the difficult defile of Geluhausen, in passing which he would be exposed to attacks from the Bavarians on his left flank, appeared too hazardous. He resolved, therefore, to strike heavily at the Bavarians again. Prince Charles had his army now posted along the line of the Saale (not the well-known river of that name, but another, called the Franconian Saale, which runs into the Main at Gmünden), and he held Kissingen strongly, and also occupied the village of Hammelburg, a village a few miles lower down the river. But his troops were too much scattered, and his information of the movements of passage of the Saale. On the same day the main body of Falkenstein's army was heavily engaged with the Bavarians at the celebrated watering-place of Kissingen. The inhabitants had been alarmed some days before by the sight of a party of Bavarian troopers, fleeing through their town from the scene of their disgraceful panic at Hünfeld; but the Burgomaster had given his word that every one should have twenty-four hours' notice of the approach of the Prussians, and the numerous visitors and invalids were reassured. Even on the 8th July, Bavarian staff-officers might be seen saunter ing about the Kurgarten as tranquilly as if in a time of profound peace. But on the 9th it became known that the inhabitants of the villages to the west of the river were fleeing from their houses before the Prussians; a large force of Bavarians was brought into the town; and now it was too late for the visitors to take their departure, for all the avenues were closely guarded, in order that no one might carry intelligence to the Prussians concerning the dispositions for the defence. The bridges over the Saale-except the stone bridge, which was strongly barricaded—were destroyed; but the supports of one of the iron bridges below the town were left, and of this inadvertence the Prussians skilfully availed themselves. Five battalions occupied the town, supported by only twelve guns; an inexcusable negligence on the part of Prince Charles, who had a hundred and twenty pieces of artillery at his command, but had dispersed them at different points along the river between Kissingen and Hammelburg, so that most of them were of no use when they were wanted. Early on the morning of the 10th, the Prussians might be seen approaching along the roads which cross the plateau west of the town; the brigades of Kummer and Wrangel were in advance. When they came within range, the Bavarian guns opened upon them, and from the houses of the town a biting fire was kept up by the soldiers who occupied them; so that for a long time the battle was stationary. Wrangel at last brought up some guns to the Alten Berg, a hill nearly opposite the southern portion of the town, but commanded from the Finster Berg, on the town side of the river, where, however, owing to the paucity of artillery, no guns had been posted. Protected by the fire of the guns on the Alten Berg, some Prussian infantry, led by a Captain von Busche, collected planks, tables, and anything that would serve for a temporary bridge, from the houses near the river, and succeeded in patching up the bridge of which the supports had been left sufficiently for troops to pass over, one or two at a time. A whole battalion having thus crossed to the Kissingen side, the passage of the stone bridge, on the defences of which an overpowering fire of artillery and musketry was opened, was at length forced, and the Prussians advanced into the town. But the Bavarian light infantry fought hard, and, while suffering heavily themselves, inflicted grievous loss on the Prussians. Three times did Wrangel's men force their way into the Kurgarten, and thrice did the riflemen holding it drive them back. A fourth assault succeeded; but not till the young lieutenant who commanded the Bavarians, with all his men, refusing quarter, had fallen on the places where they stood. At a little after three the whole town was carried. But although worsted, the Bavarians did not renounce the contest. Prince Charles brought up strong reinforcements from the encampments eastward of the town, and pressed fiercely on Wrangel as he endeavoured to deploy on either side of the road leading out to Winkels. The Prussians were brought to a stand-at one time even retreated-but fresh troops were brought up, and by nightfall, though at a heavy cost, the Bavarians were beaten back, and Prince Charles sullenly relinquished the strife. When Prince Alexander turned to retreat on the 5th July, he might still have united with the 7th Corps (the Bavarians) by a flank march to Brückenau, and so been able to lend them a helping hand at Kissingen; but he appears to have considered the risk too great. He retired to Frankfort therefore, and on the 9th July concentrated his troops round that town. But the Prussians did not long leave him unmolested. On the day after the battle of Kissingen, July 11, General von Falkenstein dispatched General Göben against Frankfort, by way of Gmünden and Aschaffenburg; and about the same time he ordered General Beyer to march by the direct road from Fulda, through the defile of Gelnhausen, upon Hanau. These movements brought the Prussians for the first time into collision with the 8th Corps, a force, it will be remembered, little inferior in numbers to that which Falkenstein commanded. But the resistance which it offered to the Prussian advance was feeble and unskilful to the last degree; and the march of both Prussian columns upon Frankfort could scarcely have been easier, and attended with less peril to life, if a single regiment, instead of an army, had opposed them. General Beyer marched by Gelnhausen on Hanau, and thence to Frankfort, without meeting any opposition whatever, although the defile of the Kinzig presented an impediment which an energetic enemy could have rendered almost insurmountable. Göben encountered no opposition till he had reached the village of Laufach, between Gmünden and Aschaffenburg. Here was posted a force of 8,000 men, the troops of Hesse Darmstadt. These (July 13) attacked the Prussians with the greatest gallantry; but such was the ignorance of their officers, and the inexperience of the men themselves, that, after being exposed in masses to the deadly volleys of the needlegun for some time, they were obliged to retreat in disorder, with a loss of 500 in killed and wounded, and 100 prisoners. The Prussian loss on this occasion did not exceed twenty men. Göben pushed on the next day to Aschaffenburg, defeated there (July 14) the Austrian brigade under Count Neipperg, which was attached to the 8th Corps, and drove it southward, with a loss of nearly 2,000 prisoners, besides many killed and wounded. The prisoners were nearly all Italians, who must have known that the Emperor of Austria had already ceded Venetia, their native country, to the French Emperor, that it might be transferred to Italy, and may naturally have felt little disposed to shed their blood in a quarrel with which they were now less concerned than ever. The amazed Prussians, upon forcing their way into the streets of Aschaffenburg, heard themselves greeted with shouts of "Evviva l'Italia!" "Evviva la Prussia;" and 1,500 Trevisan soldiers, belonging to the Austrian regiment "Bernhard," allowed themselves to be taken by Göben's Westphalians before the Main bridge. While the battle was raging at Aschaffenburg, Prince Alexander remained inactive with the mass of his army at Seligenstadt, a place some three miles distant. Helpless and hopeless, he saw the passage of the Main at Aschaffenburg wrested from him, and felt that he could no longer defend Frankfort. He accordingly evacuated A.D. 1866.] THE PRUSSIANS IN FRANKFORT. that city on the 15th, and on the next day the main body of the 8th Corps was in full march through the Odenwald, on its way to join the Bavarians near Würzburg. The ancient city of Frankfort, rich with the associations and the historic memorials of a thousand years-which had witnessed the election of so many German emperors in the grand old days of the Reich, and whose republican freedom had survived the shocks of so many revolutions-now lay defenceless before a German conqueror, in whose eyes her glorious past was of little account in comparison with the vindictive pleasure that he felt in being able to avenge an insult offered to his pride. Some three months before, when the quarrel between the two Governments was becoming more and more bitter and dangerous, it was thought advisable that the contingents of Austrian and Prussian troops then in garrison at Frankfort should be withdrawn, lest in the prevailing political excitement the soldiers should come into hostile collision. The population of Frankfort, whether high or low, had always leaned towards the Austrian side. The Austrian statesmen, with their refined courtesy and dignified manners-the Austrian officers, with their ease and gaiety and social tact-suited the taste of the grand old imperial city far better than the rough abruptness and arrogant self-consciousness of the Prussians. Accordingly, when the Austrian troops took their departure, there was a general demonstration of affectionate regret and sympathy on the part of the Frankfort population. A great crowd accompanied them to the railway station; the men cheered, the ladies waved their handkerchiefs; mementoes were showered upon them, and tender farewells were exchanged. When the Prussians departed, some days later, it was amidst a blank and freezing silence, the contrast of which to the farewell given to the Austrians must certainly have been galling to Prussian pride. And now the Prussians were entering the city as conquerors. About four o'clock on the afternoon of the 16th July, they marched into the place with all military precautions, a regiment of cuirassiers with drawn swords leading the way. The Frankfort battalion was drawn up to receive them, and went through the usual military formalities; but the Prussians took not the slightest notice of them. They posted two guns in the great square, and stacked their arms there and in the Zeil. Late at night they broke into groups, and went to the different houses, on which, without previous consultation with the municipality, they had been billeted, forcing their way in without ceremony wherever a recalcitrant householder was found. It was observed that especially large numbers of soldiers were billeted on the houses of those citizens who were known to be anti-Prussian in their politics. One of these, Herr Mumm, was required to lodge and feed 15 officers and 200 men! General Falkenstein took up his quarters in the town, having issued a proclamation announcing that, by orders of the King of Prussia, he had assumed the government of the imperial city, together with Nassau, and the parts of Bavaria that were in Prussian occupation. He at once imposed upon the citizens a war contribution of 7,000,000 231 gulden (about £600,000), besides 300 horses, and other contributions in kind. The Burgomaster Fellner and the Syndic Müller visited this modern Brennus, to endeavour to obtain some diminution of the impost; but they were only treated to a Prussian version of the classic declaration, "Vae Victis." Falkenstein roughly told the burgomaster that he used the rights of conquest; and is said to have threatened that if his demands were not promptly complied with, the city should be given up to pillage.* A melancholy incident happened on the following day. Falkenstein sent for Herr Fischer, the proprietor of the Journal de Francfort, a French paper published in Frankfort, well known for its consistent advocacy of the Austrian cause, and at first made overtures to him the object of which was to induce him to change his politics; but when Herr Fischer replied that he did not think it would be consistent with his honour to do so, the Governor overwhelmed the unfortunate man with such a torrent of menace and invective, that in his agitation and excitement he was attacked by a fit of apoplexy, and expired almost immediately. On the 19th July, General Falkenstein was recalled, having been appointed to the important government of Bohemia. The unhappy citizens of Frankfort augured favourably for a less cpp:essive rule from the character for moderation possessed by the new Governor-General Manteuffel. He, however, acting doubtless under orders from Berlin, immediately imposed an additional war contribution on the city of 25,000,000 gulden. Frankfort had suffered much from the French in the wars which followed the French Revolution; but this was a point of rapacity which not Custine, nor Hoche, nor Davoust, nor any of the French commanders most notorious for the severity of their exactions, had ever come near to. The Frankfort capitalists, in their despair, appeared as suppliants at the door of every European Cabinet, imploring the intervention of foreign states to moderate the rapacity of the Prussians. For a time every effort was vain. General von Röder was appointed commandant of the city under Manteuffel, and Councillor von Diest civil commissary; and the political independence of Frankfort was rudely suppressed by the dissolution of the legislative and executive bodies. The citizens were then informed that unless the new impost was promptly paid, the plan of compulsory billeting (Zwangseinquartierung) would be resorted to. The unfortunate Burgomaster Fellner, who, as the intermediary between the new government and the citizens, had done his utmost to induce the former to listen to reason, and the latter to submit with a good grace to the inevitable, was driven to despair by a new demand, requiring him to furnish the commandant with a list of the principal citizens of Frankfort who had borne any part in the fallen government, showing the amount of property belonging to each. The object of this was to enable Von Röder to direct with greater precision the military execution which was about to take place. Fellner could not bring himself • * Malet, "Overthrow of the Gorman Confederation," p. 289. thus to act the jackal to the Prussian lion, and, sooner than do so, put an end to his existence on the night of the 24th July. The execution took place, and as many as fifty soldiers were in many cases billeted on an individual householder. Dreadful and distressing scenes are said to have occurred in consequence in Frankfort households, which Colonel Rüstow, though he had heard the particulars of them, declines to relate, lest they should prove to be exaggerated. In the end, some impression was made on the King of Prussia by the representations of the plundered citizens and the indignant comments of the European press. The twenty-five millions do not appear to have been exacted, in consideration of the destruction of the independence of Frankfort and its annexation to Prussia. A few members of the Diet had continued to reside at Frankfort after the outbreak of hostilities, their chief employment being to draw up and publish elaborate protests against the conduct of Prussia. The approach of the Prussians compelled these protesters to leave Frankfort. Gathering together the archives of the Bund, they repaired to Augsburg, and caused the black, red, and gold flag of the Confederation to be hoisted over the well-known hotel with the sign of the Drei Mohren ("Three Moors "). Italian officers as on equal terms. La Marmora had also begged that a Prussian general, if not Moltke himself, might be sent to Florence, in order that a common understanding might be arrived at on the military question; but this request had not been complied with. But in the month of May a somewhat mysterious personage, named Signor Bernhardi, about whom it could not be ascertained whether he was sent by the Prussian Government, or came in the capacity of historiographer to the King of Prussia, was brought to La Marmora's office by Count Usedom, the Prussian minister at Florence. La Mar mora found to his amazement that this Bernhardi expected him to enter into a serious discussion of the Italian plan of campaign. He spread out a large map on the table, pointed to Bohemia, and explained the manner in which it was intended at Berlin to combine several movements of Prussian troops so as to effect a concentration about Pardubitz. La Marmora paid no great attention to what he said, not choosing to discuss military questions with a civilian, however intelligent he might be. He treated the subject with him " academically "—to use the Italian phrase-that is, purely as a matter of theory, without reference to actual intentions and circumstances. One question, however, he did put to Bernhardi, and that was, at what point it was desired at Berlin that the Prussian and Italian armies should meet, in case both should make a victorious advance into Austrian territory. Bernhardi replied, at Lintz. This was in accordance with a sugges tion already made by Count Bismarck to Govone, when they were discussing military probabilities at Berlin. But, before the campaign actually commenced, the views of Prussia were communicated-fully enough, but through an unexpected channel-to the Italian General. On the 19th June, when La Marmora was at Cremona, having given marching orders to the different corps composing the Italian army, and having of course decided upon his plan of action, a note was brought to him from the Count Usedom. It was a missive, the wording of which needed and re At last, when it was too late for any useful purpose, Prince Alexander of Hesse effected a junction between the 8th Federal Corps and the Bavarians under Prince Charles. But the crushing disaster of Königgrätz had by this time taken all heartiness and hopefulness out of the operations of the friends of Austria. Nor was the Army of the Main the only Prussian force now advancing in Bavaria. The second reserve corps, numbering about 23,000 combatants, had been organised at Leipzig, and placed under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin. Advancing into the north-east corner of Bavaria, it literally met with no resistance for the greater part of its march, in the course of which it penetrated into the heart of the king-|ceived great deliberation and care; for while, on the one dom. Manteuffel marched from Frankfort in pursuit of the 8th Corps on the 21st of July, defeated them in various unimportant actions on the line of the Tauber, and again in a more considerable combat at Gerscheim, and drove both them and the Bavarians behind the Main, at Würzburg. On the 29th, a flag of truce was sent from the Bavarian head-quarters to General Manteuffel, announcing that an armistice had been concluded between the Kings of Bavaria and Prussia, and hostilities came to an end. It is now time to return to Italy, and to relate the military operations which were undertaken on this portion of the field of war. The Prussian Government, though repeatedly urged by La Marmora to conclude a military convention with the Italian plenipotentiary at Berlin, General Govone, whereby a joint plan of operations would have been agreed upon, had always evaded the subject. It seems that the great soldiers and strategists of Prussia had too little faith in the solidity of the Italian army, and its capacity to carry on war on the grand scale, to permit of their discussing their strategical plans with hand, it was necessary to avoid as much as possible the appearance of dictating plans to an independent and high-spirited ally, it was, on the other hand, not in the Prussian character to leave in doubt, through indulgence in vague and complimentary language, the precise nature of the course which it was thought desirable for the Italians to adopt. It was a difficult piece of steering; and few who read the document without prejudice will deny that the Prussian diplomatist acquitted himself of his delicate task with consummate dexterity, and made his unpalatable communication as little offensive as the circumstances of the case permitted. He began by say. ing that the heavy sacrifices which the necessity of making war had imposed both on Prussia and Italy made it, in the opinion of Prussia, unavoidable that the confederates should carry on a guerre à fond," and should push hostile operations to the utmost extremity, so as to place the enemy, if fortune favoured them, at their absolute mercy. Vienna, in short, should be the objective point which the armies of both Powers should place before their eyes. Prussia, for instance, should think nothing of the 66 A.D. 1866.] COUNT USEDOM'S NOTE TO LA MARMORA. obstacles which nature or art might oppose to her advance from Lintz on the west to Cracow on the east; she should, if successful, push resolutely on to Vienna. "As to the analogous operations of the Italian forces, the course preferred would not be that of laying siege to the Quadrilateral, but rather of traversing or turning it, in order to bring the enemy's army to a pitched battle. There can be little doubt, especially when we consider the numerical proportions of the combatants, that the Italian army will in a short time find itself in possession of the whole of Venetia, with the exception of Venice, Verona, and Mantua, the garrisons of which, it is true, would have to be paralysed by strong corps of observation. The Italian generals will undoubtedly be the best judges of the operations here indicated; however, if she is to act in union with Prussia, it will be necessary that Italy should not stop short at the northern boundary of Venetia; she will have to force her way towards the Danube, and effect a meeting with Prussia in the very heart of the imperial monarchy-in a word, she will have to march on Vienna. To secure the durable possession of Venetia, she must first have struck a blow to the heart of the Austrian power." Italy, however, might think the march on Vienna too perilous, the distance to which her army would have to remove from its resources too great. But it should be remembered that every mile which the Italians advanced into Austria would bring them nearer to the Prussians; "besides, there existed an infallible agency by means of which the efficacious co-operation of the two armies on common ground might be ensured." "The Prussian Government has recently caused the Hungarian question to be carefully studied; it has acquired the conviction that this country, if supported equally by Italy and Prussia, will in turn serve them as a rallying link and a strategic appui. For example, let a strong expedition be directed to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, which would not in any way weaken the principal army, because it would be taken for the most part from the ranks of the volunteers, and placed under the orders of General Garibaldi. According to all the information which has reached the Prussian Government, such an expedition would meet with a most cordial reception among the Slavonians and Hungarians; it would cover the flank of the army advancing on Vienna, and would open to it the co-operation and all the resources of those vast countries." The Prussian plan, then, appears to have been this: that the main Italian army should march through or turn the Quadrilateral, leaving strong corps of observation to mask the fortresses, and should then cross the Alps into the German territories of Austria, somewhere to the north of Venice, and push forward towards Vienna. Meantime, an irregular and revolutionary force, under Garibaldi, landing on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, would advance into Hungary, excite the people to insurrection, and support the right flank of the regular army. La Marmora might well feel some surprise at the startling transformation which the views of the Prussian Government respecting the lawfulness of encouraging revolutionists had experienced. In 1861," he says, 66 the Cabinet of Berlin reproved us severely for having pro 233 fited by certain partial revolutions in Italy, our own house, in order to constitute our national unity: now, in 1866, it proposed that we should take in hand the business of suborning revolutions in a house that was not our own, because it suited the interests of Prussia." But our narrative has shown that on a much more recent occasion, no longer ago than January, 1866, Count Bismarck had addressed Austria in the language of grave rebuke, on account of her supposed inclination to favour revolutionary movements in Holstein. Yet here he was endeavouring with all his might to sow the seeds and reap the harvest of disloyalty and revolt, amid the vast non-German populations which had for centuries lived contentedly under the rule of the Austrian Kaisers! La Marmora might fairly urge that, whatever the merits of the Prussian plan, it was communicated to him at too late a period to be of any service. He wrote immediately to Jacini, the new Foreign Minister at Florence, saying that he had not time to answer Usedom's note; and that the truth was, that, if he did answer it, he should have to say various disagreeable things, which were better left unsaid. His own plan is said to have been to move the bulk of the Italian army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps (each containing four strong divisions of 12,000 men each), across the Mincio, and upon the Adige direct; the movement being supported on the right by General Cialdini, who was to cross the Lower Po with his corps somewhere about Ferrara, and advance northwards, and on the left by Garibaldi and the volunteers, who were to operate against the Austrians in the region of Lake Garda, and endeavour to stir up an insurrection in the Tyrol. On the 20th June, General La Marmora sent an officer of his staff to the Archduke Albrecht, announcing that the Italian army would commence hostilities on the 23rd. King Victor Emmanuel arrived at Goito (a small town on the Mincio, about fourteen miles below Peschiera) on the night of the 22nd; and before morning of the next day the whole of the 3rd Corps, and three divisions of the 1st Corps, forming a force of about 87,000 men, with 138 guns, were thrown across the Mincio at various points between Goito and Peschiera. The 1st Division of the 1st Corps, under General Pianelli, was left on the right bank of the Mincio, to observe the fortress of Peschiera.* La Marmora's information department appears to have been badly managed; for so little did he know of the intentions which were entertained at the Austrian head-quarters, and of the position of the several Austrian corps, that he had persuaded himself that the Archduke would not make a serious stand anywhere between the Mincio and the Adige, but would fall back and defend the passage of the latter river. Under this persuasion, he resolved-the troops under his command having taken up suitable positions in the course of the 23rd-to move forward to his left on the 24th, and take Some of our readers may need to be reminded that the famous Austrian "Quadrilateral," which it was said that the Emperor Napoleon, after Solferino, shrank from attacking, was composed of the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, and Verona and Legnano on the Adige. |