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pelled a concentration of Prussian troops in Westphalia and Rhineland which would have left her too weak to contend with Austria in Saxony or Bohemia. On the 28th May, notes, couched in almost identical terms, from the Governments of France, England, and Russia, communicated to the Powers at variance the proposal of the mediating Courts for the convocation of a Congress. Count Bismarck, while stipulating that the proceedings should be brief, and that the opening of the Congress should not be delayed if the representatives of the Confederation were not nominated in time, accepted the

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Congress should discuss the cession of Venetia." Beyond question the existence of this understanding" was known at Vienna; the Austrian statesmen knew that they would enter a Congress the members of which had already made their minds up on the one subject of discussion which vitally affected her interests and her honour. It is true that Austria had a month before offered to cede Venetia; but at that time she reckoned on compensation. If Italy could be induced by the cession to stand neutral, Austria hoped to overrun and annex Silesia. Yet to refuse the Congress absolutely was not

proposal for Prussia, but he took an opportunity of declaring to the French ambassador, M. Benedetti, in vehement and impassioned tones, that the position of affairs was become intolerable, and must be brought to a close at all risks. Italy also agreed to the Congress, as well she might, knowing the settled opinion and desire of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to the cession of Venetia. For Austria, the desirable course was not so clear. If she rejected the Congress, she alienated the good opinion of the neutral Powers. Yet if she accepted it, she knew that she could expect no good from its deliberations. The Chevalier Nigra wrote to La Marmora, on the 24th May, that the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had assured him that it was "well understood between the three neutral Powers that the

close alliance with a non-German Power, he explained that, on account of the menacing attitude of Italy, Austria could not leave herself unguarded on the side of Venetia; but that she would recall the troops that had been raised to protect her northern frontier, if Prussia would declare that she did not intend to make an attack on Austrian territory, or on any state allied to Austria, and would give security against the recurrence of the danger of war. The envoy then turned to the question of the duchies. He reminded the Diet that in August, 1865, the two Powers had promised to communicate to it the result of their negotiations as to the future of the duchies, and then added that, in spite of the sincere and strenuous efforts of Austria to come to an understanding with Prussia on this subject, all her exertions had been in vain ; he therefore declared, in the name of his Government, that Austria, being unable to procure a settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question in the manner first proposed, now remitted the settlement of it to the Diet, and, in order to assist their deliberations, had ordered her Commissioner in Holstein to convoke the Estates of that duchy, with a view to obtaining an expression of the wishes of the people as to their future fate.

This convocation of the Estates of Holstein appears to have been an ill-considered step on the part of Austria; for while it can have tended but little to gain for her the reputation of liberalism and respect for German popular rights (which was doubtless her object in taking it), it amounted to a distinct breach of the Convention of Gastein, and, as such, placed a weapon in the hands of an adversary, who was only too well able to play his own game, without the assistance of false moves on the other side. It will be remembered that that Convention, while it severed the administration, left the sovereignty of both duchies in the joint possession of the two Powers as before. Now, to summon the Estates of Holstein for the purpose indicated was certainly no mere act of administration; it was only compatible with the possession of full sovereignty in Holstein by the convening Power, whereas Austria held under the Convention, as under the original treaty, only a divided sovereignty. Austria, therefore, first broke the Convention, and Prussia, as we shall soon see, did not fail to press the act to its logical consequences.

When Baron Kübeck sat down, the Prussian envoy, M. de Savigny, rose, and said that, with regard to the question of disarmament, Prussia was still willing to disarm in the measure and at the rate that Austria and other German Powers did so. A sentence of ominous import followed that if Germany could not give to Prussia guarantees for the maintenance of peace, and rejected those reforms of the Federal constitution which were everywhere recognised as necessary, Prussia must entertain the conclusion that the Confederation did not fulfil the object of its existence, and was powerless to attain its proper and most important aims. He added, that in the proceedings of Austria with regard to Schleswig-Holstein, both as concerned her appeal to the Diet, and in convoking the Estates of Holstein, Prussia saw a violation of the Convention of Gastein,

These two speeches were the main events of the famous meeting of the Diet on the 1st June. They were telegraphed to every part of Germany, and disturbed the repose of all Germans. Yet few suspected that war was so imminent as proved to be the case; for Prussia was at that time supposed to be much inferior in military resources to Austria, nor was the existence of the treaty with Italy generally known; it was supposed, therefore, that Austria would be the first to break the peace, and she was, it was well known, far from being ready for

war.

Count Bismarck sent a despatch, on June 3, to Vienna, renewing the protest which had been made by the Prussian envoy in the Diet against the infraction by Austria of the Convention of Gastein, and declaring that Prussia now considered herself justified in reverting to the basis of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Government had consequently placed the defence of its condominate rights in the hands of General Manteuffel. At the same time, the Prussian Minister addressed a circular to the Prussian representatives at all foreign Courts, accusing Austria of giving direct provocations to Prussia, with the manifest intention of settling the matters in dispute by an appeal to arms. This circular was couched in terms of the bitterest invective, and sufficiently indicated that all prospect of an accommodation was renounced.

The reasoning and the acts of Prussia, in consequence of the precipitate declaration by the Austrian envoy of the intentions of his Government in regard to Holstein, were strictly logical. If Austria broke the Convention of Gastein, then the original Treaty of Vienna, of which the Convention was a sort of modification, came again into force; then the joint occupation of both duchies which had existed previously to the Convention must be resumed; and General Manteuffel must detach a portion of his troops into Holstein, but "quite in a friendly spirit." No sooner had General Gablenz, acting under instructions from Vienna, issued an order (June 5) convoking the Holstein Estates at Itzehoe for the 11th inst., than General Manteuffel intimated to him that he regarded the act of convocation as an infringement upon the sovereign rights of the King of Prussia, and invited the Austrian Governor to recall the order. At the same time, he communicated his orders to occupy, by way of practical assertion of the revived condominate right of Prussia in Holstein, certain unoccupied points in the duchy, and his intention of leading troops across the frontier for that purpose; but he declared that the contemplated movement had solely a defensive character, and requested that the local authorities of the places which he meant to occupy might be warned of the fact, so that all collision between the troops of the two nations might be avoided. Suiting the action to the word, Manteuffel crossed the Eyder on the 8th and 9th June, and directed his march upon Itzehoe, in order to prevent the deputies who were assembling there for the expected meeting of the Estates on the 11th from executing their

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General von Manteuffel from carrying out in Holstein any policy which the Prussian Government might have resolved upon; at the same time, even if the pacific professions of the advancing General could be fully relied upon, it was incompatible with the dignity of Austria that her administrator should act the part of a passive spectator, while Prussian troops were dissolving an assembly which had been convened under an order emanating from the Imperial Government. Instructions had also been received from Vienna, should Prussia make hostile demonstrations, to concentrate the Austrian troops at Altona, and retreat across the Elbe. General Gablenz therefore hastily withdrew his troops from Kiel, and concentrated them at Altona. Manteuffel marched unopposed to Itzehoe, and on the 11th June prevented the assembly of the Holstein Estates by taking military possession of the town, locking the door of the House of Assembly, and placing a guard before it with fixed bayonets. The attention of the Austrian commander was now solely directed to making good his escape out of the duchy; and this he skilfully accomplished by bringing his whole force across the Elbe on the night of the 11th to Harburg, and thence dispatching it by railway, through Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort, to the Austrian Army of the North in Bohemia. The Prince of Augustenburg, his protectors having gone, took his departure also; and Herr von Scheel Plessen was appointed by the Prussian Government Supreme President of the Elbe Duchies. From this time the thorny question of Schleswig-Holstein has ceased to trouble the peace of European diplomatists. The record of an interesting conversation which passed, some days before the advance of Manteuffel into Holstein, between General Govone and Count Bismarck, and which the former embodied in a letter (May 22) to the Italian Premier, casts a strong light on the military position of the two Powers at that time, and on the calculations of the cool and far-seeing intellects that were marshalling the forces of Prussia. Two army corps, said Bismarck, were near Neisse in Upper Silesia; a third was being concentrated at Görlitz; three more were in course of concentration on the Saxon frontier, facing Dresden; a seventh, facing Leipzig. This imposing mass of troops was about to be further reinforced by the two corps from the Rhineland. (In point of fact, of about 60,000 men who were stationed along the east bank of the Rhine, not more than 10,000 were left, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities.) Prussia calculated that at the beginning of June 200,000 Austrian troops, and not more, would be already concentrated and ready, and that Prussia would have from 280,000 to 290,000 to oppose to them. Govone thought that the Prussian troops were rather too scattered, and Bismarck asked him to speak to General Moltke on the subject. Moltke explained the weighty considerations which had governed his judgment in determining upon the dispositions which Govone had criticised; and the latter proceeds to say that the impression which remained to him from the conversation which he had with General Moltke was that he felt confidence in the issue, and believed that in the first days of June (whatever appearances of delay the proposal of a Congress might

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just then present) the armies would come to blows, it not being possible to prolong a situation so formidably armed as that which would prevail from the 4th of June and onwards."

The King of Prussia appears to have been unfeignedly distressed at the prospect of going to war with his imperial brother; he spoke of it, says Count Barral, “with large tears in his eyes." He even attempted in the last days of May to open secret and personal negotiations with the Emperor of Austria; but they came to nothing. But he was shocked and incensed by the declaration made by the Austrian envoy in the Diet of June 1, that Austria would convene the Holstein Estates; for he looked upon this as a clear breach-as indeed it was-of the Convention of Gastein. To a precise and narrow mind the infringement of a positive agreement, though the matter of it be of slight importance, is more offensive than a far more gross violation of equity in which forms and technicalities are observed. From this time Count Bismarck had little cause to complain of the irresolution and backwardness of the King.

Count Mensdorff replied (June 9) to the Prussian note of June 3, denying that the rights of the Confederation could be infringed by any agreement made between Austria and Prussia. (This was true, and was a justification of the conduct of Austria in submitting the question of the future of Holstein, as a member of the Confederation, for the decision of the Diet; but it did not justify her in convoking the Holstein Estates.) The Austrian Minister proceeded to say that his Government protested against the self-righting measures (selbsthülfe) which Prussia had resorted to in Holstein as a violation of Article XI. of the Constitutional Act, and reserved to itself the right of taking whatever steps might be necessary for the maintenance of the dignity and safety of Austria, and the defence of the rights of the Confederation. The article appealed to says that "should there be ground for apprehending the use of force between Confederates, or should such have taken place, the Diet has the duty of taking preliminary steps for staying all self-righting, and for putting a stop thereto if begun.” In virtue of this article, an extraordinary sitting of the Diet was held, at the instance of Austria, on June 11, to consider the proposal of Austria that the armed force of the Confederation should be mobilised, with the view of keeping in order the unruly Confederate, who persisted in "helping himself." This memorable meeting was practically the last ever held by that unwieldy body which the statesmen of 1815 had substituted for the Holy Roman Empire. But before we narrate its incidents, we must speak of a remarkable circular which Count Bismarck had dispatched on the previous day (June 10) to all the German Governments.

This circular contained the definite and final proposals of Prussia for the reform of the German Confederation, and comprehended ten articles. By the first, "the territory of the Confederation was to consist of those states which had hitherto been included in it, with the exception of the dominions of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of the Netherlands." The other articles provided

for the constitution of a German Parliament, the creation of a German navy, and the reorganisation of the Federal army. There was to be an Army of the North, commanded by the King of Prussia; and an Army of the South, commanded by the King of Bavaria. This last provision was an attempt to disarm or weaken the apprehended hostility of Bavaria in the approaching war. To call such a scheme a “reform" of the Confederation was surely an abuse of words. To exclude from Germany that state which was the chief treasure-house of ancient German traditions-around which clustered the mighty memories of the old Reich, the thought of Rudolf of Hapsburg, Frederic Barbarossa, and Henry the Fowlerthat state which was the nearest existing representative of the old civilising Germany, which nearly ten centuries before had founded the Mark of Brandenburg itself as an outpost of Germanism against the Wends; such an act was Revolution, not Reform. By it, when extorted from Austria at the sword's point, the dualism which had paralysed Germany in its exterior relations was doubtless abolished; but by it no less was the hold of the German race on the great Danube valley fatally weakened, and the sovereignty in that region, with the command over its future, transferred to the Magyars and Sclavonians. Such a proposal, to which neither Austria nor any friend of Austria could for a moment listen, may be regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war.

In the sitting of June 11, Austria moved that all the Federal contingents,* save those of Prussia, should be mobilised and placed on their full war establishment, concentrated within fourteen days, and then ready to take the field within twenty-four hours. Austria knew that the majority of the German Governments were favourable to her, and the scope of this motion was to get their contingents mobilised in a legal and regular manner, and brought into line with the Austrians against Prussia. The Prussian envoy naturally protested against such a motion being even taken into consideration, declaring that both in form and substance it was subversive of the fundamental ideas of the Confederation. The voting on the motion was fixed for the 14th June, and on that day it was adopted by the Diet, by a majority of nine votes to six. Thereupon, M. de Savigny rose, and, after a few remarks on the Holstein question, said that, by the declaration of war pronounced against a member of the Confederation by the Austrian proposition, and the vote of the Governments adhering to her—which, according to Federal law, was impossible-the King's Government held the breach of the Federal compact to have been consummated. “The envoy consequently declares, in the name and by the orders of His Majesty the King, that Prussia regards the hitherto existing Federal compact as dissolved and no longer obligatory." Prussia,

"The Federal Constitution provided that Austria should furnish the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Army Corps; Prussia the 4th, 5th, and 6th; Bavaria the 7th; Wurtemburg, Badea, and Grand Ducal Hesse the 8th; Saxony, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, Lemburg, and Luxemburg

the 9th; while the 19th was to be composed of the troops of Hanover, Brunswick, Holstein, Lauenburg, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg." (Sir A. Malet.)

however, did not undervalue the national necessities for the sake of which the Confederation had been formed, and therefore she was willing and desirous to enter into a new Confederation with any German states which were prepared to accept the basis of reform sketched in the Prussian circular of the 10th June. Finally, having protested against the disbursement of any Federal moneys without the consent of his Government, the Prussian envoy left the assembly.

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The die was cast, and war was inevitable; yet in what manner, and at what precise point, it would break out, was probably suspected by few, if any, persons outside of the diplomatic world. But the revelations of General La Marmora show that Bismarck had meditated the precise stroke with which Prussia should commence operations for weeks before. On the 13th May, Count Barral telegraphed to Florence that Count Bismarck had again told him that "the hostile attitude of Hanover would probably oblige Prussia to direct the first military operations against the kingdom of Hanover." Again, on the 22nd May, he told General Govone that Prussia would be completely ready for war in a very few days, and that then war might break out, either through a hostile decision of the Diet, or owing to armaments to which Hanover, or some one of those little states which cut the Prussian monarchy in two, might choose to proceed." Now, poor little Hanover, so far from being forward, was sadly backward in her preparations for war, as events soon proved when she was surprised by the Prussian ultimatum of June 15. But there were two advantages to be gained by attacking Hanover and other small states that were friendly to Austria. First, the military advantage. A glance at the map will show that Hanover and HesseCassel did truly "cut the Prussian monarchy in two;" so that it was of the utmost importance to the celerity and security of the movements of her armies that Prussia should at the outset overpower and occupy those countries. Secondly, there was probably what may be called a sentimental advantage. King William had a sort of superstitious aversion from attacking Austria, for the sovereign of which he certainly entertained a feeling of warm friendship; but in the case of Hanover and Saxony there was no such obstacle, and it was perhaps easy to convince the King that the safety of Prussia required that their military preparations should be suppressed with a high hand.

On June 15, the day after the memorable vote in the Diet, Prussia sent an identical summons to the Govern ments of Hanover, Saxony, and Electoral Hesse, which had voted for the Austrian proposal, requiring that they should immediately reduce their troops to the peace establishment, as it had existed on the 1st March, and should agree to join the new Prussian Federation on the basis of the reform proposed on the 10th June. If these Governments declared, within twelve hours, their agreement to these demands, Prussia undertook to guarantee their sovereign rights within the boundaries of the proposed Federation; otherwise, Prussia announced her intention of declaring war.

Saxony at once refused; the two other Governments