Portug, occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army, in the stare in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.—I. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and, on their arrival in France, they shall be at liberty to serve. -II. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France, between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively. them. VI. No individual, whether native of Portugal or a country in alliance with France, or of France, shall be molested for his political conduct; they shall be protected in their persons, their properties respected, and they shall be at liberty to remove from Portugal with what belongs to them within a stipulated time.-VII. The neutrality of the port of Lisbon shall be recognised with regard to the Russian fleet; that is to say, when the British army or fleet shall be in possession of the city and port, the same fleet shall not be molested during its continuance there, nor obstructed when leaving-IV. The French army shall carry with it it, nor followed after it shall have quitted that port, before the time prescribed by the maritime laws.-VIII. All the artillery of French calibre, as also all the horses of the French cavalry, shall be transported to France.-IX. This suspension of arms shall not be broke without forty-eight hours notice.-Made and agreed upon by the forementioned Generals.- (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. KELLERMANN, Gen. of Di vision. Additional Article.-The garrisons of the places occupied by the French army shall be included in the present Convention, if they shall not have capitulated before the 25th instant. (Signed) ARTHUR WELLESLEY. KELLERMANN, Gen. of Division. (A true Copy)-A. J. DALRYMPLE, Captain, Miltary Secretary. Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army. The generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negociate and conclude a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d inst. for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negociate the same in their names, viz.-On the part of the general in chief of the British army, lieut. col. Murray, quarter-master general; and on the part of the general in chief of the French army, M. Kellermian, general of division, to whom they have given authority to negociate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the adinital commanding the British feet at the entrance of the Tagus. Those two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the articles which follow:-Art. I. All the places and forts in the kingdom of in all its artillery of French calibre, with the Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagsi aw, Brydges Street, Caval Garde, where former Numbers may be had sold also by J. Build, Crown and Mitic, Pall-Ma Vol. XIV. No. 15.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1808. [PRICE 10D. "The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a "commander, and in every part of the enterprize, no man of a just mind, will, whatever be his senti ❝ments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no "small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their "share of the praise."POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XIV. p. 386. 545] SUMMARY OF POLITICS. CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.- This subject may now, until the makers of the Convention return home, receive its dismissal, every material question relating to it having been discussed, and having been pretty clearly decided in the public mind. It is settled, that the thing was, in itself, disgraceful to our arms; that it was, in its effects, injurious to our allies of Portugal in particular, and to those of Spain and Sweden; that it was insulting, to the last degree, to the Prince Regent of Portugal and to his faithful adherents; that there existed, not only no necessity for making it, but that obvious policy pointed out an exactly contrary course; and, lastly, that the to blame is equally divided between Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley, the latter, if any difference, meriting the greatest share. We have, however, to to consider what shage of blame attaches to the ministers, and particularly the war minister, for having made such appointments; and, I think, the words which I have taken for my motto, and which were written before any one had the smallest doubt of the final success of the expedition, will fully justify me in imputing to them no small share of blame.It has always been the practice of the public to blame the ministers for the follies or vices of those whom they appoint to command; and, that this is generally just no one will deny; because, in a state of things, where there are so many temptations for them to seek, in such appointments, their own or their party's interest, in preference to that of the public, there ought to be some check upon them, which check is to be found only in that responsibility, which the public has a right to demand at their hands. Were there no blame, in cases of this sort, to attach to them, with what reason can we expect that they will ever make good appointments, unless we choose to suppose, that wisdom, Bourage, and integrity are inseparable from parliamentary interest? That every minister must wish to see his military and naval plans succeed is evident enough; but, the mo [546 ment any expedition is on foot; that is to say, the moment any lucrative and honourable appointments are to be made, that moment is he assailed with applications, backed by such arguments as are not to be treated with contempt, unless he choose to run the risk of being out voted, and of losing his place, his emoluments, and his power. This being the case, it is quite reasonable that there should be a check upon him, in this respect. He appoints, at last, whom he pleases to appoint; but, then, it being notorious, that his interest may be affected in his appointments, he be comes responsible to the public for the disgrace or the injury it may sustain from the misconduct of those whom he selects, and invests with commands. Upon these principles the public have always proceeded. The late ministers were blamed for the folly, or the cowardice, of their commanders in Egypt and in South America; and, why should not these ministers be blamed for the conduct of Wellesley and Sir Hew? As to Sir Hew, I had never heard any harm of him, to be sure; but I had never heard any good of him, because, until the Portuguese expedition, I had never heard his uncouth name pronounced in my whole life. His being utterly unknown to every body, except, perhaps, that silly part of the public, who waste six or eight minutes every day in reading what is called “ the "court news," was of itself a reason for his not being appointed to the command of an expedition of such immense inportance to the country, It is said, with what truth I do not know, that he is a relation of Mr. George Rose. If this be the fact, we need not wonder so much why he was selected. But, be this as it may, the ministers knew him well, or they did not know him well if the former, they sinned in ap pointing a man whom they knew to be unfit for a great command; and, if the latter, they sinned in committing the honour of England and the welfare of her allies to the hands of a man, whom they did not well know. It is their business, they are paid well for it, to examine into, to ascertain, : to make themselves sure, as to the character and abilities of those whom they invest with high authority, and on whom they bestow large emoluments. When we conplain of the weight of taxes, and of the great sums which public men receive out of the fruit of our labour, we are always reminded of the arduous duties they have to perform and of the weight of responsibility that rests upon their shoulders; and, we are asked, whether any man, possessing great talents and high rank, can be expected to exert those talents for the public and to incur such heavy responsibility, without the security of a suitable compensation. I appeal to the reader, whether this be not, upon such occasions, the argument constantly used. Well, then, if the men, whom we pay at such an enormous rate, and who, if they serve us but for a few years, are saddled upon our devoted ass-like backs for life, accompanied, perhaps, with paniers containing their wives and children; if these men be so wonderfully gifted as to merit all this, have we not a right to expect, and even to demand, at their hands, the selection of proper commanders? Have we not a right to demand proofs of their discriminating powers, of their judg ment, and of their firmness in resisting applications, which, if yielded to, would be Injurious to us? And, when is it that we are to call upon them for their far-famed "responsibility," if not when we have suffered an injury from the conduct of persons appointed by them? If this be not the true meaning of ministerial responsibility, what is its meaning? If they are to appoint whom they please to command our troops; if they are to commis our honour and our safety to the hands of their own relations, or to those of others who will vote for them in the parliament house, and if, when that honour and that safety have been sacrificed, we are to be told that the ministers are not responsible, I beg leave to be informed of the cases, wherein they acknowledge responsibility Wellesley was well-known to them. It is notorious, that he was an inmate with them. I believe he is, even now, one of the principal officers of the government of Ireland. They must have known him well; and, as to their saying, "who would "have thought" him capable of taking the lead in such a deed as that committed in Por tugal, we are not so to be answered: "I "should have thought; many others would "have thought it; and, at any rate, it was 66 $0. That is enough for us." Wellesley was one of themselves; chosen from their own boly they had previously committed the gov.rnment (for his was the really effi cient office) of a third part of the kingdom to his hands; they must know his character and every part of his character well, or they were too stupid to be entrusted with the management of the affairs of a parish. And, shall they not now be responsible for his conduct? He was, I repeat it, one of themselves He went out as their immediate representative. Shall they not, then, be answerable for what he has done?—The ul timate consequences of the Convention cannot yet be known; but, we know, that it has filled our allies in Portugal with disgust and indignation, and that these must operate to the injury of both nations is certain We know also, that the sending home of five or six thousand Russian officers and seamen must be injurious to Sweden as well as to ourselves. And, as to Spain, we have the strongest reason to believe, that our conduct in Portugal, must excite suspicion and dis trust amongst all our allies, more especially amongst those in Spain. There, if our troops are now sent, our commanders will, in all human probability, have little or nothing confided to them. Spain, who looks up to us for assistance of every sort, is just in that state, in which distrust is most likely to ba fatal. Can any man reasonably hope, that we have not excited distrust of us, by our conduct in Portugal? And, if we have, who will take upon him to say, that, fr the date of the Convention, the ruin đư Spanish cause began? We see, that Ba parté is making great exertions for the re tion of Spain. The people of that country cannot be unaware of the danger. If they distrust us, they will cool in spite of all the toasts at the London Tavern and all the odes of poet Fitzgerald. How different would the feelings of Spain as well as of England have been, at this moment, had we captured Junot and his army? In short, if the Spa nish patriots should be subdued, if their cause should now begin to be deserted, it may, in great part, be fairly attributed to this Convention. And, shall the people of England call upon no one for responsibility? Shall those, who appointed the commanders, and who had so many persons amongst whom to choose, plead not guilty to this heavy charge?If Spain fall, let England take care. "Colonies!" Napoleon Joseph is not fool, is not ass, is not stupid beast enough to set any value upon them. Give him Spain, and he will very willingly leave in our hands the mines that have hitherto proved a curse to Spain; and will leave us, as a make weight in the bargain, all the feuds, the commotions, the expensive and blondy wars, which would inevitably arise cut of our possession of those colonies. Should Spain fall, is there any man who will say, that that fatal event has not been accelerated by the Convention in Portugal? And shall not the minister's be responsible for the conduct of those who made that convention?" Why whom were they "to choose?" Oh, insulted nation! It is not for them to ask thee whom they were to choose; but for thee to ask them, whether they could not have made a better choice out of a Staff establishment that costs thee nearly a million sterling a year, It was for thee to ask them, whether that Staff, which exceeds in number the whole of the standing army of England in the reign of Charles II, would not afford generals enough for the command of thirty thousand men, without taking one of the ministry of Ireland for the purpose. This is by no means the least mortifying part of the story. We are a nation be-generalled from head to foot. There is scarcely a parish wherein some general does not reside. "The gene-wilful, and to draw, from that fact, the ral and his aide-de-camps" make the dust fly from one end of the country to the other; and yet, when we find fault of an appointment of generals,, we are asked, that, in the Official Gazette, which contained the documents relative to the Convention, the armistice, which was the most important of the documents, because it was the basis of all the rest, was inserted in the French language only, while all the others were inserted in the English language only, It was Sir Arthur Wellesley ho negociated and sigued the armistice; and, the minis ters at home, his colleagues in office, publish that document to the people of England in the French language only. One other fact, pray note down and remember; that we pay a man, called "the GAZETTE WRITER," three hundred pounds a year out of the taxes; though, as you must perceive, he has nothing to do but merely to see that publications of this sort are correct. Neither the ministers, nor any of their wri ters, have attempted to say, that this partial insertion was owing to mistake, or to the misconduct of their underlings; we have, therefore, a right to conclude, that it was why, whom were the ministers to choose?" We have sent only about a tenth part of our force to Portugal, and if we could not find good commanders for them, what is to become of the rest? 17 "hear thee; "A military nation," indeed! We are a pretty military nation, if, when only a tenth part of our force be sent out, and that, too, upon a service the most important, we are unable to select generals better than those, who made the Convention in Portugal, and when one plea in favour of the ministers, is, that they had not the means of making a better selection. There has been, as far as the public can perceive, nothing done yet in the way of recalling. Nothing has been done; not even the previous steps, have been taken, for the purpose of doing the nation justice. There has dropped from the ministers not one word, tending to shew, that they have a design to do us justice. Their intention appears to be, to let the thing remain quiet; to say nothing and do nothing; to let the public rage exhaust itself, and when it has died away, to smuggle in the commanders, having given them and their friends an abundance of time for the contriving of excuses of all sorts and sizes. This may, very probably, succeed; but, if it should, it will bring with it one source of consolation, at any rate, that, in future, the success of Napoleon will become a matter of indifference. Remember, reader; always remember, natural inference, which is, that they mean to shelter Wellesley. This, however, they cannot do, unless they shelter Sir Hew. Sir Hew will speak in his own defence, I warrant him; and, he will find, at his back. the same interest that procured him the command. Come, come, then, Sir Hewy, and let us hear you. "Had I three ears I'd but the ministers will, I dare say, take care, that none of us shall hear you for some time yet to come. They will let us cool first. Their study, at present, seems to be, not so much to overcome Buonaparté as to overcome us. Instead of the defence of the country, they seem to be thinking of the defence of its generals. Poor Whitelocke, had you no friends at home! What! could you not muster up a single half dozen of hags to rattle over the pavement and intrigue for you? Unfortunate and careless man, not to provide for a safe retreat, in case of disaster! Another time (for there can be now no earthly objection to your being sent out the chief in command) you will, I dare say, profit from the experience now before you, and will, above all things, take care, that you negociate in French. Below will be found two letters upon this subject, which I beg leave to point out to the attention of my readers. The first touches upon some points that had escaped me, and puts several questions, to which I should like to hear an answer given. His praise of my endeavours might have been spared; and, upon a future occasion, if he should think proper to address the public through me, I shall be obliged to him to refrain from the like, because a plain unvarnished declaration of acquiescence in opinion, and of approbation of my conduct, is better calculated to answer the purpose in view, and is much more gratifying to myself. The second letter is the vehicle of sentiments precisely the opposite of those contained in the one just mentioned. It evidently comes from a friend, if not relation of Wellesley; and, though, for the greater part, it consists of a repetition of the statements and reasoning, which I have already quoted from the Nabobs' Gazette (commonly called the Morning Post), and which I have, I trust, pretty completely refuted, there is a point or two, upon which it touches, that I cannot let pass unnoticed. The writer appears to be of opinion, that what I have written is likely to produce an effect hostile to his friend, therefore he endeavours to find out for me a motive for misrepresenting his conduct. He says, that my hatred of the Wellesleys for having been the firm friends of the late Mr. Pitt has induced me to disfigure facts in order to injure Sir A. Wellesley in the public opinion. Now, in the first place, I never knew the Wellesleys as adherents of Pitt, that famous talker being, fortunately for the nation, dead before they came flocking home from India, where they had been so long engaged in glorious wars against the native Viziers and Aumils. But, how does this imputation tally with the notorious fact? Did I, when the news of the victory, in Portugal, came,. seem grudging of my praises of the commander's conduct? Did I not attribute the victory to him alone; and did I not put the victory upon a level, as to its probable consequences, with that of Trafalgar? Should I have done this, if my hatred against the Wellesleys, on account of their attachment to Pitt (or rather to their own selfish views through Pitt) had so completely subdued in my mind all sense of impartiality and of justice. There were two lights, in which the Portuguese victories might have. been spoken of; there were two lights, in which Wellesley's dispatches might have been exhibited to the public; and, if I chose that which was, in both cases, most favourable to Wellesley, will the public believe, that I have since been actuated by motives of personal or party hatred? When am I to hear the last of this hatred of mine against the friends of "the late Mr. Pitt?" I can publish no account of peculation, of folly, or of cowardice; I can detect or expose no rascal whatever, but I am instantly accused of being actuated by motives of hatred on account of the party's friendship Dots, 4 1 for "the late Mr. Pitt." No matter that is to be ascribed to the same malicious mo- This writer says, that Wellesley did protest privately against the Convention, and, for proof of his assertion, he appeals to the many" private letters that have been "received from the army," which private letters I had, as the reader will bear in mind, represented as base fabrications. Now, says this acute gentleman," you have called "them lies, but you will find it difficult to "make the public believe that so many persons of high honour would have con "curred in the statement of what was totally "false." So I should; but he forgets, that it has not yet been proved, that any from a person of high honour, or that any letter at all, has been received from the army, containing such a statement. Extract upon extract from such described letters of have, indeed, been published in many the news-papers, and particularly in the Nabob's Gazette; but, where have we seen any voucher for their authenticity? Has there appeared one with any name wit letter |