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A.D. 1866.]

CIRCULARS OF COUNTS MENSDORFF AND BISMARCK.

intention, do you imagine I should tell you?" The tone in which the denial was made must have conveyed to the mind of the Austrian an impression the reverse of reassuring; he is reported about this time to have informed his Government that he considered war inevitable. Count Mensdorff-before this celebrated interpellation of Count Karolyi-had addressed (March 16) a confidential circular to all the German Courts, explaining the proposals and declarations which Austria intended, for her own security, to make in the Diet, should she be unable to obtain from Prussia definite and tranquillising assurances. Upon re

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What Austria could accomplish with difficulty in two months, Prussia, from her superior organisation, could perform with ease in three weeks. It was known also that the Prussian infantry were armed with breech-loading firelocks, and although the full superiority of the needlegun over all muzzle-loaders could only be established by. experience, the certainty that it rendered possible a much greater rapidity of fire than had ever before been known, must have caused anxiety to the Austrian military chiefs, and ought to have disquieted the Vienna Cabinet. Eight days after the dispatch of the Austrian note, Count

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ceiving Count Karolyi's report of the result of his interpellation, and of his impression respecting the intentions of Prussia, Austria began slowly and secretly to prepare for war. Her power of mobilising her army in a short time was greatly inferior to that of Prussia; if, therefore, she was not to be taken unprepared by a sudden declaration of war, it was necessary for her to commence at once the measures necessary for placing her army on a war footing. Prussia, on the other hand, through the able initiative of General von Roon, the Minister of War, had during the last four years reorganised her military system with such admirable skill, forecast, and completeness, that she could, starting from a profound peace, be, in an inconceivably short space of time, ready for a great war,

Bismarck also (March 24) sent a circular to all the German Courts, marked with all the transcendent ability and lofty audacity which were characteristic of his genius. He spoke in it of Austria's armaments, and affected an alarm on that subject which he certainly could not have felt. He proceeded to treat of the political requirements of Germany, and it is easy to read "between the lines" his fixed conviction that, upon a wide view of national interests, it was necessary that Austria should be excluded from the German Bund. 'We hoped," he said, "and, at all events, will first endeavour, to find security for national independence in the basis of German nationality, and in strengthening the ties which bind us to the other German states. The conviction, however, forces itself upon us,

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as often as we contemplate this object, that in its existing state the Confederation is ill-adapted for such an end, and for the active policy which important crises may at each instant require. Its constitution was based on the supposition that the two great German Powers would always be at one. So long as Prussia upheld this state of things by continually giving way to Austria, it could subsist serious antagonism between the two Powers it would not endure; a threatened breach it could neither obviate nor set aside." The conclusion to which such reasoning pointed was not obscure; the Bund has subsisted hitherto through Prussia's giving way to Austria; Prussia means to give way no longer; either, therefore, there must be perpetual war, or danger of war, or one of the two great Powers must be excluded from the Bund. But Germany and Prussia, as a later pregnant sentence of the circular declares, are inseparable; it is Austria, therefore such is the clear, though suppressed conclusion-that must go. "The fate of Prussia involves the fate of Germany, nor can we doubt that if the power of Prussia was once broken, Germany would merely exist with a passive share in the policy of the nations of Europe. All German Governments ought to regard it as à sacred duty to prevent this, and ought to labour together with Prussia for that end." There are various expressions in the circular which show that Bismarck did not expect that the German princes would be convinced by his reasoning; but to this he was indifferent; he had more potent arguments in reserve.

Step by step, as though by an inevitable destiny, or unalterable concatenation of events, the fatal hour drew on. At the end of March, General Govone was in Berlin, charged by the Italian Prime Minister, General La Marmora, with the duty of negotiating a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia. That Italy would forego the opportunity which a rupture between Prussia and Austria afforded her of obtaining by force the Venetian territories of the latter Power, was hardly to be expected; for such a chance, once let slip, might never have occurred again. But to Prussia also the alliance of Italy was of the highest importance. With her vast superiority of population, Austria, could her military force have been wholly concentrated against Prussia, though she might have lost battles, could not have been crushed and compelled to yield; such a consummation was only rendered possible by the division and dilution of her strength necessitated by the attack of Italy upon Venetia. Could even Austria have been content to cede Venetia itself, and take Venetia's money value, she might have rid herself of her Transalpine foe, and employed her whole strength in Bohemia. Secret overtures had been made at Vienna by the Italian Premier, in the autumn of 1865, for the cession of Venetia by purchase; but the Emperor conceived his military and ancestral honour to be involved, and absolutely rejected the proposal. On April 8, the treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed at Berlin. Prussia, under it, reserved to herself the right of declaring war within three months, in which case Italy bound herself to attack Austria; but Prussia did not bind herself to declare war

in Germany, or to help the Italians on their own ground, if Austria attacked Italy. Each Power bound itself not to make peace separately from the other, and to continue the war till Italy had gained Venetia, and Prussia secured a corresponding augmentation of territory in Germany. Already-between March 29 and 31-orders had been issued for the mobilisation of the whole Prussian army, and the necessary movements were effected with extraordinary celerity. By the middle of May "the 490,000 men who formed the strength of this army stood on parade, armed, clothed, equipped with all necessaries for a campaign, and fully provided with the necessary transport trains, provision and ammunition columns, as well as field hospitals."* Austria, though she had commenced her preparations earlier, was soon distanced by her opponent, and, when the war broke out, her arrangements were still far from complete. The King of Italy published a decree on the 25th March, increasing the Italian army by 100,000 men.

For several weeks after the treaty between Prussia and Italy had been signed, continual diplomatic fencing was maintained on the part of the two Governments. First there were criminations and re-criminations on the question of priority of armaments. On the 6th April, a note from the Prussian Foreign Office was sent to Vienna, insisting on the magnitude of the Austrian preparations, which could not be adequately accounted for by the alleged apprehension of disturbances in Bohemia, and ending with the declaration that nothing was farther from the views of the King than an offensive war. Yet only two days after this, as we have seen, the alliance was concluded with Italy. Nevertheless, there was a basis of truth in the statement as to the King of Prussia's inclinations; he was, in truth, earnestly, almost superstitiously, averse to being the first to resort to arms; and Bismarck had infinite trouble to bring his royal master up to the point of commencing the war. This despatch of April 6th gratified the Austrian Cabinet; and Count Mensdorff replied to it in a conciliatory tone, pointing out that the Emperor had explicitly declared that he had never contemplated an attack upon Prussia, and expressing the hope that after this avowal Prussia would countermand the military preparations which it was admitted that she had made. The Prussian Minister, whose real intentions were far from pacific, replied (April 15) that as Prussia had not commenced to arm, so she could not be expected to take the initiative in disarming, but that she would follow pari passu any steps which Austria might take with that intention. Count Karolyi was then instructed to make this offer at Berlin-that the dislocation of troops, which Prussia had regarded as a step menacing to peace, should be countermanded by the Austrian Government on a given day, if Prussia would undertake to order on the following day the demobilisation of those portions of her army which had been recently mobilised. The Prussian Government (April 21) frankly accepted this proposal, saying that it did so with satisfaction, and requesting the

• Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War."

A.D. 1866.]

ITALY AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.

Cabinet of Vienna to submit further proposals touching the proportion and time of the reductions. The real feelings of Count Bismarck we learn from a telegram from Count Barral, the Italian Minister at Berlin, sent on the previous day to the Italian Premier, General La Marmora, and published by the latter in his recent remarkable work, entitled "A Little More Light on the Political and Military Events of the Year 1866." Count Barral telegraphed, "The impression of the General [Govone] and myself is, that Bismarck is disappointed by the Austrian proposition, and visibly discouraged by the new pacific phase upon which the conflict is about to

enter."

But now Count Mensdorff found himself in a difficulty. The attitude of the Italian army on the frontiers of Venetia was believed at Vienna to have grown so menacing that it was impossible for Austria to replace matters on a peace footing in Venetia, short of a positive understanding with Italy similar to that which seemed on the point of being concluded with Prussia. We have the distinct assurance of General La Marmora, in the work just quoted, that at this time Italy had made no concentrations of troops whatever-had, in fact, taken no warlike step of any kind. But he admits that the impression to the contrary which prevailed at Vienna was a bonâ fide one, and accounts for its existence in a very curious manner. It was, he thinks, the English Government-the warm and importunate advocate of European peace-which, misled by reports from English diplomatic agents in Italy, who had imagined some inconsiderable movements of troops that were really directed against brigands to be part of a scheme for concentrating the Italian army near the frontier, had conveyed, of course, with the most friendly intentions, this false information to the Austrian Cabinet. However this may have been, the effect of the erroneous persuasion as to Italian armaments which Austria had taken up in overclouding the prospects of peace was soon apparent. It must be remembered that Austria, not having recognised the Italian kingdom, had no minister at Florence, nor Italy at Vienna; direct means, therefore, for clearing up such a misconception the moment that it had arisen, were wanting. On the 26th April, Count Mensdorff wrote to the Austrian Minister at Berlin, declaring that the intentions of Austria continued to be sincerely pacific and conciliatory, but stating that as the Italian army had been "placed in a condition to attack Venetia," common prudence obliged Austria to strengthen her military position in that country. Count Bismarck had good reason to know that the belief of the Austrian Cabinet that Italy had been concentrating her troops on the borders of Venetia was groundless, for on the 23rd April La Marmora had telegraphed thus to Count Barral: “You can declare in the most formal manner that there has not been the least concentration of troops, neither at Piacenza, nor at Bologna, nor anywhere else." But on the 27th April, La Marmora dispatched a circular to all the representatives of Italy at foreign courts, repeating in the most solemn manner the declaration that Italy had made no warlike preparations, but announcing the present

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determination of the King's Government, in consequence of the alarming nature of the military preparations of Austria, to take those military measures of precaution which the defence of the country required. These important documents from Florence evidently governed the reply of Count Bismarck to the Austrian note of the 26th inst. On the 30th April, he wrote that the Prussian Government was grievously disappointed by the tenor of the Austrian despatch, having expected that the re-establishment of the normal status quo would have extended to all movements of troops conducing to the war effective state. Prussia could not recognise the motives alleged for arming in Italy, for all sources of information agreed in stating that no warlike preparations had taken place in the kingdom of Italy. If, indeed, quite recently, any steps of the kind had been taken, they could have had no other cause than the Austrian armaments. Prussia could only consent to continue the negotiations for disarmament, if Austria would include her southern forces under the terms of whatever arrangement might be concluded. To this Austria replied (May 4) that the negotiations for a simultaneous reversal of the steps which both countries had taken in the direction of war must now be considered as exhausted. The scheme of reciprocal disarmament thus fell through, chiefly, if General La Marmora is right in his conjecture, owing to the unlucky piece of false information which the English Government imparted to the Austrian, about the imaginary concentration of troops in Italy.

Besides disarmament, two other important subjects were debated in the correspondence between Austria and Prussia in these critical weeks. One related to SchleswigHolstein, the other to the reform of the Confederation. In her proposals on the former subject, Austria was bidding for the support of the German princes; in her proposals on the latter, Prussia was bidding for the support of the German people. Anxious to withdraw from her hazardous position in the duchies, but to make her withdrawal in such a way as would augment her popularity with the minor German states, Austria invited the Prussian Government, in a note dated April 26, to make in the Diet a joint declaration that the two Powers would cede the rights acquired by them under the Treaty of Vienna to that claimant of the sovereignty of the duchies whom the Diet recognised as having a predominant right to the succession. Although some collateral offers, such as that Prussia should have full and permanent possession of certain strategic points in the duchies, at Kiel and elsewhere, were added to the main proposal, in order to make it more palatable to the condominant Power, Count Mensdorff probably expected a refusal, and he was not disappointed. Count Bismarck, in his reply (May 7), professed in the strongest terms Prussia's intention to adhere faithfully to the Treaty of Vienna and the Gastein Convention, but maintained that by those instruments the intervention of any third party, not excepting the Diet, in the affairs of the duchies was precluded. (But this could only be maintained, at least with reference to Holstein, on the assumption of the truth of the immoral view of the Prussian law officers,

that all previous public right in the duchies was cancelled by the Treaty of Vienna.) The note went on to say that Prussia, while repudiating the interference of any third party, was always ready to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would be disposed to cede her share of the rights accruing to her by the Treaty of Vienna.

This reply, Sir A. Malet justly observes, though it "apparently brought the question back to the original starting-point of the discussion, proved in reality that matters were come to a dead-lock, and that in fact no agreement was possible."

any distinctly warlike preparations before the appearance of General La Marmora's circular of the 27th April. From that time war was looked upon as inevi table; and in order to enlist the national feeling more fully in its favour, a decree was published at Florence on the 8th May ordering the formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under the immediate command of Garibaldi. Great were the excitement and enthusiasm in Italy. Garibaldi left Caprera, and repaired to Como, where a concentration of volunteers had already commenced; here such numbers flocked to his standard, that at the end of May the number of battalions had to be doubled. Yet all this time the mind of the Italian Premier was agitated by the most anxious misgivings. The expression in the treaty with Prussia, “alliance offensive and defensive" (for which Count Bismarck had desired to substitute the words " alliance and friendship," but had been defeated by the persistence of the Italian plenipotentiary), had appeared to the Government of Florence to afford ample security that Italy could under no circumstances be left alone to measure swords in a single combat with Austria. Yet when, alarmed by the preparations which Austria was making in Venetia, La Marmora sent pressing instructions to Count Barral to ascertain what Prussia would do in the event of Austria's attacking Italy, the answers that he received were not altogether reassuring. King William seems to have feared that Italy might purposely provoke Austria, make it impossible for her to refrain from war, and so force the hand of Prussia; and, accordingly, Count Bismarck said to General Govone, about the beginning of May, that "the King would never sign a stipulation which should place Prussia at the mercy of Italy." He added that the King did not think that the obligation to make war was reciprocal, according to the text of the treaty; Italy had bound herself to attack Austria if Prussia took the lead; but Prussia had bound herself by no corresponding obligation to Italy. The Italian diplomatists were alarmed by this language more than, to all appearance, they ought reasonably to have been. Count Barral telegraphed to Florence on the 2nd May that he thought Italy must now rely on herself and France rather than on Prussia; and La Marmora declares, in the work already quoted, that as Prussia was thus playing fast and loose with her engagements, he should have deemed it justi fiable in Italy to do the same, had her obvious interest been to abandon Prussia. But there was surely some

The other subject discussed was the reform of the Confederation. The Prussian envoy proposed in the Diet on the 9th of April that, within a period to be precisely fixed, the Diet should decree the convocation of a National Assembly to be elected by universal and direct suffrage, for the purpose of receiving and deliberating on the proposals of the German Governments for the reform of the Confederation. This proposition, which caused great surprise and excitement in Germany, was referred by a Dietal vote of the 21st of April to a committee of nine; at the same time the Diet requested Prussia to state the nature of the proposals which it intended to submit to the Assembly when convened. Count Bismarck sharply replied (April 27) that the determination of the date at which such a Parliament or Assembly should meet was of the essence of the Prussian proposition; the modes of procedure habitual to the Diet would, he knew, lead to the indefinite adjournment and final miscarriage of the project; however, he would bring under the notice of the committee such information as would show to what regions of political life the Prussian proposals would extend. This promise he redeemed on the 11th of May by laying before the Committee of the Diet the heads of the changes which Prussia deemed necessary. These included the completion of the central power by means of a freely-elected German Parliament, the concession to the central power so reorganised of a wide legislative competency, the removal of all fetters on German trade, an improved military system, the formation of a German navy, &c. But the proposals did not embrace the exclusion of Austria from Germany, nor the organisation of a North German army under the leadership of Prussia, though these were the reforms" which Count Bismarck had really at heart, far more than any other. Probably he foresaw the impossibility, in the midst of the increasing stir and excite-thing extravagant in this mistrust, something which did ment, of subjecting such proposals to serious discussion; but he might consider that his object had been in great part gained by the mere fact of having brought them forward; for the Liberal and progressive party throughout Germany would thereby be induced to look to Prussia as the only German Power from which the advocacy of serious and fundamental reforms was to be expected.

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injustice to the Prussian character and to the known integrity and honour of the Prussian Minister. Count Bismarck, whatever faults he may be justly charged with, was the last man in the world to lead an ally into an embarrassing position and then desert him. But he made no protestations, and only appealed to the common sense of the Italian Government. He authorised Govone to declare to his chief that the Prussian Government believed that the eventuality of war between Prussia and Austria would be inevitably brought about by the force of circumstances, and would attach itself to the impossibility of Italy, though she had enlarged her army, had not made permitting the struggle to commence between Italy and

Two or three days before the dispatch of Count Bismarck's confidential communication to the Committee of the Diet, the decree had been issued for the mobilisation of the whole Prussian army!

A.D. 1866.]

PROPOSAL FOR THE CESSION OF VENETIA TO FRANCE.

Austria, without Prussia taking part in it at the same moment. And when Govone asked whether, since the signature of the King of Prussia could not be obtained to a military convention binding him to take the field, should war break out in Italy, his Government could give the assurance that they considered themselves bound in honour to Italy, Bismarck replied, "You can tell General La Marmora that we shall make of that condition [that Prussia should take the field if war broke out in Italy] a Cabinet question; for what remains, trust to the irresistible march of events." Some days later (May 7), Bismarck repeated to Count Barral that, "according to the letter of the treaty, Prussia was not strictly bound to attack Austria if Austria attacked Italy; but that it was for Prussia a moral engagement; and that the King, to whom he had spoken on the matter, answered that his loyalty caused him to regard it as a duty." What could have been plainer than such declarations as these? Yet La Marmora talks in a magniloquent style about not abandoning his ally in spite of his most serious delinquencies (gravissimi torti"); and Govone, in a memorandum dated May 7, while admitting that Bismarck assured him that "in no case would Italy be left alone to face Austria, angry and armed," cynically observes that he only said so because he had heard some rumour of a plan of separate accommodation between Austria and Italy.

There was indeed such a plan, and General La Marmora's revelations make us acquainted with its exact scope. Although the General declares that he himself rejected it from the first, it is clear that General Govone was not altogether disinclined to it; it seems not to have been quite out of the question for Italy to entertain it; and this is perhaps the reason why Italian statesmen lay so much stress on what they regard as the (hypothetical) bad faith of Prussia towards Italy. On the 5th of May, General La Marmora received a telegram in cipher from Paris, of which the first words were, "Decipher for yourself." After he had done so, he found the purport of the telegram (which was from the Chevalier Nigra) to be this-that Austria was willing to cede Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who would at once transfer it to the King of Italy, on condition that she should be left free to recoup herself at the expense of Prussia. La Marmora telegraphed back that his first impression was that it was a question of honour and good faith for Italy not to break her engagements with Prussia. Again (May 6) came the tempting voice from Paris, saying that the Emperor had told Nigra that Prince Metternich was formally authorised to sign the cession of Venetia in exchange for a simple promise of neutrality. We have no ground for supposing that La Marmora wavered for an instant; but, if his resolution had been momentarily shaken, other telegrams soon arrived, of a nature to confirm him in it. On May 6, Count Barral telegraphed that he had been just informed by Count Bismarck that the Prussian army might now be regarded as entirely mobilised; and on the 9th, Nigra telegraphed from Paris that Govone had just arrived from Berlin, and was under the full conviction that Prussia had absolutely decided to

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draw the sword, at latest, towards the beginning of June, and would, in any case, declare war if Italy were attacked. Setting against the risks of war the odium which the acceptance of the French proposal, involving as it did a direct breach of faith with Prussia, would bring down upon the young Italian kingdom, and the painful and inconvenient consequences which might ensue from Italy's debt of obligation to France being so greatly extended, the Italian Premier wisely determined to be true to his first faith; and the project for the cession of Venetia to France vanished for the present into space.

Meantime events were ripening to a crisis in Germany. On the 27th of April, Count Bismarck dispatched an im perious missive to Dresden, demanding to know with what intentions Saxony was arming, and declaring that Prussia could not view the preparations that were being made so close to her border with indifference, the more so as there were grounds for believing that Saxony was arming against Prussia. Baron Beust, the Saxon Premier, replied with diplomatic reserve, evading all assertion of direct partisanship, and appealing to various articles of Federal law; at the same time the Saxon envoy was instructed to bring the correspondence which had taken place with Prussia under the notice of the Diet, and claim the intervention of the Confederation. This was done on the 5th of May. The Prussian envoy declared that Prussia did not intend to attack Saxony, but that it was the duty of the Diet, if it disapproved of his Government's proceedings, to restrain Austria and Saxony in their warlike preparations; if this were not done, Prussia would be compelled to have regard only to her own security and the necessity of upholding her European position, and would subordinate her relations to the Confederation to the imperative claims of self-preservation. The voting on Saxony's motion-the object of which was to obtain a decree of the Diet, with reference to the proceedings of Prussia, that the internal peace of the Confederation must be preserved-was taken on the 9th of May, and the motion was carried. Bismarck told Count Barral that the hostile feelings of the middle states towards Prussia were plainly expressed at this meeting, and that there could be no doubt that the preparations which they were making were intended for the support of Austria; he did not care, however, for Prussia would be ready before they were.

The secondary states resolved that they would make one last effort for the maintenance of peace. At the Conference of Bamberg, convened with this object, representatives of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Baden, and several minor Powers, agreed upon a policy which they embodied in a motion made in the Diet on May 19, to the effect that all Powers which had armed should be called upon to state at the next meeting of the Diet their reasons for arming, and whether, and on what conditions, they were prepared to consent to a general and simultaneous disarmament. This motion was carried, and June 1 was the day fixed on which these important explanations were to be given.

The efforts of neutral and friendly Powers were, of course, not wanting to the cause of peace. From the

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