"" SO much afflicted your country, and to the

recovery of which your excellency's zeal " and solicitude have so much contributed. "I have the honour to be, with the highest "consideration and respect, your excellenec cy's most humble and obedient servant, "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."- -Now, where are the liars with their "letters from the army," and their "protest"? There was nothing even remarkable, except the part to which even Cotton would not assent; and he congratulates the Bishop upon that, against which his friends here swear that he solemnly protested.-Pray, reader, bear with me, while I trace along the course of these villainous lies; while I ferret out the political vermin that are gnawing at the heart of the country.--On the 16th of September the news of the disgraceful Convention was published in an Extraordinary Gazette.

By recurring to the newspapers, it will be seen, that, as far back as the 11th, a rumour of the Convention prevailed. On the 12th it was stated that there had been a Convention made; but, that it had been done by the Portuguese Regency; that it was a clever French trick, and that our generals were not (no, no, 'faith!) men to be imposed upon by any such device. On the 13th, the Courier had the following remark upon this supposed Convention :

Though we have been unable to trace "this rumour to any authentic source, yet ec we must confess that it is a manœuvre or "trick perfectly in the French character. "Junot might hope by such a capitulation "to get off with his plunder and save the "Russian squadron, and he might think "that, however we might object, we could not refuse to abide by it. Nothing to be sure would be weaker in the Portuguese Regency, knowing of our approach to "their assistance, than to conclude a Con. "vention of such a nature. The very pro"posal to capitulate on the part of Junot "would, we should think, have made "them perfectly sensible that he had no "hopes of making an effectual stand against "the British force advancing against him.

in the different papers, which paragraph stated, that, in consequence of Sir A. Wellesley having been superceded, and his advice having been rejected, the victory of the 21st was not followed up, and the enemy was enabled to concentrate his forces and to take strong positions. This is the identical lie, which has since been repeated, and which was, I trust, completely detected and exposed, in my last, where it was shown, that Wellesley had, agreeably to Sir H. Burrard's dispatch, the whole and sole active command during, and till after, the battle of the 21st. But, observe the time of this lie's appearing. It was a day, if not two, after the ministers had received intelligence of all that had been done. Wellesley's friends had got hold of it; and they instantly set to work, with their usual activi ty and impudence. On the 16th, when the news,. as communicated through the Mayor of London, made its appearance in the public prints, it came side-by-side with para graphs, stating, that there had been a misunderstanding amongst our commanders in Portugal. But the best way is to take one of these, with a particular reference. The Morning Chronicle of the 16th, had this paragraph: "These accounts seem to jus tify the reports which have been for some days in circulation, respecting a mis derstanding which is represented toe "taken place between our military "manders in Portugal. Sir A. Welle "in particular, is mentioned, as being a "tremely dissatisfied with the proceedings "which have taken place since he was s

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perseded in the command, and it has bee "said even that he was about to retur "home in disgust. But whatever founda "tion there may be for the former part "the rumour, the high character of this

distinguished and gallant officer makes it impossible to believe the latter. We un"derstand, that when the capitulation was

signed, he was at above twenty miles dis"tant from head quarters."- -When, however, the Gazette came out, and exhi bited to us the name of this same high"charactered and gallant officer," at the bottom of the most infamous of the doct ments, a circumstance of which his friends, even those of the highest rank, could not be aware, until they saw the documents; when the Gazette came out, it was time to change the lie; and, it was then asserted, with as much assurance as his absence had before been asserted, that he was compelled to sign the armistice; that he had solemnly protested against it; and that he was, there fore, not at all responsible for what had been

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done. Corresponding with these assertions, there were published several pretended letters from the army, insinuating, that Dalrymple and Burrard were fools, at least; saying that their arrival had spoiled ail, and praising Wellesiey to the skies. But, now we have, under Wellesley's own signature again, a proof that he approved of what he had signed in the armistice, and that he considered the terms of that document, which terms have filled all England as well as all Portugal with grief and rage; that he considered those terms, which his friends take the devil to witness that he protested against at the same moment that he signed them; we have now, as if he had been resolved to raise a blush upon the cheek of even his hardened advocates; we have now, under his own hand, the proof that he regarded those terms as a matter of congratulation. And, observe, that he writes this letter to the bishop, before he knew that Cotton would not agree to the neutrality of the Russian fleet and of the port of Lisbon. It is the thing in all its worst light that he approves of, and upon which he presents his congratulation.And how came Wellesley to be the person to write to the bishop? Why not Sir Hew Dalrymple? This circumstance, though, at first sight, it appears trifling, is of great importance; because, it shews, that, though superceded in form, he, in fact, did keep the command of the army How came he to write to the bishop? Whence should this arise, but from that arrogance, which had prevailed over, and borne down, every person and every thing that came in its way?

In short, there remains not, in my mind, the smallest doubt of bis having been the chief, nay, the sole cause, of all the mischief that has been done. There are some who ascribe a still worse motive to him than I am inclined to ascribe, and, it must be confessed that the acknowledgment of "the emperor and king of Italy" together with that of the Duke d'Abrantes," might justify any suspicions; but, the motive I think imputable to him, supposing him not to be either a downright fool or coward, is that of a determination to gratify his own insolent ambition, and to keep all others in the shade, cost what it might to his country, to the country of our allies, or to the great cause of Europe in general - Dearly has the Country paid for this arrogance; this insolence; but, when we cast our eyes back but a little, we must confess, that, great as is the punishment, the country richly deserves it. Ah! we now feel, do we, what it is to profect, cherish, and pamper such men? We

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have not yet done with this sort of feeling. We have yet new indignities to encounter. I am told, indiced, and from what I deem good authority, that "the ministers and the king are as indignant at the conduct of our commanders as I am." It is very natural that they should be so; but, I am, nevertheless, fully prepared to witness a series of the basest arts to which villainy, backed by a heavy purse, ever yet resorted. That these arts will not succeed, I think very probable; yet, again I beseech the public to be upon their guard against them.

With respect to the consequences of the Convention in Portugal, some of them have already been pointed out; but, there is one which forces itself upon us in a way not to be denied immediate observation, and that is, the delay in sending part of the troops to the assistance of the Spanish patriots. Sir Hew told us, that the hastening off troops to Spain was, in his mind, the chief advantage of the Convention. The Convention was signed between five and six weeks ago. Is there any man who believes, that a sing's English soldier has yet left Portugal for Spain? Three weeks, we know, had been spent without any step being taken to fulfil the Convention; or, at least, without any of the French troops having been embarked; and, should there be no impediment from the Portuguese, it will, in all human probability, be a month from this time, before a regiment cau be marched off. But, if there should be an impediment, what will, in that case, be the delay? Why four times as great, perhaps, as could have arisen from a reduction of the French army, and a sending of them to England prisoners of war. But, why are not the Convention-making generals recalled? Can any one affect to believe, that our army, under these men, either will or can do any thing good, in Spain or Portugal ? Spain and Portugal have made common cause against a common foe; the latter has protested against our conduct; it has, in the person of its chief commander, accused us openly of having usurped the rights of its sovereign and having sacrificed its interests to the safety and impunity of its foreign and domestic foes. This protest has, by this time, been read in every town of Spain. Is it to be believed, then, that the Spaniards will suffer the Convention making generals to enter their territory?— No time should, therefore, be lost in recalling those generals. For want of one to ake the command, the Serjeant, who is said to have refused the watch and purse of general Bernier, as a bribe for setting that

general at liberty, would do very well. That man, I'll engage, would never have signed the armistice of the 22d of September. It is clear, that the recall of these men ought immediately to take place; and, I repeat my astonishment, that it has not already been announced to the public, as a But, measure in the course of fulfilment. there is more besides this to be done, in order to reinstate us in the confidence of the Portuguese and Spaniards, who will hardly be satisfied with the disclaimer, however strongly and generally expressed, of the public in England. They will require a disclaimer on the part of our government; and, surely, they will not have to wait many days for a formal, a public, a solemn Declaration, in the name of the king, expressing his grief for what his generals in Portugal have done; giving the strongest assurances, that the like shall not again be done; and, to give weight to these assurances, a distinct intimation, that the parties, against whose conduct the Portuguese have protested, shall, with all the speed that the impartiat administration of justice will admit of, be brought to trial. Nothing short of this will afford us a chance of restoration to the confidence of the nations in question; nations upon whom the enemy is now pouring down with immense force, and who, if they need our aid at all, must need it at this moment. What a wide difference there would now have been in our prospects; how different would they have been from what they are, if this shameful Convention had not been made; and, if our commanders had, from the firsi, acted with the discretion, with that respect for the feelings of the Portuguese, which the circumstances of the case rendered so peculiarly appropriate. I perceive, in the Gazette which has reached me to day, an account of a very gallant exploit of my LORD COCHRANE; but he does not take all the merit to himself; you hear from him. not a word of bragging; he talks of no wonders that he and his crew have performed; but he takes care not to omit the mention of the good conduct of the Spaniards. "The castle of Mougal," says he, "important post, completely commanding a pass in the road from Barcelona to Gerona, which the French are now besieging, and the only one between those towns occupied by the enemy, surren ered this morning to his majesty's ship under my command' The Spanish militia behaved admirably, in carrying et an outpost on a neighbouring hill. Lieut. Hone, with the marines, took possession

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"of the castle, which, by means of powder, "is now levelled with the ground. The "rocks there are blown down into the road, "which in many other places is rendered "impassable to artillery without a very heavy loss of men, if they determine to "repair them.-I inclose to your lordship "" a list of the prisoners and of the material

part of military stores; all that could be "of use to the Spanish militia have been de"livered to them."This is the manner, in which a brave, a wise, and modest man acts and speaks. He leaves his commander and his country to determine the degree of his merit and the importance of the particular service. Oh, had we had my lord Cochrane at Ramahal, we should now have had Junot and his army in England! The conduct of Sir Samuel Hood, in the Baltic; his judicious proceeding after the action; every thing that we now see of gallantry, or wis dom, or modesty, in our commanders, ser ves as a contrast to what has taken place in Portugal, where, more than in all other places put together, we stood in need of the practice of these virtues. To be overbearing and vain glorious is, too, so opposite to our national character; it is so to belye our country! Well, we have now a pretty good lesson up on the consequence of committing our interests and our honour to the keeping fighter of nabob viziers; and, if from t lesson we do not profit, wo merit to be tr ed like the subjects of those same nabob viziers.

Here I should have dismissed this subject, until, at least, it had been seen what the ministers really intended to do; but, I must add a few words upon the conduct of the Morning Post newspaper of yesterday. It will be remembered, that, in my last, I stated a fact about the proprietorship of that paper, which fact was of great importance, considered in connection with the defence which that paper has attempted to make for Wellesley. Instead of any thing in answer to that statement, what do I find? Why, a silly letter of two columns and a half in length, controverting my opinions about the Spanish Revolution, and which letter the editor acknowledges to have had in his hands for a month past; as if, by controverting those opinions, he should prove my statement, relative to his paper, to be untrue.

In the same paper, there is a long article, the object of which is, to cause it to be believed, that the censure now bestowed upon the conduct of Wellesley proceeds solely from a spirit of party. Now, let the ministry betake them quickly to political re pentance, if this be true: for, of this

the distance of about 15 or 16 leagues, with the strong fortress of Monjui by which it is overlooked; and had now laid siege to Gerona, situated in the intermediate space between those places. Under these circumstances, and keeping in our recollection the vicinity of the scene to France itself, the Count advanced for the purpose of raising the siege." On his arrival at the town of Castilla, he found that he could muster about 6000 men in arms; and though there were among them only about 300 veterans, and but a very few more that were formed into companies of miquelots, he did not hesitate a moment to attack the enemy, upon a system adapted to the nature of his and their force." The enemy is stated to have been from 7 to 8000 infantry, and from 8 to 900 cavalry," under General Duhesme.

Now admitting, (even against the express evidence of the dispatch), that the French might not have been superior in number to the army by which they were attacked, and admitting likewise that the besieged Geronians themselves were to be accounted as part of the Spanish force, yet, according to the doctrine of an armed population being to a regular army an "unresisting medium," the Spanish Patriots who attacked this army of accomplished regulars, in a position between two strong fortresses in their possession, and very near the French gate info Spain, and protected also by a body of cavalry to which they themselves had none to oppose, ought to have been put to a shamefal flight, or, had they been mad enough to have rushed upon destruction, ought to have been cut to atoms and annihilated. But, on the contrary, these regulars, having every advantage on their side, are borne down by "the skill and valour" of the patriots, their line of battle is broken, one part seeking their safety in Figueras and the other within the walls of Barcelona. It seems probable that the "300 veterans" of the Spanish were no part of a distinct corps, but individuals who, in consequence of the rule of the Spanish army, of enlisting for limited service, were found among the population now armed and organized; but, be that as it may, and whether serving together, or (as more probable) in the capacity of non-commissioned officers, here is an army of volunteers with as few veteran individuals in its ranks as can be supposed ever to happen, and yet, so far is it from being a mere "depositary of panic," that it attacks the enemies' batteries with the bayonet, with such ardour and celerity, they have acarce time to think of resistance; they

are defeated, they perish, or fly under the impulse of terror."-They attempt to rally, "in order to reconquer what they had so ignominiously lost; " but it is impractica ble. Although a remnant of their force is preserved by their protecting cavalry, yet, leaving behind them artillery, small arms, ammunition, wheat, and plunder, and car rying off" 30 waggons filled with their wounded," in the course of the night after the battle, which had commenced at 7 in the morning and lasted until late in the evening," they seek for safety in flight. But here again, so keen was the pursuit, that they had to sustain "various encoun ters on the road to Barcelona, in all of which they proved to be in a state of complete disorder, and, at every step of their progress, many of them paid the forfeit of their lives; so that their dead almost touched each other as they fell, until their arrival at Barcelona, with a remnant of about 600, for the preservation of which a corps advanced from that city." Of what befel the other division which fled to Figueras, in an opposite direction, the writer of the dis patch does not appear to have been ac quainted; but he had informed us that both divisions were "pursued by Milans and Glaros, in the routes which they had respec tively taken;" whence we may natu suppose that those who fled to Figuera ed not escape unpunished.-Such, Sir, are be facts: but what is the moral ?-It is that which is everywhere inculcated in the Egis, that a regular army, necessary as it may be for invading other countries, or for foreign service of every kind, is not neces sary for a nation's defence. Nor will it be any impeachment of this doctrine, should Spain, now she has got a general Junta of Regency, increase her regular force in any degree to which her finances may extend. The raising of the siege of Gerona and the defeat of Dubesme will still remain upon record to prove, that a regular army necessary for the defence of a nation.

tus.

is not

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I am, nevertheless, Sir, well aware of sound reasons why Spain, under her pre sent circumstances, may adopt the expe dient of increasing her regular force. Her militia is on a bad model; she never had such a system as the English posse Perfect as in its own nature that sys tem is, yet even in England a plan for restoring it to "full vigour and energy," ac cording to the wish of Sir William Jones, has got no nearer adoption than being in manuscript, as the draught of a parliamen tary bill. Meanwhile, Spain has not a mo ment to lose. Although armed patriots,