VOL. XIV. No. 26.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1808. [PRICE 10d. The Honourable C. Stewart is serving as a Brigadier, or a Major, General, in Spain or Portugal, with, of course, the pay and allowances of that rank. He is a member of the House of Commons. He is also, according to a Report, printed by order of that House, an Under Secretary of State in the office of the war department, which office is kept in Downing Street, and, in which latter capacity, he receives two thousand pounds a year. He is a brother of Lord Castlereagh. 961]. SUMMARY OF POLITICS. Sir COURT OF INQUIRY.- -Since the arrival, and appearance, of Sir Harry Burrard, the objects of Inquiry have taken a new shape. This general is accused of having prevented Sir Arthur Wellesley from pursuing his victory on the 21st of August; that is to say, at the close of those proceedings, which constituted what has been called the Victory of Vimiera, It clearly ap pears, that Sir Harry Burrard was opposed to the advance of our troops, which advance led to the battle of that day; and, after the battle was put an end to by the retreat of the French, he, having thei: landed, and being upon the spot, was likewise opposed to a pursuit of the enemy. It is impossible for the public to be able to determine, whether this decision was right or wrong, unless they could come at an authentic statement of the force of the French. Arthur Wellesley now says again, that the whole of the effective force of the French Was that day engaged. If so, and, if the roads and distances were as they are described in the published evidence; then it cer tainly does appear, that the enemy might, by a pursuit of them, have been completely defeated; and, of course, that Sir Harry Burrard was the sole cause of preventing that defeat. We must take it for granted, that the roads and distances have been accurately described; but, as to the force of the enemy, if that force did really consist of 27 or even of 25 thousand men, as the Convention-makers would fain have us believe; then the decision of Sir Harry Burrard was certainly wise; for, in that case, is it at all probable, that our army would not have been finally defeated, if not captured in great part or in whole, especially as it is acknowledged, on all hands, that the French were greatly superior to us in cavalry, and that we could not get on our artillery? Besides, it now clearly appears, that, though there was some confusion in the French army, that confusion was by no means general. The retiring corps fonned in good order, not only in sight of our army, but within the reach of our artillery. Now, if the French [962 army, which we fought with 17 thousand men, consisted of 14 thousand, and if the French had, as they had according to the Convention-makers' account, 13 thousand more, besides the Russians, in their rear, would it not have been madness to have attempted a pursuit of the 14 thousand, who were retiring upon their reserves and their forts? The enemy was not routed; he was in very little confusion; we took some prisoners, but no standards that I have yet heard of; and, from the account given before the Court of Inquiry, it does not seem that much of a victory was, upon the whole, obtained, though there evidently was a good deal of bravery displayed, on the part of our troops. Thus, as to the conduct of Sir Harry Burrard, it appears to me, that the whole of the case turns upon the question, of what was the real strength of the French army, or the strength of which our people had information? Upon this question will also depend, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley was right, or wrong, in advancing upon the 21st of August; for, if he was aware, that the French had an army of 27 or 25 thousand men, it was evidently faulty, and even criminal in him, not to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, which division was, at that time, actually landed in Portugal, and which could have been brought to the scene of action in the course of a few days. Nay, upon the su po ition, that the 14 thousand in Kendal Green" were the whole of the French army, and that the 13,000 rogues " in Buckram' have only been brought in for the purpose of justifying the Convention; even, upon this supposition, it does not ap ear to me, that Sir Harry Burrard was to blame for wishing to bring up the division of Sir John Moore previous to an advance against the Duke of Abrantes in person;" be ae, as the French could, at any time, retreat towards their forts; as there was no compelling them to keep the field against 17 any more than against 25 thousand of our troops, it does not seem to me, that any thing could have been lost by the delay of a few days, while it is quite clear, that much might have been gained, because no one can fail to pers| ceive, that a retreat before 25 thousand men must have been more difficult, than a retreat before 17 thousand. But, though such a determination, on the part of Sir Harry Burrard, might have been wise previous to the battle of the 21st of August, it does not follow, that, supposing the French force to have been thus inferior to ours, his decision was wise after that battle; because then all the advantages to be hoped for from greatly superior numbers were given up.So much for the reasoning upon supposition. But, I think, there can be no doubt in the public mind, that, at the utmost, the French force did not exceed 14 or 15 thousand men; and that of this fact our officers were well assured. How does this tell, then, for the Convention? What becomes of all the paltry excuses for suffering the French to go off with their plunder, and with all the honours of war, and to be carried home, and set down (ready to march against the Spaniards) at our expence ?· -The cause of this disgraceful event appears to me to be the deSign of Wellesley to have to himself all the honour that was to be achieved, and the desire of Sir Harry Burrard to thwart him in that design. Wellesley hastened to the combat before Sir Harry landed, and against Sir Harry's expressed opinion, who wanted the former to wait for the arrival of Sir John Moore. On the 22d, Wellesley was no longer commander-in-chief. honour gained by capturing the French must have been claimed and enjoyed by another; Wellesley's name would have apppeared neither at the head nor the tail of the official papers relating to the event; and, which was of still more importance, in this view of the matter, his "Victory of Vi"miera" would have sunk into compa rative insignificance. If not, to a cause of this sort; to a jealousy somewhere or other; to what can we ascribe a Convention, such as that of Cintra, made with an enemy, whose whole force, commanded by the Duke of Abrantes in person,' bad been obliged to retreat, at least, before one half of the army which we had ready to act on the day when that Convention was signed ? Oh," say they, "but, after the 21st the opportunity was lost." What opportunity? What opportunity, my good Nabobites? Why, the opportunity of "annihilating the whole of the French Any army." This is what you said at first; but, you had not then thought of the 13 thousand men in Buckram. At the utmost, it was only the army in Kendal Green that could have been annihilated by continuing the pursuit of the 21st of August. Besides, docs it not appear from the evidence, that, at most, supposing the pursuit to have been attended with all the success, which its most strenuous advocates contend for, there was only a part of the French army, amounting to about 4 or 5 thousand men, that there was the smallest chance of intercepting on their retreat towards their strong holds ?" What becomes, then, of the pretence, that, after the 21st of August, "the opportunity was lost?" The object of this pretence is evident enough. Sir Hew, it is clear, is no more than a participator with Sir Arthur, whom he was to consult, whom he did consult, and with whose concurrence he acted. It is, therefore, necessary to make it out, that the fault lay elsewhere; and the only way that can be found out of doing this, and of con.bining all the purposes together, is to throw the blame upon him who prevented a pursuit on the 21st; but, unfortunately for this scheme, it must be shown, by those who have invented it, that the army in the forts was the same, or very nearly the same army, that retreated before our troops the day before; and this does not suit any of the persons concerned in making the Con vention; of course, it does not suit Sis Arthur Wellesley, who is in this dilemma i either the French had 27 or 25 thousand men, or they had 14 or 15 thousand. If the former, Sir Harry Burrard was right in wishing to wait for Sir John Moore, and also in preventing a continuation of the pursuit on the 21st of August: if the latter, then the Convention, in making which Sir Arthur Wellesley had his full share, is deprived of one of the principal facts, which have been stated in its justification. -This clutter about the "fatal effects "of preventing the gallant Sir Arthur "from pushing forward on the 21st". is a ruse de guerre, against which the people should be upon their guard. Granted that he would have pushed on; granted that he would have succeeded; granted that he would have cut off and captured the 4 or 5 thousand men, whom he and his What friends say he could have captured, then? What would that have done towards driving out of the forts, the 27 or 25 thou sand men, which they are now said to have contained? Evidently nothing. Junot would have been able to march out, the very next day, with a force greatly superior to ours, and consisting chiefly of fresh troops. And, if we take away this force of Buckram men, away goes Sir Arthur's chief argue "dictated to thirty thousand Englishmen, "the terms of the Convention of Cintra, "which terms caused a firing of cannon, and an illumination in London, under the "direction of those who administered the government." ment in favour of the Convention. It is, therefore, the Convention to which our attention is still to be directed. We ought not to suffer our minds to be led astray by any of these pretences of " a lost opportutunity." Let it, for argument sake, be granted, that Sir Harry Burrard acted unwisely; let it be granted, that, if he had acted upon the suggestion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 5 thousand Frenchmen would have been captured on the 21st; still, according to the latter's own first account, there would bave been but a force, one half, at most, as great as ours to subdue. The whole question is, after all, a mere question of numbers. If the French had, as we were first told, only the 14 thousand men, who were engaged in the battle of the 21st, then nothing in the world can justify the Convention of Cintra; and, if they had 27, or even 25 thousand men, previous to that battle, the getting them out of Portugal, except upon the condition of retaining their plunder and securing indemnity to their partisans, was a very meritorious and honourable service, and there is no blame attaches to any of the generals; though one cannot very well excuse Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose greediness for fame would have led him to continue his pursuit of the 21st, while "the Duke d'Abrantes" could have come out upon him with 13 thousand fresh troops. - As to the settling of this important question, no proof has been produced, or attempted to be produced, that the French had 27 or 25 thousand soldiers that could possibly have been brought into the field; and, as I have before asked, is it probable; nay, is it possi-clared will of their late masters, and to the -- le, that Junot, who knew that our army was daily receiving large reinforcements, would have met our 17 thousand men, with only 14 thousand, if he had had 27 or 25 thousand men capable of being brought into the field? There is not, I think, one man in the whole world, who is impudent enough to say, that he believes the affirmative of this proposition. It cannot be believed. Of course, the public must still see, as the world will always see, that about 12 or 13 thousand Frenchmen, allowing for the losses of the battle of the 21st of August, ob. tained from, or rather dictated to, 30 thousand Englishmen the terms of the Convention of Cintra. Whitewash, plaister, disguise the matter howsoever we may; confuse, confound, bewilder, as long as we please; to this plain nut-shell statement, the world, who has no interest in becoming our dupes, will ill return; and this the enemy does, and will continue to, throw in ou teeth. Thirteen thousand Frenchmen " ness SPAIN. If the French bulletins and accounts be true, Buonaparte was at Madrid on the 4th instant, and, of course, his brother has, before now, been crowned in that city. Madrid is not Spain; and, upon the supposition, that a complete change of the-government be intended by those who' are at the head of affairs in Spain, the country, I hope, will let the invading despot see, that his conquest is hardly yet begun. He will issue proclamations, as the Duke of Brunswick did; but, with men resolved to live free, or die, hostile proclamations are nothing. A correspondent, whose letter I insert below, complains of my "lukewarmas to the reverses in Spain, and says he expected from me something mora patriotic." Now, I have no recollection of what I have said, or thought, upon this subject; if I have, upon any occasion, shown myself wanting in warmth towards the cause of the Spanish people, whom I regarded as engaged in a most perilous conflict against a despot, to whom their former despot had transferred them. For their own sakes I heartily wished them success, and also, for the sake of other nations, who, in more than one way, might be induced to follow their example, as far as that example might be found to apply to their several situations. The resistance of the Spaniards to the de threats and violence of their new ones, excited in my mind more pleasure, as far as I know, than I had ever felt at any political event. But, what had this to do with a war for that very Ferdinand, by whom they had been abandoned, and by whom they had been, in terms the most earnest, exhorted to submit to the sovereign sway of Joseph Napoleon My correspondent, in complaining, that I am continually looking "at the abuses of the old government," asks me, if I am not assured that those abuses "would be corrected ?" I answer, that, so far from being assured of this, I see no reason to believe the fact, in the case of a successful war in behalf of the old government; and, if I had had no doubts upon the subject before, the proclamation of the Central Junta, for restraining what is there called "the licentiousness of the press,": would have excited such doubts; because, for reasons which I have, of late, amply stated, I can see no good motive for restraia needles, but like splinters and fish-hooks; it draws no blood, but leaves an aching festering wound; and a wound, too, which is, somehow or other, shy of showing itself to the doctor. Mr. Canning seems to have been put into so much agony by this observation as not to know very well what he was about; for, the latter part of the Declaration is, whether as to manner or matter, any thing, I think, but what it ought to be. There is a pitiful hankering still after the Emperor of Russia; there are blant attemps at severity; there is a roundness of assertion that nothing short of proved facts could have justified; and, as to the phraseology, it may, perhaps, be thought at compliment to it, to say, that it is equally "unparallelled" with the usurpation of the throne of Spain by the Buonapartes.When parliament meets, we shall, I suppose, have all these negociation papers before us; and, my opinion is, that it was to soften the effect of Buonaparte's sarcastic observation, about the Catholics of Ireland, that the newspapers were enabled to let it leak out beforehand. There is, to be sure, a gross fallacy in the reasoning of that observation; but, gross as it is, it is a fallacy, which many will not perceive, and which will be affected not to be perceived by many more. And, whose fault is it, that we are exposed to the probable, or, at least, possible, effect of such a dangerous fallacy? That question may be useless; but, certainly it is not useless to ask, whether all possible speed ought not now to be used, in older to remove the ground, whereon it rests? Frequently have Napoleon's newspapers sympathised with the Irish Catholics; but, this is the first time that he has openly and officially given us to understand, that they are an object of his imperial attention and solicitude. There is no doubt, however, that they long have been such, and that, if he succeed in his present enterprize; if he get safe possession of Spain and Portugal, the Irish Catholics will be the next, or nearly the next people, to whom he will directly, and with very little reserve, address himself. This must be evident to every man of common sense; and, it being evident, the question is, whether our government will, while there is yet time, adop1 the means, and the only possible means, of preventing him from obtaining a fair chance of final success ; or whether, we are doomed to keep blundering on to the end of the chapter, under the influence of despicable bigotry and more despicable intrigue. That Buonaparte will, as Jong as he has life, never rest until he has tried all the mcaps in his power of subjugat ing this kingdom no one can doubt. The motives which existed at the rupture of the peace of Amiens, still exist in all their fore mer force; they have received strength from time, and especially from recent events. Our fleet is, indeed, a mighty bulwark; but, as has been a thousand times observed, there are modes of attack against which a fleet cannot be brought to bear. Experience has proved, that our fleet caunot, at all times, prevent the landing of French troops in Ireland. Now is, therefore, the time to erect, in that country, an impenetrable barrier against the enemy. The means are completely in our hands. They will cost us nothing. Only a single act of parliament does the business. How many millions. What freights of treasure, what streams of blood, might be spared, by an act of parliament passed in time! DUKE OF YORK'S INCOME.- -In my last statement, upon this subject, there was, I am informed, an important omission. At page 901 of this volume, I stated the seve ral sources of the Duke's income, taking his military income at the acknowledged amount, as published in the Nabobs' Gazette, which statement shewed that, exclusive of the immense grant of crown, or rather national, lands in Surrey, the total of that income, paid out of the public purse, was £39,858. But, I now find, if my information be au rect, as I believe it is, that, to this mous sum must be added £7,000 a yea pension, upon the IRISH establishment The place and pension Report of the Finance Committee, which, as I observed before, is, in bulk, equal to the Old and New Testament, and contains about 300 folio pages, does not, however, contain the places and pensions upon the Irish establishment, except in part, but contents itself with refering io another Report, which was laid before parliament some years ago, and which, of course, very few of the present members ever saw, or ever will see as long as they live. I will endeavour to find out this Report, and when I have so done, I will state the fact, relating to this additional pension. In the meanwhile, I beg the reader to look again at the whole of the article begining at page 807 of this volume. Botley, Dec. 22, 1808. SPAIN. SIR, Accustomed to approve and admire your writings on most subjects, I cannot but read with a mixture of surprize and indig nation your very lukewarm remarks on the late reverses in Spain. It seems with you a matter of doubt whether we eighte regard the success of the French as a circum stance of regret or not, From you, Sir, a more patriotic spirit was expected. You are continually looking to the abuses in the old government of Spain. Are you not assured these would be reformed? And if that were not to be the case, is this a time to chill the blood of patriotism and raise a doubt to which side we should lend our hearts and aid? Look at the tremendous power of Buonaparte. Is there an object that can come in comparison of importance with the diminishing of that power? Can any one estimate the extent of his ability to injure us as a commercial nation? Independent of our sympathy with the brave resisters of his tyranny, our own situation is become most alarming. Instead of reflections upon an old government, it was expected that you would have shewn that zeal and energy (which you have displayed on more trivial occasions) to excite and animate the spirit of this country to every practicable means of assistance to the patriots. Convinced that you cannot exert it at a fitter period, I trust I shall yet not be disappointed. Your constant reader, A. Z.-Coven try, December 13th, 1808. BREWERIES.. dispate. To some of them, particularly to SIR,-On the perusal of controversial writings, we may observe that a general pertinacity attaches to most of them. We defend a position merely because we have advanced it; and are ingenious in framing arguments, by which our favourite hypothesis may be supported. It was under a full persuasion that there is in the human mind a tendency to this sort of obstinacy, that I ventured my remarks on the first paper of the Hampshire Brewer. And as we are all desirous of taking credit to ourselves, for our full share of candour and ingenuous-quote; but, however, I have one, and that ness, I trust I may be intitled to a presump. tive credit for my own openness to the full force of my respondents' arguments, and a readiness to acknowledge my conviction, should they be able to effect it. There can be no reason, sufficient to induce an honest man, to persist in error after he is convinced of it; neither can there be any, for renouncing an opinion without its being fully confuted. Had the reply of the Hampshire Brewer been such as to satisfy my mind, it should have been followed by an ample acknowledgement; but I should deem it -worse than folly, to admit the force of arguments, of the illegitimacy of which I am firmly persuaded. That gentleman has shrouded himself under the protection of names, the greatness of which no one will in itself a host;-it is the Hampshire Brewer himself. When he admits that a third part of a wort of 30lbs. per bariel, is superior to another of 10lbs. per barrel, merely because of the greater prevalence of mucillage in the latter, does he not by this concession establish that opinion which he is labouring to overthrow, and prove that the instrument, indicating in both instances an equal gravity, is insufficient to shew their relative value? Mr. Martineau's experiments nearly coincide with my own, as to the final gravity which will appear by the instrument in a separate solution of either malt or sugar; but, I think, neither of them sufficient to form the basis of a decision. From many experiments which a private friend of mine has made on the subject, and which have been |