Page images
PDF
EPUB
[blocks in formation]

stead of parliament being prorogued till' Christmas, I cannot but think, as a preli minary to an effectual inquiry into this mysterious business, that it most undoubtedly ought to meet as soon as possible, at least o the day originally fixed upon in next month; that ministers may have an opportunity in their piaces of setting the public right, whether their do ghty generals or themselves, are the fittest objects of blame. I, therefore, Sir, with the deepest indignation at the whole proceedings (the more particulars of which we come at, the worse the case seems to be) do thus formally accept your invitation to remonstrate in the strongest language, and to demand in the firmest tone, the earliest and the most rigid inquiry of the nation assembled in parlia

The Eleventh Volume of the PARLIAMEN TARY DEBATES, comprising the period from the 11th of April to the close of the last Session, is ready for delivery. In the Ap-ment, to rescue, if possible, the insulted pend.x to this Volume, besides several valoable Reports, will be found all the Annual

and prostituted honour of the country; and on whomsoever the base-born act shall even

Accounts relative to the Finance and Com-tually attach, that his or their dastardly heads

merce of Great Britain and Ireland; documents which are not to be met with in any other work extant. Complete sets of the Parlamentary Debates, from the cominencement in 1803, may be had of the Publishers.

-The Firth Vole of COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, embracing the period from the Revolution in 1688, to the Union in 1707, will be ready for delivery on the 20th of December.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.

Woodcote House, Hants, Oct. 24. SIR-Had I not concluded, that your invitation of the 1st of this month, to the freeholders of this county, to join you in a requisition to the high sheriff to call a County meeting, upon the present most exasperating and mortifying occasion, the inexplicable infamy of this Portugal Convention, would, of course, have been accepted by scores of indignant individuals, I had certainly answered your challenge to remonstrate, as soon as I had read your Register of that day. Since, however, I rather collect from your Register since that date, that such has not been the case; though I am not in the habit of putting myself forward on such occasions, I cannot forbear, though this late, (if none other has or will) to close with your invitation to petition the king, in respectful, but firm langnage, for the earliest and the strictest scrutiny into this nauseous transaction; to the end that the author or authors of such an indelible disgrace and scandal to our country, and to manhood itself, may be brought to summary justice, and the most condign punishment; let them turn out to be who they may. In

may fall, as a poor compensation and satisfaction for the gross subjection and prostra tion of Old England, to the insolent pretensions and intrigues of this execrable Corsican It is impossible to find language to express one hundredth part of our's feelings on the subject; and how these generals could forbear jumping down Kellerman's throat when he had the consummate impudence to presunue to dictate to those who had but the day before drubbed Lim soundly, I cannot for the life and soul of me conceive. I have not yet heard it asked, how Kellerman came to have such free egress and regress to and from his tête à téle with Sir Hew, without (as has as yet appeared) any previous leave or introduction asked; but without even a by your leave" or "with "your love," he seems to have coolly dropped in upon Sir Hew's head quarters with all the easy familiarity of a brother officer, instead of the cautious and ceremanious admittance of a treacherous and beaten foe. And how Sir Arthur Wellesley (if he really felt as he professes, and wishes us to believe he did, confident of having done his duty) how he could possibly think of quitting the army immediately after two such creditable victories, and get leave of absence to come home, I can as little conceive, as for what purpose; unless (if he felt that he had acted might) impatient perhaps to receive the plaudits and homage of his noble relation the most noble Marquis Wellesley, and his Eastern admirers; or rather, if he felt (as I suspect he did feel, and must have felt), that on the contrary he bad blasted bis military laurels, in his civil capacity as a conventionist; in which case

he would very naturally wish to get snuggled home, that he might get (as he did) the first word with the ministers, and make his now story good. Under the singular predicament in which he stood on his return, I should have thought it would have been more natural for the " mens conscia recti," to have been at least anxious to clear itself to an indignant public by some address to them, it not to have courted and demanded an inquiry, rather than consent to be again smuggled off to his post in Ireland, leaving behind him a most unfavourable impression against him from this very circumstance, in addition to the violent prejudice previously entertained of his conduct in the Portugal cabinet. How his patrons will justify their conduct in most indecently obtruding him upon the king's notice at the very moment a Petition was actually presenting in the same room, to have his conduct inquired into; and then, as it should seem, in mere contempt and defiance of the avowed sense and feeling of the nation, not only screening, but honouring and rewarding him (while labouring under this publicstig majby re-dubbing him a member of the Irish cabinet, I confess I have some curiosity to see. With respect to the Address of the city of London, however the good citizens may have, from their previous conduct, merited a rap on the knuckles, it is no justification whatever of the most insulting folly in the ministers in their palming so thoroughly ungracious, not to say harsh a reproof upon the king, with the additional preposterous aggravation and contradiction, of calling it his majesty's most gracious Answer. I trust the witty wags will not by-and-bye pretend to say it was only meant as a neat piece of irony on the Corsican's manner of baptizing his replies to his good city of Paris. Though there be among the ministers, some three or four, deeming themselves cleverish lawyers, surely my learned friends have in this instance travelled out of the record; if not gone beyond their instructions likewise.-Hitherto, whenever I have thought upon the annual threat of invasion, I have always been disposed to consider it as impracticable: but, if this kind of tunnel be carried under the bed of the constitution, if this species of subterraneous and infernal passage be made through the bowels of the country, if this sort of fatal shaft be sunk to the heart and vitals of its existence, as this Portugal Convention is calculated to do; if it be not instantly and effectually dammed up, nothing more prac ticable than our invasion, nothing easier than Old England's rain!-1 remain, Sir, yours, -R. L.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL. SIRAs I have noticed in one of the late Addresses to his majesty, a wish expressed, that those who are guilty, with regard to the late unfortunate Convention, may experience the royal displeasure; and as I think it natural to suppose, that a man would rather subject himself to the displea sure of all the potentates in Europe, thm submit to lose the joint of his little finger, I think it my duty to request the insertion of the inclosed plain statement of facts in your justly popular paper, or something of a similar nature in your own energetic in guage. For my own part, I am so well convinced that in cases of this nature, ind vidual mercy is public cruelty, that I do not hesitate to affirm my belief, that had I pronounced sentence upon General Whitelocke, the Convention of Cintra never would have received the sanction of a British officer; or, at least, he must necessarily have been pos sessed of more courage than I ever knew man possessed of, who would dare even to listen to such an infamous proposal. And as the reason which deters the northern counties from addressing his majesty on this subject, is a belief that a petition with respect tow Convention is a censure on his Majest's ministers, I have conceived it necessary remove this prejudice and without the smal est injury to truth: for, if ever there wa time when the honour of the country a the preservation of the constitution required the sacrifice of partial interests, it never was more necessary than at this moment.I am, respectfully, Sr, &c.-M.-London, Nov. 4, 1808.

TO THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

To be truly loyal, my countrymen, it is not always necessary to be passive; circumstances sometimes, nay frequently occur, on which, it is the indispensable duty of all honest and loyal Englishmen to make known their sentiments to his majesty. First, because his majesty, being a human being like ourselves, is not infallible; and second, because it sometimes happens, that the partial interests of the nobles are put in competition with the true interests and permanent security of his majesty and his people: in the latter case, it surely is the duty of the people to support his majesty against the undue and improper influence of the nobles, and to express unanimously and publicly this their determination.-Whether the Convention of Cintra is one of those oc currences which precludes the necessity of publicly addressing his majesty, I leave you to determine; but certain I am, that it is

the true interest of his majesty, and of his majesty's people to endeavour to prevent a repetition of the alarming, dreadful, and disgraceful disasters, which have so frequently occurred with respect to the military expeditions of this country: this can only be accomplished, by a discovery of the causes which have produced such fatal effects.It is neither my intention to inflame your passions by eloquence, nor to sway your judgment by argument; but I shall take the liberty of stating a few memorable facts for your consideration. Previous to the battle of Minden, British soldiers were invariably successful in the field; the victories obtained by British armies in those days, were victories; expedition was then expedition; and merit at that time was merit. Since that period you cannot be ignorant, that victory has frequently assumed the disguise of de feat; that expedition has become a mere creeping thing; and that merit is now understood to mean, rank, fortune, and influence. Do not imagine, my countrymen, that. I consider the result of Lord George Sackville's trial the (sole) cause of these extraordinary" occurrences;" indeed I really do not: at the same time I must state, that had the people of England, during the progress of Lord G. S.'s trial been animated with the same laudable feeling with which they are now animated or had the members of that court martial been such men as I could have wished,-I am perfectly convinced, that the frequent repetitions of similar misfortunes would not have disgraced the pages of British history. I shall not affirm that Lord G. S. escaped just and salutary punishment, because the truth is, that at this moment, I am not qualified to decide whether disgrace is, or is not, a punishment: however, for purpose of forming a just conclusion on this subject, I am now studying moral philosophy, and should I find it proved to my satisfaction-that men who deserve extreme punishment, are capable of feeling disgrace as the greatest of all possible punishments," I shall immediately communicate the important discovery to his majesty's attorney ge neral, who will without doubt recommend it to the consideration of the judges at the Old Bailey. I have long been of opinion, that disgrace to an innocent, to an honourable man, is the greatest evil which can possibly befal him; and I am confirmed in this opinion, by the demonstration of an eminent moral philosopher, who also assures me, that what is an evil to the innocent, is not always a punishment to the guilty. How ever this may be, I shall not at present hazard any remarks upon such a tender sub

the

66

ject.-In thus addressing you, I am neither actuated by party motives, nor private feelings. I am by no means dissatisfied with his majesty's present ministers; on the contrary, when I consider the nominal opposition of their enemies, and the real opposition of their friends, I am compelled to applaud their conduct, and on the whole, from my own knowledge of the vast abilities of some British generals, their secretaries, commissaries, &c. &c. I heartily acquit ministers of all charges which have been urged against them, with respect to the late dismal and unfortunate Convention. I now implore you, oh! my countrymen! no longer to remain silent, and passive spectators of events which involve the dearest interests of your country; but to make known, in a respectful manner, to a justly beloved sovereign, the disappointed hopes of a loyal people.-&c. JNO. HOMESPUN.

DEFENCE OF THE CONVENTION.

SIR, The penetrating genius of Hudibras discovered that one spur was sufficient to make both sides of a horse go; wisely reasoning, that while one side of the animal was in action, the other could not be at rest. You appear to have also made a discovery, though not equal to Hudibras'; his reasoning was incontrovertible; yours will only convince those who conclude without investigation; and who will consequently readily believe, that you would not devote a dozen lines of your Register of the 15th inst. to explain what you intended by the expression "next arrival," unless your meaning had been misrepresented; that you would not contend, unless opposed; appeal, unless resisted; or triumph, unless victorious. But, it is impossible to repel where no attack is made, and ridiculous to attack where no vulnerable point presents itself; and I felt perfectly satisfied that it was impos sible to extract from my letter to you of the 30th ult. any one sentence from which, when properly considered with its context, you, possessing no moderate share of ingenuity, could make it appear, that the fair and natural inference coincided with what, in your explanation, you state you never intended. My meaning evidently was, that "the public could not reasonably expect that an unconditional surrender of the French forces in Portugal would be the immediate consequence of their defeat at Roleia and Vimiera," that "the defeats sustained by the French on the 17th and 21st Sept. did not materially increase the probability of eventually expelling them from Portugal more speedily, or on terms more advantageous,

than they would have been expelled by the English army, had no victory been obtained." I stated my reasons for so thinking, and the fallacy of them has not been established. The question then was, considering the relative situation of the armies, according to the information of which the public was possessed at the time of the pub. lication of the Gazette, announcing the victory at Vimiera, whether terms might not be granted, which would be preferable either to consuming time, and encountering the difficulties that must necessarily be experienced in blockading them, or to sustaining a great loss in forcibly expelling them from their forts and entrenchments. Indeed, so clear and obvious was my meaning, that I concluded no Englishman could be found so perversely stupid, as not to comprehend it; and under the influence of this conviction, added to the expectation I enter tained, that, on the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, some additional particulars would be communicated to the public, I determined neither to reply to your explanation, nor to the other observations which you made upon what I advanced. In both instances I have been disappointed; and shall therefore now shortly reply to those observations, and assure you, that, as you are well acquainted with mankind, I now begin to incline to the opinion, that you thought there might be some for whose benefit it was necessary to elucidate what was not ambiguous, and expound what was not mysterious.

[ocr errors]

And now this fustian stuff is done, Let's fairly to th' argument come. You ask was it a reasonable expectation? First: If you mean by it, was the victory at Vimiera such as to render reasonable the expectation generally entertained that an unconditional surrender would be the inintediate result?" I answer, no; and from the general tendency of your observations in the Register, I should conclude that you are a convert to this negation, were it not impossible to deduce this inference from your statement, that the whole of Junot's force (14,000) was repulsed by part (9,000) of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, amounting to 19,000. Now, Sir, this is a phenomenon (if you please) in military affairs, for the existence of which a skilful tactician, even supposing the bravery of the contending armies to be equal, would experience no difficulty to account. But neither does necessity urge, nor inclination prompt me, to detail the demonstrations of theory, or crowd your pages with mili

tary axioms. It is with peculiar satisfaction I admit, that the superior bravery and firmness of our troops repulsed the attacks of superior numbers of the French. Bat was their ability to do so first discovered at Vimiera? No. Fortunately many instances have occurred, in which the intrepidity and resolut on of English troops have rendered abortive the impetuous and vigorous attacks of the French. They have resisted, where cautious prudence would dictate retreat, or advise surrender; they have assailed, where cold calculation would predict defeat, or foretel destruction. The people of England well knew the character of their soldiers; the retrospective view of their exploits was cheering and delightful; but what reason was there to suppose that they had degenerated? Was the spirit and courage, displayed by our soldiers at Mal plaquet, at the commencement of the eighteenth century, less apparent at the attack at Lincelles and other places, at its close? Was the glory acquired at Minden obliterated at Maida? We were covered with glory at Vimiera-but obtained little else. The battle of Alexandria was gained by our troops, in nearly the same proportio to the French, as the battle of Vimit The retreat of the French in both cases wa not prevented. Was the unconditional sur render of Abdallah Menou's troops immediate and necessary consequence? W it the eventual consequence after Sir David Baird had joined with the Indian army, and General Belliard had surrendered at Cairo, to the particulars of which surrender, and the circumstances under which it was negociated, I beg leave to refer you? To return, however; was it the immediate and necessary consequence? No, and the only possible reply is, that after the battle of Alexandria the English army received no reinforcements; after the battle of Vimiera it did. This reply concedes the point, that, with the troops Sir Arthur Wellesley had at the battle of the 21st, it was not rea sonable to expect an unconditional surrender. We have now to examine, with the augmen tation of force on the part of the English, the relative situation of the two armies, which naturally includes the consideration of what you may, secondly, mean by the term it, viz. was the position of Junot so strong, his supply of provisions so ample, and his force so formidable, as to prevent the English army compelling him, without great delay or considerable loss, uncondi tionally to surrender? I refer to my former letter to you to shew, that, with the infor mation the public then had, it was not rea

the

sonable to expect it, and shall now offer such observations as your remarks on that letter seem to require. It is necessary to premise, that it was generally known that 30,000 men had sailed for Portugal, yet till the news of the victory at Vimiera arrived, no sanguine expectations of unconditional surrender were entertained by the public; and that, at the time I wrote my former letter, no accounts had reached this country of the numbers for which transports had been demanded. I purposely admitted as correct the number which you acknowledged Junot had re-conducted into Lisbon; I stated the manner in which I accounted for the number of men Junot could collect; it was what no one could misunderstand or deny; and I still continue to believe that Junot had 20,000 men on whose active services he could rely. You do not prove that there is even a strong probability of the contrary. I cannot avoid expressing my surprise that you should so far have misunderstood as to misrepresent what I stated with respect to the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers` in a blockade. I started no difficulties, but even granted, that immediately after the battle of Vimiera, "the English army was enabled to blockade him, and prevent his incursions into the country; Junot could not again meet them in the field." Further comment is unnecessary. I shall now consider what you advance respecting the advantage to be derived from a superiority of numbers in a storm, reminding you that I then said: "I do not mean to insinuate

that our troops could not reduce Junot, but their amounting to 30,000 men would not prevent a great effusion of blood." Estimating, then, the actual military force of Junot at only 20,000 men, and increasing the 30,000 English troops in the proportion of 14 to 9, the ratio established at Vimiera, and which is conceding to you every advantage you can possibly expect from your ar gument, we shall gain an additional force of 17,000 imaginary nien, phantasmagoria soldiers, Philipstal hussars, phantoms who would have been a long time in clearing redoubts, ramparts, counterscarps, &c. and have done little to enable our 30,000 substantial English soldiers to possess themselves of Junot's intrenchments. [ Risum teneatis, aici?" It is important however to be serions in considering a serious subject. Let us give form and substance to airy nothing. Let us suppose that 30,000 English soldiers contain materials sufficient for the manufacture of 50,000 Frenchmen: here, then, 20,000 Frenchmen in intrenchments have to resist the attack of 50,000 Frenchmen.

I admit that this superiority for insuring success in storming is advantageous; but I repeat, that it would not prevent, on the part of the assailants a great effusion of blood. I suppose success, and shall therefore not allude to instances in which the assailants were defeated. When the Austrians, under Daun and Nadast, attacked the Duke of Beverr, commanding an army of 25,000 men in enentrenchments before Breslaw, their loss nearly equalled the whole of Bevern's army, although they attacked him with a force nearly four times as numerous. The Austrians were astonished at their success, and the duke of Bevern was censured for returning with a comparatively trifling loss. Did the superior numbers of the French at Lodi prevent on their part a great effusion of blood? Did Mollendorf-but you must already be exclaiming :

Utituria re non dubik testibus non necessariis. Further, it is notorious, that many instances may be cited to prove, that, after great loss has been sustained in storming the intrenchments and outworks, the assailants have granted to the besieged in the citadel terms of capitulation which secured to them very considerable advantages to small bodies of men shut up in forts not more formidable than those of Portugal, the greater part of which you say, if your information is correct; were things to be taken by storm with perhaps the loss of a thousand men for each attack.-Bravo! Mr Cobbett ! Excellent well! Let the public read this, and every cool reflecting man will be vexed that he has suffered his feelings to get the better of his judgment, that he anticipated what was either impossible or what policy could not justify. I have a strong suspicion, that, with all your pretended contempt for the learned languages, you are well acquainted with the classics, and that, in writing the preceling sentence, you had in view the followin passage of Cicero de Oratore: "Si quæ premat res vehementiùs, ità cedere solere, ut non modo non abjecto, sed ne rejecto quidem sento fugere videar; sed adhibere quandaın in dicendo speciem atque pompam et pugnæ similem fugam." The application is not difficult; and i proceed to reply to what you advance respecting the successful defence of Saragossa and Valencia. You say it has not been owing to the strength of the place, but to the strength and courage of the defenders. I thought I had provided against an-answer of this sort by instancing the defeat of the defeat of the Spaniards at Rio Seco by a third of their number; and it so happen ed, that the undisciplined defenders of these places were vanquished in the field, cum

[ocr errors]

گر

« PreviousContinue »