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Wellesley, respecting his PROTEST, were downright lies. All the stories, which came before the public (as relating to this Protest) in the shape of letters from officers of high "rank and reputation in the army;" all the numerous extracts of this sort; all the assertions about Sir Arthur Wellesley being forty miles distant from the scene of negociation; all, all and every one of these assertions, are now, from Sir Arthur's, from the reported protestor's, own lips, proved to be lies. Observe, as connected with this point, an assertion of Sir Hew Dalrymple; that a paper, from England, was actually circulated in the army, to the same, or nearly the same, purport with these now-acknowledged lies. Sir Arthur Wellesley denies having had any hand in the promulgation of either; but, as my correspondent, R. L. in a late number, very pertinently asks, why did not Sir Arthur, who" came home on leave of absence" so long before Sir Hew was "recalled;" why did not Sir Arthur, give a contradiction to these atrocious calumnies against his absent Commander-in-Chief, especially as the evident and necessary tendency of them was, to exculpate himself at the expence of that absent commander? No: it may be, that he had, himself, no hand in hatching, or in promulgating, those nalignant lies; but, I may venture to leave any man of sound moral principles to judge, how far, under such circumstances, to wink at such hies makes him an accomplice with those, by whom they were hatched and promulgated. Had I been in the place of Sir Arthur Wellesley, I should, I hope, upon landing at Plymouth, and upon finding how things stood at home, instantly, before I got into my chaise; before I saw the face of the ministers; have taken care to send to the most rapid and most extensive channels of circulation, a declaration of my opinion," that "the Convention was a wise measure; but, that, at any rate, whatever degree of "blame it merited, a full share of it was "mine, I having assisted at the negociation,

the Commander-in-Chief having done no thing of importance without my advice "and concurrence, and I, so far from pro"testing against the Armistice, having most

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heartily approved of it." It appears to me, that this is what I should have done. I think, I could not have slept an hour, 'till I had done this. It is certainly what honour, truth, and justice demanded; and it certainly is what was not done -The next point worth particularly attending to is this: that, it now appears, om a document, produced by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that he, by the instruction of Lord Castlereagh, was to do no

thing without consulting Sir Arthur Wellesley. More was meant than met the ear, in this case, and that Sir Hew would clearly perceive. What a man must be made of, to accept of a command on such conditions, I will leave the reader to say; but, the fact clearly enough is, that it was meant, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was the seventh in command; who had six senior officers over him, should, in reality be the Commander-in-Chief; that his should be all the praise that might become due; his all the renown; and, as far as saving appearances would permit, his all the reward, of every sort.. Accordingly, it is said, and I have it frorino bad authority, that the head of the high family is offended, that Sir Arthur is not created Viscount Vimeira! To this conduct, on the part of the ministers, and of Lord Castlereagh in particular; this creatingof an unnatural sway, a confusion and conflict of authorities, where nominal rank was set in opposition to confidential trust; to this unwarrantable partiality; this poisonous influence at home, no small part of the indeli ble disgrace, and of all its consequent mis chiefs, may, probably, be attributed; and, all other points apart, the having instructed a Commander-in-Chief to be, in fact, ruled by an inferior officer, being the seventh in command, is not only a fair, but necessary subject of parliamentary inquiry; for, of two things must be: either the nom nal Commander-in-Chief was, by the winisters, throught incapable of that post, or he was, without any necessity, insulted and disgraced from motives of favouritism towards another.The next point, mering the notice of the public, is, that it now appears, from the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, that the whole of the documents, relating to the disgraceful Convention, were transmitted to Lord Castlereagh in the French language. Men of spirit; men who had felt, as they ought to have felt, upon such an ocCaston; men, who had had a proper notion of what honour required, and who had had the wisdom to perceive the great effect, which, in certain cases, is produced by ap parently trifling causes; such men would not, in the face, and under the very noses, of the Portuguese nation, have put their hands to any document in the French lan guage, though, after acknowledging the legitimacy of the title of the "Dut "d'Abrantes," and of the "Emperor Na"poleon I." this is hardly worth notice. So it was, however; the documents were not only drawn up, and signed, in the French language; but, in that language they were all sent home to Lord Castlereagh. Now,

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then, let that Lord explain to an abused and most grossly insulted nation, how, for what reasons, from what motives, he came to cause the Armistice, the only document signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, to be published to the people of England in the French language only, while all the other documents were published in the English language only. From the first, this was a great point with me; because, until this distinction appeared, there was no reason, that I could perceive, of suspecting the ministers of a disposition to do any thing that was wrong, or unfair. From this distinction, I did begin to suspect unfair intentions, Yet, until now, there might be a doubt; because, until now, we were not quite certain, that all the documents came home in the same language. Now we are certain as to that fact; and, there can be, I think, but very little difference of opinion as to the motive, whence all the other documents were translated for pub. lication, while that one, that one which alone bore the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was published in French.--The next thing, towards which the public should, in my opinion, direct their attention, is the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, accompanied with documents to prove, that, after a few days' consideration, the Portuguese expressed their pleasure at, and their gratitude for, the Convention; though, at first, they had loudly condemned it; whence it is meant, that we should draw an inference favourable to that measure, which bas, in this country, been so decidedly and so generally condemned. But, Sir Hew Dalrymple, before he prevails upon me to adopt this inference, must show me, that this change of language proceeded from some new lights, which the Portuguese had received upon the subject; he must let me see the grounds of their change of opinion; he must convince me that their reasoning was correct; and, above all things, he must convince me, that the persons, who had, at first, expressed opinions hostile to the Conventios, were not under the smallest apprehension, that a Continuation of that hostility might be atfended with disagreeable consequences to themselves. I remember an English House of Commons, who, on one day, by an almost unanimous vote, did, upon a motion of the minister (Mr. Addington) decide in the affirmative relating to a certain tax; and who, when, on the morrow, the same minister, proposed to negative that same proposition, did, without any division, or opposition at all, give their vote in the said negative. We, who were not born yesterday, know too much of the means, by which

approving letters and addresses are sometimes, and particularly in cases of emergency, obtained, to lay much stress upon such documents; and, we know, that, in the present case, there existed, as to the disapprobation, no undue influence at all; and that the Portuguese, whether right or wrong in their opinions, had no temptation, when they first heard of the Convention, to say what they did not think. -We now come to the wonderfully magnified numbers of the French army. It has been stated, it appears, before the Court of Inquiry, that the number embarked amounted to twenty-five thousand men. It is not averred, that these were all soldiers; that they were all persons bearing arms, or capable of bearing arms; but, as the public must have observed, and with no small degree of surprize and indignation, all the generals, and others, who have been called upon to state their opinions as to the expediency of the Convention, have reasoned upon this fact, relating to numbers, as if all the persons embarked were actually so many capable of being brought into the field of battle. Now, if this were so, is it probable, that Junot would, in the first instance, have met Sir Arthur Wellesley with no greater a force than fourteen thousand men? Is this probable? And, then, when he actually negociated, he had, if this new edition of numbers could be believed, more fighting men than our army consisted of, even after the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Nay, when Sir John Moore arrived, and he did not arrive till after the Armistice was signed, our whole army, even then, amounted to only one-sixth more than that of the "Duc

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"d'Abrantes" is now made to amount to, he having all the fortresses and strong holds and positions, not only at his command, but in his possession. I appeal to the sense and judgment of the reader, whether Junot would have dared to make an offer of evacuation under such circumstances? much as to the reason of the case; but, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his dispatch, told us, that he defeated the WHOLE of the "French force, commanded by the Duke "of Abrantes in person ;" and, indeed, that › the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the effective force was that day in the field, there can be very little doubt. It is barefaced hypocricy to affect to believe, that Junot, who had so much time for preparation; who had the choice of time as well as of place; whom it so evidently behoved to have driven our first-advancing battalions into the sea; who had received a check on the

day before; and who had all his means at his back and completely at his command: it is barefaced hypocricy to affect to believe, that such a Commander, so situated, would march to the attack of superior numbers leaving nearly half of his efficient force in a state of inactivity. Besides, the reader will not fail to bear in mind, that, when the news of the Convention first reached England, it was asserted, by the friends of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that "if he had not "been prevented from following up his "victory of the 21st, the WHOLE French

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army must inevitably have been destroyed." Now, either this was a falsehood; it was, from beginning to end, a lie, invented for the purpose of raising Sir Arthur Wellesley in the public estimation, at the expence of Sir Harry Burrard's reputation; either this was a foul and malignant lie; or, it is not true that Junot ever had, after the landing of any part of our army, twenty-five thousand effective men under his command. It is curious to observe, how this French army is raised, or lowered, as the purposes demand. They were nothing, when the purpose was to persuade the pub lic, that Sir Harry Burrard was guilty of the crime of preventing Sir Arthur Wellesley from putting an end to them; "de

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stroying the whole of them," after the manner of Captain Bobadil; but, now, when the purpose is to defend the Convention, it being no longer to be denied, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had a principal share in making that instrument; now, the French army was very numerous, nearly twice as strong as the army with which Sir Arthur beat them. It is; it is, say what they will, the old story of the Buckram Men revived.

-The reader will see, that, at Chelsea, there is great stress laid upon the state of the army's provisions. Provisions, we are told, were not to be got on shore, in Portugal, and those, which we had on board, it was difficult to land. I have asked this question before, but I will ask again : how did the “ Duc d'Abrantes;" how did Wellesley's Tartar Duke; how did he obtain provisions? He had, they now tell us, twenty-five thousand men; he had long had them there; he had had no communieation with the sea; he had even the Rus⚫ian fleet to feed, besides his own army. How did he, who had all the people for enemies; how did he obtain his supplies of provisions, in this sad barren country, and Not only enough for the time being, but enough to horde up stores for the long lingering siege, which our heroes apprehended; Jam in ribulation for an answer to this

question; but, I have not yet heard it put by any of the great captains, now sitting in the Court at Chelsea. The truth is, that our generals appear to have eyes wonderfully adapt. ed to the discovering of difficulties and obstructions. We have often been amused with_descriptions of the miserable state of the French armies; the shoe-less, hat-less, shirt-less state of the "wretched conscripts, "whom Napoleon leads to battle in chains." But, somehow or other, these wretches do fight and get on. They feed on the air, perhaps; but, certain it is, that they live; they find something to eat and to drink. Alas! Buonaparte has generals, who can shift, for a while at least, without port wine and fea ther-beds; and he has, of course, soldiers who follow their example. To hear the miserable excuses of a scarcity of provisions, want of horses and carriages, want of cannon, and the like, is truly deplorable, at a time when we have just been witnessing the campaigns in Austria, Moravia, and Poland; campaigns, at one half of the battles of which, in the midst of winter, Frenchmen, bred up under a southern climate, fought up to their knees in ice and snow, at the end of a march, which had left them scarcely a shoe to their foot, and in which hardships the officers had shared with the men. If this is to be our manner of making w if to go into the field of battle, we r have our English luxuries, let us, in the name of common sense, give up the thing at once; withdraw from the contest; stay at home in ale-houses and barracks; keep guard over the prisoners taken by the skill and valour of the navy; and no longer ex pose ourselves to the scorn and derision of the world.These are the points, which, as far as the proceedings have hitherto gone and been published, have chiefly attracted my attention. Out of the circumstances of Sir Arthur Wellesley's command, however, there arises a question or two, which are worthy of great attention. Whether this officer received the usual sum given to commanders of expeditions for their out-fit, to gether with the staff-pay and enormous a lowance of a lieutenant general command. ing in chief, including bat and forage me ney, which last alone would, I imagine, amount to, at least, five hundred pounds? There is, too, it has been publicly stated, another general, employed upon the staff of the same army; I mean the brother of Lord Castlereagh, who, along with the pay and emoluments of a major general, but and jarage money, &c. &c. receives pay, agreea bly to the report laid before the House of Commons, as an under secretary of state,

should, at a moment like this, be, as the Morning Post states, necessary to “ curb "the refractory disposition of certain cisss"es of the Portuguese," is, indeed, matter for serious reflection; for, in the first place, the "refractory" must, if this necessity do really exist, be the most powerful part of the nation; otherwise, they might be “ curbed" by the part, who are not refractory. Then, what is the mark of this refractoriness? Is it a disposition favourable to the French? Is it a spirit of hostility to the Prince Regent or the old government? Or is it a dislike to the English authority? One or the other of these, I think, it must be. If the latter, it is quite evident that to withdraw our troops and our authority is the only effectual way of removing the necessity of keeping troops locked up in Portugal; and, if either of the former, it would, I think, puzzle the Morning Post to assign any probable good that will arise from keeping them there. To cherish, or defend, a people against their will, is a most difficult as well as a most ungrateful task. It is a task, which, from the nature of things, can never be attended with success.

Is it not a strange thing, that, amongst all the numerous nations, who have been subdued and plundered by the French, there has never yet appeared one, that has demonstrated any great degree of anxiety for the return of their former rulers? Some few have fought a little to keep the French out; but, when once in, there is scarcely any people that have discovered any very strong wish to get them out again. Who would not have supposed, that the people of Portugal, for instance, would have been half mad with joy at their "deliverance ?" Who would not have expected to see them vie with each other in eagerness to obtain a return of the ancient order of things? Who would have imagined it likely to be necessary for us to keep ten thousand men in the country," to curb the refractory disposition.

of certain classes" of a people, just delivered from the grasp of the French, and restored to the rule of the representatives of their "beloved sovereign"? I should like to hear the sapient editor of the Morning Post explain this political phenomenon; for it is a matter of vast importance with all those who study the science of government. AMERICAN STATES -The election of the new President and Vice President, which has taken place before now, will, it is thought, terminate in favour of the JefferBon party, and in the election of MR. MADISON to the office of president. If so, the embargo will, probably, continue; but, the violations of it, the almost open defiance of

it; will not be less than they now are. We were told, that the Americans could starve the West India Islands. Those Islands were, perhaps, never much better supplied from America than they now are, and have been ever since the embargo was laid. The town of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is become a grand depository for American produce, whence it is shipped to the West Indies. And, in fact, all that Mr. Jefferson and his bitter set have done, with a view of injuring England, has had no other effect than that of injuring his foolish constituents.

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CORN AGAINST SUGAR.- -The effect of the American Einbargo puts one in mind of the alarm of the "Barley-Growers," who are now selling at from 50 to 60 shillings a quarter that corn, which they were afraid would sink below 37 shillings a quarter; and who, upon seeing the ports in the Baltic and in America closed against us, seized with a dread, that we should be starved in consequence of being able to convert into bread 300,000 quarters a year of that corn of our own growth, which wo formerly employed in making spirituous liquors! I defy all the world, the readers of the Morning Post not excepted, to produce me an instance of folly equal to this. Mr. Wakefield denied me the privilege of judging upon such a subject, because I was not a practical farmer. Just as if it was necessary for a man to be a good hand at ploughing and sowing, in order to be certain that 300,000 quarters of bread corn would add to the food of the nation. It was a question of such plain common sense, that, to come to a right decision, their required neither experience nor reason. Barley must now be dear till next harvest; so that, at any rate, there is one year for the BarleyGrowers, free of that mischief, which they really did, or affected to, anticipate.

*** A letter from LORD ANSON to the Freeholders of Staffordshire is inserted, because it is right that my readers, who have seen the letter of A. B. should see, that that nobleman had it not in his power to be present at the county meeting.

The Income of the DUKE OF YORK I do not state this week, because my intention is to publish, along with it, the whole of the act of parliament, granting him the estate in Surrey, and which is too long to be inserted, except in a double number.

MAJOR HOGAN does not answer my request. I have a letter before me, saying, that, next week," the publisher of Major

Hogan's Appeal will send me a letter upon

the subject of that Appeal, and particularly with respect to the BANK NOTES." I dare say, that there will be no objection to the insertion of the intended letter; but, I cannot refrain from apprizing the writer, that I am rather surprized, that the numbers of the Bank Notes have not been published. As the Major expressed his anxious desire to return the notes, one would think that he must still have them in his possession; and, the gentleman who suggested the question to me, assured me, that, if the numbers were advertised, the notes would be traced to the late possessor, with the greatest facility. What I should do, were I in the Major's place, is this. State pubJickly the numbers of the notes, and offer to give them up to whomsoever would prove a proprietorship in them, than which, I am told, nothing is more easy. The fact is, that, if the Major does this, the public will believe his account, respecting the notes, to be true; if he does it not, they will, with very great reason, believe it to be a most atrocious falsehood.

Botley, December 2, 1808.

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"wasted in learning sounds instead of sense; "suffer not his body and mind to be debi"litated by continual confinement and "continual controul and correction. Give

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him, God being your helper, a sound body and strong limbs; habituate him to "bear fatigue, to move with confidence "and rapidity in the dark; to fare and to sleep hard; and, above all other things in "the world, to rise with the lark, thus making his year equal to eighteen months "of his effeminate contemporaries. Next "lead him into the paths of knowledge, not "minding whether pedants call it learning, or not; and, when he arrives at the proper age for acquiring that sort of knowledge, make him acquainted with every thing material, as to public affairs, "that has really occurred in his country

In proceeding with the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, which it has been, and is, one of the principal objects of my life to lay complete before the public of the present day, and, in that state, to have the satisfaction of leaving it to posterity, I have, for some time past, perceived that there would still be wanting a Work like that above described. In putting to myself this question, "How shall I go to work to secure "the best chance of rendering a son capable "of accomplishing great things; fit to "have a share in guiding the minds of "others; of weight sufficient to make him "an object of respect with good, and of "dread with bad public inen?" In putting this question to myself, the answer my mind suggested was: Suffer not his time to be

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from the earliest times to the present day. "Open to him the book, not of speculation, "but of unerring experience. That he may "be able to judge of what is, as well as of what ought to be, show him, in detail, all the political causes and effects, to be found in our history; make him see clearly how this nation has come up, " and how this government has grown to"gether."

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From these, or such like reflections, sprang that arduous undertaking, the PARLIAMEN TARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND; and, fam the same source arises the Work, which now submit to the judgment of the public, As I proceeded with the HISTORY, I found, that to read discussions, relating to Trials for High Treason and for other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, and not to be able to refer immediately to those Trials, they being so intimately connected with the history of the parliament, and being a detailed relation of some of the most important and most inte resting events to be recorded, could not fail to be greatly disadvantageous to the student: yet, to bring into the HISTORY such a mass of legal proceedings, which admitted of little abridgment, was, for several reasons, not to be thought of. I, therefore, resolved to form them into a separate Work, to be published during the same time, and in the same manner, as to paper and print, with the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.

Besides the consideration of uniformity, there were others which had great weighti this determination. The STATE TRIALS are now to be found only in an edition of Eleven Volumes in folio, a form so unwieldy that it is impossible they should ever be much read, to say nothing of their incomplete state, or of the expence; which latter alone, owing to the scarceness of even this imperfect edi

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