than from the united zeal for proselytism of all the sects; and those who pretend to be so staunchly her friends would better evince the sincerity of their professions by endeavouring to bring about a reform, than by joining in the factious and vulgar bawi of "no popery." When the offices of the church are thus considered as so much property which, without regard to the duties annexed to them, may be bought and sold, how can we be surprised that offices in the state, and seats in the House of Commons should also be taken in to the estimate of individual wearth? They are all abuses belonging to the same system, they have a common origin, and are employed for a common purpose. Do you imagine, that when a rectory is sold, the welfare of the parish is consulted? Far from it: you might as well suppose that attention, is paid to the interest of the public, when places and boroughs are transferred from one possessor to another. No, Sir; it is well it the parish do not suffer by the change: Thereare, I am aware, some cases which form honourable exceptions to his character; but so few are they, as to be scarcely worthy of mention, unless it be as examples of private excellence exerted for the public good-We are taught to regard our ecclesiastical and civil establishments as monuments of the wisdom and virtue of our forefathers-with more propriety may we look upon them as the remains. But when we hear that the friends of this young nobleman, or that young commoner, who has wasted his substance in riot and extravagance, are about to provide forhim by procuring him a living, a place, or a borough, how can we avoid being reminded of two stupendous almshouses, where highben mendicants are charitably received! I request your attention, Sir, to the foregoing letter, and am, with every sentiment of respect-A FRIEND TO RADICAL REFORM.Liverpool, Aug. 20, 1808. POOR. MITCHAM. executed, and to excite resident country gentlemen to the same laudable exertion. Allow me, Sir, to introduce another case to the notice of your readers as a further stimulus.The parish of Mitcham in the county of Surrey, bad for many years been suffer. ing the dictatorship of Methodists and members of the Suppression of Vice Society; under whose government the poor were fed on cheap provisions, rice and dried herrings; a walk was raised two-fifths of a mile over the common, for the saints to visit and pray with the idle and profligate at the workhouse; eternal complaints were made by the paupers to the bench of magistrates, the rates were from 12 to 14 shillings in the pound, and the parish were nearly £700 in debt. About 5 or 6 years ago a Mr. Moore, the lord of the manor, having some hun 'dred acres of freehold, and occupying some hundreds more, felt the increase of por rates oppressively himself, and listening to the complaints of the neighbourhood, although he had an exemption from parish offices, yet offered himself to be one of the overseers; having held the office for 3 years he paid off the old standing debt, reduced the rate from 5s. to 5s. 6d, and left £100 in hand though the rate was burthened with the half bounties for militia men, and the maintenance of their wives and families, which had not been the case in his predeces sors' time; though he apprenticed cut with parish fees between 30 and 40 of the chil dren who before had been "fed with the "bread of idleness," and though he at a very considerable expence repaired the work house.-His first step was to compel 2-5ths of the able but idle paupers to maintaio themselves, who had been supported with out work at public expense, merely be cause they affected saintship; the rest, who were not incapacitated by age or infirmity, were employed in labour according to their abilites. No householder was excused paying rates for religious or political party's sake; every man renting above £5 per annum SIR;-As the reduction of the poor's rate is become an object of such national concern, not merely on pecuniary conside was compelled to pay his share rations, but because it tends to debase and of the burthen; the lower orders thereby enervate the minds of the lower orders of feeling the obligation they were under to the the people, who were once considered, and larger renters for their larger share of the ought now to be the strength of the compulsive subscription, which they were country, I was pleased to see you relate least likely ever to be benefited by them in your valuable work, an account of some selves: thus the poorer part became congentlemen who had been successful in les-cerned in keeping the rate low; while the sening the burthen, and reforming the abuses of their respective parishes. You gave this relation in honourable testimony of their zeal, to shew the thing is practicable if ably Printed by Cox and Baylis, Great Queen Street; published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent Garden, where former Numbers may be had: sold also by J. Budd, Crown and Mitre, Pall-Mail, actual paupers were rendered more comfort able, are better fed and clothed, are kept in habits of industry and led to sober babits of religion. (To be continued.) VOL. XIV. No. 11.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1808. [PRICE 10D. "Curls are not cannons; hair-powder is not gun-powder, tails are not bayonets. Are these the arms and "ammunition, by which the enemies of Russia are to be defeated !"---SuwAROFF. 3851 It SUMMARY OF POLITICS. PORTUGAL. Of the victories, obtained over the French, in Portugal, by the English army, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and which victories are detailed in the official papers contained in this sheet, it is unnecessary to attempt to speak in praise; but, as far as we can judge from the accounts yet received, they certainly reflect the greatest honour on the army as well as on the commanders of every rank. was, in my opinion, fully proved before, that our troops, when well commanded, were far superior to the French troops. I never regarded the assertion of that superiority as an empty boast. There were always reasons why our troops should be intrinsically better, and there was abundant experience to verify the theory. But, now, I should imagine, it will be very difficult for the French, though masters of the press of Europe, to prevent that fact from being acknowledged all over the world. In this point of view alone, then, our success is of vast importance. The victory, though not more glorious to the nation, is, in this as well as in other parts of its consequences, near and remote, of far greater importance to us than the victory of Trafalgar, which gave no new turn to the war, excited no great degree of feeling in the nations of Europe, and did not, in the least, arrest the progress of the French arins or diminish their fame or that dread of those arms which universally prevailed The consequences of this victory will be, first, a thorough conviction in the mind of every man in this kingdom, that the French, when met by us upon any thing like equal terms, are pretty sure to be beate n, which conviction will produce a confidence in our means of defence which did not unequivocally exist before, it will dissipate all the unmanly apprehensions about the threatened invasion, and, of course, it will, in a short time, relieve the country, in great part at least, from the inconvenience and distress, which, in so many ways, arise from the present harrassing system of inter. nal defence. Secondly, this victory, gained under such circumstances, will take off from that dread, in which the French arms have -[386 been so long held in other nations, and particularly in the southern parts of Europe. Thirdly, it will confirm the confidence of the Spaniards, will make them even bolder than they were, will make them despise as well as hate the French. Fourthly, it will not only diminish the military and pecuniary means of Napoleon, but will reader him timid; it will make him hesitate; it will fill him with apprehensions; it will enervate his councils; the consequence of which may be his total overthrow; particularly as his rigorous maritime and commercial regulations are so severely felt in all the countries under his control. Amongst the minor consequences of this victory (taking for granted that it will lead to the total evacuation of Portugal by the French) will be a speedy and bloodless settlement of our dispute with America, which is costing us something in precautionary measures. The American trade to Spain and Portugal was very great; and to trade thither now, as well as with the colonies of those countries, we can, if they behave well, give them leave. -The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of the enterprize, no man of a just mind will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise. Indeed, it cannot be denied, that almost the whole of their measures, with respect to foreign countries, have been strongly marked with foresight, promptitude, and vigour. Their Orders in Council, against which Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Roscoe, and the Barings, so bitterly inveighed, have been one cause, and not a trifling one, of the events in Spain and Portugal, into which countries we could not have entered had not the people been with us, and that the people were with us, arose, in great part, from those despair-creating effects, which were produced by the Orders in Council, which orders they could not fail to ascribe to Napo leon, nor could they fail to perceive, that, N while he possessed their country, there was not the smallest chance of their being relieved from those effects. How false, then, have events proved to be the reasoning of Lord Grenville and Mr. Roscoe and Mr. Baring, that the Orders in Council would make us detested by all the suffering nations, and would tend to strengthen the power of Napoleon over them! I could easily. refer to the passage, wherein I contended, that the Ordets in Council would naturally have the effect of shaking the authority of Napoleon in the conquered, or dependant, states, by producing unbearable distress. 1, indeed, wished for a still greater stretch of maritime power. I wished an interdict to be issued against all those not in alliance with 115. I wished the whole world to be told: As long as you suffer France to command all "the land, England will command all the sea, "and from that sea, she will permit none "of you to derive any, even the smallest advantage, or comfort." But, without this, the ministers really have done what they said they would do; they have brought things to a crisis; they have got rid of that benumbing, death-like lingering, which had been the characteristic of our warfare for so many years; and, if they follow up their blows, it is not impossible, that, after all the senseless admiration which has been bestowed upon speech-making ministers, we may see the conqueror of Europe, the king and queen maker, toppled from his tool by the Duke of Portland. Now is the time to recall the public attention to the doctrines of Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Ros.coe. I should now like to see, from the pen of the latter in particular, an essay on the wisdom of making peace in 1806, and another upon the moderation of Napoleon, both of which were the subjects of his dull pamphlet. I should like now to see him attempting to convince the manufacturers, that they would have gained by a peace made in 1806, and that they would have enjoyed their gains in peace and safety. His doctrines, luckily for the nation, did not prevail. The common sense of the people taught them that his doctrines were false. He could not make them see any prospect of real peace; and, though the conqueror was still borne upon the wings of victory; though a refusal to submit to his terms was followed by a still greater extension of his power and of our danger, yet the nation said, "go on he must if he will, for, until the state of Europe be changed, England cannot enjoy a moment's real peace." By the measures of the present ministers, the great question, which every ene was afraid to mout, was at once clearly put: can England exist independent, and in defiance, of all the civilized world, or can she not? This question, the most interesting that ever was started, has now been decide, and for this decision, so glorious to us and to our country for ever, we have to thank the men who are at present in power.— But, if these victories, and if a continuation of success, is not to have the effect of diminishing the sacrifices that the people make, if they are not to put an end in time, to the system of red-coat arming and forts and berracks, in England, I shall regard them as being of little use. I do not expect or wish), that these precautions, little as I may think of their efficacy, should all at once be thrown aside; but, I do hope, that, as soon as al reasonable men are perfectly satisfied, th there is no longer the smallest danger of in vasion, the ministers will begin to shew a disposition to restore the country to its for mer state of confidence in itself, to abridge the enormous expences of an establishment which now costs about twenty millions a nually, and to render the ruling influence less of a military nature. The army, or least, the part of the nation under military rule and influence, is too large to be consi tent with the principles or the practice of freedom. Regarded as the means of a emergency it is not so odious; but, if were to be attempted to keep such a for on foot as a permanent establishment, might, at once, bid adieu to the hope ever being a free people, and, in fact, w should have made all these sacrifices, our countrymen would have bled, only for the purpose of forging and rivetting our ow chains. By degrees, which succeed ex other very rapidly, a military nation gets it to a military government. It is quite im possible to separate the things in idea, and as impossible to separate them long in fact They are interwoven in their nature.The expence too is enormous. Every parent who leaves a hundred pounds in legacies to his children, has to reflect, that six er seven of those pounds are now deducted for pur poses of a military nature. To maintain such an army, with all its numerous retain ers, and all its pretences for expenditure, must alone, in time, leave the individual proprietor little to call his own. In short, it must eat bim out of house and home. Therefore, in rejoicing at the success of the army, in applauding the wisdom and bravery of all concerned in the enterprize, I must say, that no small part of my satisfaction arises from the hope, that, in the end, this success, with the others, by which I trust it will be followed, will produce a diminution --- of the army and its expences.- -That we should continue a military nation, as long as the necessity exists, there can be no doubt; and, that we should afterwards have a general and permanent plan of military defence is what I wish for; but, that we should have a large permanent army, commanded by officers appointed and cashiered at pleasure; that we should have such an army an hour longer than is absolutely necessary to our security from the attacks of a foreign toe, I hope no man will be found to assert; especially after the glorious example given us by the patriots of Spain, who have proved to the whole world, that a people rising in de fence of their country, though without discipline and without appointed leaders, are more than a match for the bravest and most skilful enemy. SPAIN. In speaking of the probability of Buonaparte being overthrown, and in expressing satisfaction at that probability, I must always be understood as including the condition, that his sway is succeeded by a free government; because, if people are to be slaves, it is a circumstance of no consequence at all whom they are slaves to, except that it is less dishonourable to bend the knee to a famous conqueror than to a silly creature, who has never done any thing but eat and drink. If the nations, who, to all appearance, are breaking his chains, have the wisdom and the virtue to drive out despotism of every sort along with him, then they will and ought to succeed; but, if the wars against him be carried on by a cabal, by a faction whose object is to exalt themselves, they not only will fail but they ought to fail. The work of opposing him is but just begun. What is done is nothing, if not well followed up. To be sure, a defeat of him who has so long been accustomed to meet with uninterrupted success is an excellent beginning. He has, however, been defeated before now; and his army, under other commanders, has been defeated: yet, he recovered that; it produced little injury to him in any way. What line of conduct he may adopt with regard to Spain and Portugal, whether he may send large armies thither, or may leave them for a while to see the result of those internal differences. which he may naturally expect to see arise, and which he will not fail to endeavour to foment, is quite uncertain. It will, however, be a great error in us to act as if we supposed, that he had given up the idea of placing kings of his own family upon the thrones of Spain and Portugal. He is not easily turned from any of his projects; and it would be a dreadful mistake to suppose, that, because our newspapers laugh at him, he is really, all at once, in consequence of the loss of thirty or forty thousand men, become an object of contempt. The internal affairs of Spain cannot be easily arranged and settled. The patriots have pronounced their old government an infamous one; they have stipulated with the people for a reform of abuses; they have demanded an assembling of the Cortes. If there are no interested motives to come athwart the intended reformation, the little confusion that will arise will be of no consequence; but, if there are; if private interest and not public good be the object of the leaders, Joseph Napoleon will yet be king of Spain and the Indies, in spite of all that we can do to the contrary. I am, I must confess, sorry that Napoleon does not seem disposed to send armies into Spain I wish the war there to be long and arduous; for, if it cease now, the people will have gated very little indeed, especially if any of the rags of the old government are brought back again. Nay, it is very probable, that they may be worse treated than they were before. The despots will conclude, and with reason, that the people are fashioned to despotism. They will have got a new lease of their enjoyments and their abuses; and the people will be more wretched than ever. All the old corrupt crew will be in power. There will be no example given to the enslaved nations of the world, except that of a people having shed their blood for the apparent purpose of perpetuating their own slavery; of calling back despotism amongst them, after they had got rid of it. A struggle of some length would have made the people of Spain think no more of FERDINAND than they would think of a fly. Such a struggle must have called up hidden talents and virtues. Now there appears to be a sickliness in the councils of the Juntas; and of this, it is very probable, Buonaparte may take advantage. What we ought to wish for is a new and vigorous government in Spain; a government upon principles precisely the opposite of those whereon Napo leon's government is built and maintained; a government that would be a living example to all the nations whom he has enslaved. He has in his clutches the chief of that government which we seem to desire for Spain. Who is to make him give that chief up; and, if he does it, upon what conditions will he do it? It is easy to see what a tormoil must arise out of this single circumstance. While Ferdinand is in France, unless ali idea of making; bim king be abaudoned, there never can be any peacouble of legitimate right to reign, or they must openly avow the doctrine, that the people have, at all times, a right to cashier their kings. As to saying, that the Spaniards chose the son of the old "unworthy" king as the English chose the son-in-law of their unworthy king; the very existence of such persons was a matter of accident. Suppose these kings had had neither sons nor sonsin-law, were the people to have gone to the more distant relations? Suppose they had been able to find no distant relations; what was then to have been done? Does this right of cashiering kings, or, to use the mora gentle phrase of the Morning Chronicle, this right of "forcing kings to abdicate," exist only in cases where the said kings happen to have relations? Will the people at Whitehall admit the right of cash settlement of affairs in Spain. If, in the midst of those divisions of opinion that will inevitably arise, as to what ought to be done, Napoleon send an army of a hundred thousand men, his brother will be seated upon the throne with very little difficulty. It ap pears to me, therefore, that the thing to be desired, is a new government, established as soon as possible, unless Buonaparte immediately send his armies; for, in that case, there will want very little of government until the war be over, and then it will be found, that the talents and virtues of the nation have, of their own accord, formed the sort of government required by the state of the country. There are some who talk of FERDINAND as if he had been fairly chosen by the people of Spain, who had first put down his father. The Morning Chronicle, of the 2d instant, has, upon the subject, a long-windediering kings? If they do not, where will article, which concludes thus: The Spa"niards are fighting for their national inde pendence, and for their legitimate sovereign-but what constitutes the legitimacy "of FERDINAND VII.? That which made WILLIAM III. the legitimate sovereign of this country, the choice of the people." They have set aside his father by forcing "him to abdicate his throne, because he was incapable and unworthy to reign. "Instead of embarrassing themselves, like "the French, with speculative theories of government, they have chosen his son as "his successor, as the English chose the "son-in-law of JAMES II.; and we have not "a doubt, that their privileges will be as"sured, as ours were, by a Bill of Rights. "Their conduct ought to operate, both as " a warning to kings, and an encourage*ment to every people; and if princes do "not profit from the lesson, their subjects "will, we trust, follow the example of the Spaniards."- Now, I should like to know what evidence there is of the people of Spain having given their voice for the young king. Never has there appeared the slightest foundation for the assertion. The people had nothing at all to do with the Batter. The old king was turned out by a band of armed men; he was, indeed, forced to abdicate his throne; but it was by a cabal at court, and with which cabal the people of Spain had nothing to do. The son, having assumed the kingly office, afterwards abdicates it in behalf of Napoleon; so that, if he really was chosen by the people, he gave up what the people had given him, and Joseph went to Spain in virtue of the people's choice. With those who stick to Ferdinand there must always this embarrassment exist : They must either acknowledge in him a want they find a justification for any attempt that may be made by us to place Ferdinand upon the throne, during the life of that father, who protested against the violence which compelled him to abdicate? But, coupling the cause of Spain with that of this man; we get ourselves into difficulties, from which Nor it will not be easy for us get clear. should I be at all surprized, if, bye-and-bye, we should see all our present hopes blasted in consequence of some act of pertinacity relating to the sort of government which we or our rulers, desire to have established Spain. DUKE OF YORK.1 had, I thought, entirely done with this subject in my la sheet; and I now revive it merely to point out to the public a striking proof of the falsehood of the pamphlet there noticed. It charges the daily papers with malice against the Royal Chieftain. It represents them as encouraged by both the parties, the ins and the outs, to assault him; to misrepresent, ridicule, and degrade him. Now, let us see how this charge is justified by the conduct of the official paper of the Opposition. That paper, upon the first appearance of the pamphlet, said: "It has evidently been written under the eye, and published with "the sanction, of the Duke of York. Nay, we conceive, that it must have had the concurrence of the highest authority in the "kingdom." Here, then, it unequivocally imputes the pamphlet to the dictation, if not the pen, of the duke, and to the appro "noticed the public and authentic disavowal |