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spect of the people. He even declared that a majority of its members were traitors who were "trying to break up the Government."* These speeches undoubtedly had much effect on the elections which followed and they went heavily against him, each House having a majority sufficient to carry any measures over his veto, the Senate consisting of 42 Republicans and 11 Democrats and the House of 143 Republicans and 49 Democrats.†

During the summer the President had also allowed his differences with

Rhodes, vol. v., p. 617 et seq.; McPherson, Political History, pp. 127-143; De Witt, Impeachment, pp. 113–126. For Stevens's reply to that speech see McCall's Stevens, pp. 282-284; Callender's Stevens, pp. 157-161; also Schurz's Reminiscences, vol. iii., pp. 237-246.

+ Burgess, Reconstruction, pp. 98-104; Blaine,

vol. ii., pp. 237-244. For the entire campaign see Chadsey, President Johnson and Reconstruction, pp. 87-104.

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Congress to become a matter of dispute with his Cabinet. Feeling that they could not retain their offices under Johnson while so radically differing with him about the reconstruction, Attorney-General James Speed, Postmaster-General William Dennison and Secretary of the Interior James Harlan resigned and were succeeded by Henry Stanbery, of Ohio, A. W. Randall, of Wisconsin, and O. H. Browning, of Illinois, respectively. Secretary of War Stanton, however, while he differed with Johnson, seemed to feel that he was under obligations to the country to remain in the Cabinet and protect it from the President's designs. He was also sustained by the Republican majority in Congress and therefore decided to retain his position.

RECONSTRUCTION ACTS: ELECTIONS AND

The majority in Congress went steadily forward in perfecting plans for the restoration of the Union.

They foreshadowed their general line of policy toward the freedmen in the matter of suffrage by passing a bill

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66.

December 14 granting the elective franchise in the District of Columbia to persons without any distinction on account of color or race." The President vetoed this bill but it was passed over his veto January 7, 1867, by the Senate, and January 8 by the House, and so became a law without his signature.*

In the meantime the Southern States had almost with unanimity rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. In October, 1866, Texas refused to ratify, in November Georgia did likewise, and these States were followed in December by Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, North Carolina, Arkansas, and South Carolina, and in January, 1867, by Virginia and Mississippi.†

Edward Ingle, The Negro in the District of Columbia, in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, vol. xi., Nos. 3-4, p. 65 et seq. (March-April, 1893). "It is a fact not now generally known that a large portion of the Republicans shuddered at negro suffrage. They would gladly have voted to limit suffrage in Washington to intelligence and property qualifications, but Stevens outgeneraled them by a compact with Fernando Wood, the Democratic leader of the House. He appealed to Wood to unite the Democrats with him to defeat the qualified suffrage amendment for the reason, as Stevens said to Wood: You don't believe in negro suffrage at all, and you ought to be satisfied to make it as odious as possible by conferring it upon the most ignorant.' Wood saw the advantage of having the apportunity to assail universal negro suffrage as conferred upon a host of illiterate negroes in the capital city of the nation, and it was by this combination that Stevens secured unqualified negro suffrage."-A. K. McClure, Recol lections of Half a Century, p. 422. For the veto message see Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., pp. 472-483. See also McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1868, pp. 114-116, 154–160.

Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia, 1866, 1867 under the various States: J. G. de R. Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, p. 167 et seq.;

After the holiday recess Congress convened on January 3, 1867, and on February 6 Stevens introduced his bill from the Committee on Reconstruction setting up valid governments in the Southern States "on the basis of negro suffrage and white disfranchisement." Burgess says this was "the most brutal proposition ever introduced into the Congress of the United States by a responsible committee."'* After several unsuccessful attempts on the part of Blaine, Bingham and others to amend it, the bill was passed February 13. The Senate amended and then passed it February 17, and finally after still a few more amendments it was passed again by the House February 20. The President vetoed the bill March 2, but on the same day both Houses passed it over his veto. This was the first of the Congressional reconstruction acts.

Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, p. 394; Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, p. 33; Hollis, Reconstruction in South Carolina; Chandler, History of Suffrage in Virginia, p. 329; I. W. Avery, History of Georgia, p. 359; Woolley, Reconstruction of Georgia, p. 480; Phelps, Louisiana, p. 362; Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, p. 121.

"This bill was utterly indefensible on principle. It was completely at war with the genius and spirit of democratic government.

It was

a confession of Congressional incompetence to deal with a problem which Congress alone had the right to solve. The bill was a legislative solecism."- George W. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 306 et seq.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. vi., pp. 498-511; McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1868, pp. 166-173; Pierce's Sumner, p. 312 et seq.; McCall's Stevens, pp. 288-292; Chadsey, President Johnson and Reconstruction, pp. 109–117; De Witt, Impeachment, pp. 203-207; Burgess, Reconstruction, pp. 112-122; G. T. Curtis, Constitutional