the safety and promoted the welfare of the United States. Under such circumstances, the United States owed to France, if not indemnities. for past non-performance, at least recognition and renewal of the ancient treaties. If, then, France was held by the treaties, because the United States excused their non-performance, they were equally bound to extenuate her deviations, under such a pressure, from prudence, order, and even from justice, if she were willing to make reparation. None knew so well as they, that France broke the treaties in less essential obligations, not from want of virtue to be faithful, but from want of magistracy to enforce fidelity. But while France was always willing to make reparation, the United States insisted on being absolutely free from obligations. Jay's treaty was confessedly injurious to France. Either that treaty was necessary to the United States, or it was unneces

sary. If it was unnecessary, the complaints of France were just. If necessary, then she was entitled to equivalents. A release from the engagements in the ancient treaties was necessary to the United States, or it was not. If it was not necessary, then the United States ought not to have bartered the merchants' claims away for it. If it was necessary, then the United States received an adequate equivalent.

Thus it appears that the ancient treaties had not lost their obligation against the United States by reason of any flagrant violation of them by France.

Sixthly. The opponents of this bill next insist that the treaties had been abrogated by an act of Congress which was passed on the 7th day of July, 1798, viz. :

"Whereas, the treaties concluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government, and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity; and whereas, under the authority of the French government, there is yet pursued against the United States a system of predatory violence, infracting the said treaties, and hostile to the rights of a free and independent

nation

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties and of the consular convention heretofore concluded between the United States and France, and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States."Statutes at Large, I, p. 578.

The treaty-making power is vested, not in Congress, but in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A valid treaty can be abrogated only by the power which is competent to make one. A treaty already void needs no act of Congress or of the President or of the Senate to abrogate it, while one not void cannot be abrogated except in the constitutional way.

Neither can dis

The act of Con

A treaty, moreover, is the act of two parties. solve it without the concurrence of the other. gress, then, left the obligations of the ancient treaties, so far as France was concerned, and so far as the United States politically were concerned, just as it found them.

Seventhly. As a last resort, the opponents of these claims assert that the release of the ancient treaties was valueless, because they had been abrogated by war between the two nations.

I waive the objection that these treaties were of such a nature

that they could not be abrogated by war, and I simply deny that any such war occurred.

If war did take place, it must have begun in some way and at some time, and have ended in some other way and at some other time.

It is quite certain that France never declared war against the United States, and equally so that the United States never declared war against France. There were hostilities between them, but hostilities are not always war. The statute book of the United

States shows the nature and extent of these hostilities.

We were not at war with France on the 14th of January, 1797; for on that day Congress declared it a misdemeanor for an American to engage in privateering against nations with whom the United States were at peace, and we know that France was then regarded as standing in that relation because the United States afterward authorized privateering against her in certain cases.

We were not at war with France on the 28th of May, 1798; for on that day Congress directed that a provisional army should be raised in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion of their territory by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of such invasion.

Nor were we at war with France on the 13th of June, 1798; for on that day Congress suspended commercial relations with France-a measure quite unnecessary, if war had already broken up that intercourse.

Nor were we at war on the 25th of June, 1798; for on that day Congress authorized American vessels to oppose and resist searches, restraints, and seizures, by armed vessels of France. Such opposition and resistance would have needed no sanction if committed in open war.

We were not at war with France on the 2d day of March, 1799; for on that day Congress authorized the President to levy and organize additional regiments, in case war should break out between the United States and a foreign European power.

We were not yet at war on the 20th of February, 1800; for on that day Congress directed that all further enlistments should be suspended, unless during the recess of Congress and during the existing differences (which existing differences the sequel will show were not war) between the United States and France, imminent danger of invasion of the territory of the United States by that

republic, should, in the opinion of the President, be deemed to have arisen.

Finally, we were not at war on the 30th of September, 1800; for on that day the then "existing differences" between France and the United States were adjusted by a convention, concluded on the basis that although, in the opinion of the United States, the aggressions of France would "well have justified an immediate declaration of war, yet that they had nevertheless been desirous of maintaining peace, and of leaving open the door of reconciliation with France, and had therefore contented themselves with preparations for defence, and measures calculated to protect their commerce."-Instructions to American Ministers at Paris, October 22, 1799.

Thus, sir, it is shown, that if a war existed, neither its beginning, nor its end, nor the way of either, can ever be ascertained, and that the United States were then profoundly ignorant of its existence. If any man in France, more than another, would have known the existence of such a war, that man was Napoleon Bonaparte. Yet we have seen that the music of this "soft and silken war never reached the ear of the great Captain of France. For, in speaking of the spoliations, he described them as having been committed "in time of peace." It was not thus with the other enemies of France, while he was at liberty within her borders, nor has it been so that the countrymen of Washington, of Taylor, and of Scott, have conducted their campaigns in other conflicts.

It appears from this review that the treaties in question had been recognized always by both parties, and broken in parts by both, but under circumstances of excuse and palliation; and that they were therefore in force when the United States and France mutually agreed to extinguish them, on the condition of a release of the claims for indemnities. Of the value of that agreement, it is unnecessary to say more, than that without it the United States might have been held by the ancient treaty of alliance to have followed to some extent the varying fortunes of France through her wars during the consriate and the empire, until she found repose, from complete exhaustion, on the field of Waterloo.

No reason for rejecting these claims remains, except that they have not been paid heretofore. But mere lapse of time pays no debts, and discharges no obligations. There has been no release, no waiver, no neglect, no delay, by the creditors. They have been

here twenty-five times in fifty years; that is to say, they have appeared in their successive generations, before every Congress since their claims against the United States accrued. Against such claims and such creditors there is no prescription.

It is said, indeed, that the nation is unable to pay these claims now. I put a single question in reply: When will the nation be more affluent than now?

The Senator [Mr. HUNTER] says, again, that, if the debts are just, we should pay the whole, and not a moiety; and that if the claims are unjust, then the bill proposes a gratuity-that in the one case the appropriation is too small, and in the other too great. This is the plea of him who, I think it was in Ephesus, despoiled the statue of Jupiter of its golden robe, saying, Gold was too warm in summer, and too cold in winter, for the shoulders of the god.

Sir, commerce is one of the great occupations of this nation. It is the fountain of its revenues, as it is the chief agent of its advancement in civilization and enlargement of empire. It is exclusively the care of the federal authorities. It is for the protection. of commerce that they pass laws, make treaties, build fortifications, and maintain navies upon all the seas. But justice and good faith are surer defences than treaties, fortifications, or naval armaments. Justice and good faith constitute true national honor, which feels a stain more keenly than a wound. The nation that lives in wealth and in the enjoyment of power, and yet under unpaid obligations, dwells in dishonor and in danger. The nation that would be truly great, or even merely safe, must practice an austere and self-denying morality.

The faith of canonized ancestors, whose fame now belongs to mankind, is pledged to the payment of these debts. "Let the merchants send hither well-authenticated evidence of their claims, and proper measures shall be taken for their relief." This was the promise of Washington. The evidence is here. Let us redeem the sacred and venerable engagement. Through his sagacity and virtue, we have inherited with it ample and abundant resources, and to them we ourselves have added the newly discovered wealth of southern plains, and the hidden treasures. of the western coasts. With the opening of the half century, we are entering upon new and profitable intercourse with the ancient Oriental states and races, while we are grappling more closely to us the new states on our own continent. Let us signalize an epoch so important in