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of her commerce? Would the cries of those for peace whom he was more particularly resolved to undo by war, be a motive with him to listen to any terms of peace? On the contrary, would they not encourage him to persevere in the war, as the surest means of accomplishing his ultimate object? Then how could those who professed to be friends to peace, attempt to derive any arguments in its favour from the distresses or importunities of our manufacturers? Was not the very plea on which they urged their object the most powerful obstacle to obstruct its attainment? He gave the honourable gentleman full credit for being sincere in the opinion he expressed. But he would contend, admiting negotiation to be desirable and good when there was a prospect of its leading to peace, that it was a mischief when it did not afford that prospect. It tended to excite deceitful hope, and to paralyse exertion. The hon. gentleman was satisfied that when Russia said, We may have peace on honourable terms, the fact was so. But why, in that case, did not Russia state those, terms? What Russia may have looked upon as honourable terms, may not be so locked upon in this country. The manner in which Russia acted respecting Prussia; the manner in which that power surrendered the guarantied republic of the Seven Islands; the phrase of "maritime peace," always used by France in a sense which was wholly inconsis tent with the maritime power and prosperity of Britain, and in that sense forced into all the diplomatic papers of the powers reduced under the control of Bonaparte; the apparent compromise of the independence of Sicily;-all these were

grounds for suspecting that the terms which Russia described as honourable, may be in fact very far from being so on the principles that a British government was bound to act upon. A statement of the basis on which France was prepared to negotiate was demanded. The importance of adjusting a basis before coming to negotiate was obvious, as well from the effect it must have in confining the nego, tiation within fixed limits and principles, as from the confusion that arose from the want of an acknow. ledged basis in the last negotiation; and the labour that was afterwards bestowed in fruitless endeavours, first to arrange a basis, and afterwards to re-establish it when it was lost sight of by the French govern. ment.

And here he could not help making a remark on the strange manner in which it was made a matter of argument for a long time, that France had actually ad mitted the basis of the uti possie detis at the outset, while that admission was as repeatedly denied on the part of the French. Another material fact, tending to show the disposition of Russia and her devo. tion to France, was, that the inclination of the Russian government to complete the commercial treaty with Britain ceased on account of the influence of France, and was not concluded because it was disagreeable to that power. He had himself no doubt, that the declaration on the subject of Copenha gen was forced on Russia by France. It was thought strange, that while the mediation of Russia was thought suspicious as between Britain and France, the mediation of that power was solicited as between Britain and Denmark. But

this application was perfectly consistent with the character of protector of the north; and by preserving any part of the indepen dence of that state; there may be yet room to hope that all was not irrecoverably lost. The first offer of mediation from Austria was immediately subsequent to the battle of Eylau; described, in the gazette published by the late ministers, as a complete victory on the part of the allies. It was accepted without any other condition, than that it should be accepted equally by all the belligerent powers. The offer was made accordingly, and accepted by France in terms so offensive to Britain, that it would have been a question, Whether any negotiation could be instituted upon it? But, before this point could come to issue, the battle of Friedland had totally destroyed the hopes of the allies; and when lord Pembroke mentioned the matter at Vienna, he was told things were so changed, that nothing could be done. From that time nothing more was heard till the communi cation made by prince Stahremberg on the 20th November. The terms and tone of the offer made then were very different from the former; and it became the more necessary to ascertain the basis and the source from which it proceeded, as, when lord Pembroke asked at Vi enna, for some explanations of things stated by prince Stahremberg here in September, the Austrian government denied having given any authority for such a statement. The whole of the proceedings on the part of Austria, with respect to the second offer, bore evident marks of French dictation. It was expected that one of the last notes of the French government would have produced a great explosion

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here. But prince Stahremberg, who was as anxious as he could well be to continue to reside in this country, forbore to communicate this offensive paper, and thus the explosion did not take place. Here Mr. C. entered into some verbal explanations of the note of prince Stahremberg, and concluded by saying that be should give his negative to the motions.

Mr. W. Smith disapproved of the two first resolutions, but expressed his intention to vote for the third.

Mr. Sheridan was surprised at the declaration of his hon. friend, just as much as he was at the con duct of other friends of his who approved of the two first resolutions but determined to oppose the third. He could not conceive any ground of consistency upon which such conduct could be justified. He determined to support the whole three; which he should have done, had they been even much stronger in their terms. They were such as ought to be passed by that house, as a guide and warning to minis ters. And when some of his friends told him that they ought to be postponed, he asked why? These ministers had already suffered two opportunities for negotiation to pass by, and was it required to wait until they should lose a third ? With regard to petitions for peace, he was decidedly of opinion, that the way to put a stop to them would be to pass those resolutions, which would serve to satisfy the country that the house was strongly disposed to peace, when peace was fairly attainable. Thus alone would the suspicion which prevailed among the people as to the hostility of ministers to peace, and which suspicion produced those petitions, be effectually removed.

As a great deal still remained to be said upon this important question, particularly upon the third resolution, into which it was now too late to enter, the right honourable gentleman moved an adjournment of the debate till to-morrow..

Mr. Adam requested his right hon. friend (Mr. Sheridan) to withdraw his motion, and let the house decide upon the resolutions, for every one of which he meant to yote affirmatively. His opinion was, that ministers had by their conduct put a bar to any expectation of peace being proposed by them or to them; and until that bar was removed by a declaration of the sentiments of that house, he very much feared there could be no hope of peace for the country...

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CHAPTER III.

Danish Expedition-Lord Danley's Motion and Resolutions on the Baltic Expedition-Lord Elliot's Resolution-Debate on Mr. Sharp's Motion, and Mr. Stewart Wortley's Resolution.-" Orders of Council"-Lord Henry Petty's Motion for Papers-General Gascoine's Motion on the Liverpool Petition-Mr. Ald rman Combe's from the American Merchants -General Gascoine's-Debate on the Third Reading of the Bill on the Orders of Council; on the Admission of Counsel; and on the Examination of Witnesses-Lord Lauderdale's Motion and Resolutions-Lord · Grenville's Motion-Lord Holland's Motion and Resolutions.

WE must dition, which the only ground on which it could

E must again advert to the this expedition, and contended that

occupied several other discussions in both houses of parliament besides those which we have referred to in a former chapter. It will, however, be sufficient, if we give an outline of the termination of these debates beginning with what took place in the upper house, which claims a priority in point of time. On the third of March the earl of Darnley took a review of the principal circumstances connected with

be justified was actual necessity, which was not proved to exist by any documents, nor by the arguments of ministers. It had been said, that an option was given to the prince regent to deliver up the Danish fleet: this was in fact no option, because had he delivered it up Holstein and Jutland would immediately have been seized by France. In apology for this expedition, it had been said, that it was intended

intended to ward off danger from this country; But how had it been prevented? The danger was not of an invasion of this country, but of the shutting up of the Baltic; and instead of precluding this danger, the expedition had accelerated it. Possession of Zealand had not been retained, and Denmark had been thrown completely into the arms of France. The national character had been degraded, and its honour stained, by this expedition-And what was the gain? Sixteen ships of the line, which could be of little or no service; and as to the stores, they did not amount in value to the stores expended in the expedition; and the whole was not equal to the expense of the expedition. He was aware that a part of the public considered this as a victory, but he hoped the house would make a more accurate distinction, and characterize this act in terms which it merited. His lordship concluded by moving, that a humble address be presented to his majesty, submitting,

That after attentively consi. dering all the public documents before us concerning the late attack on Copenhagen, and the war which it has produced, we have found the information which they afford extremely imperfect and unsatisfac

tory.

"That in a matter in which both the honour and the interests of our country are so deeply concerned, we had hoped for the fullest explanations. The principles of our constitution, and the uniform practice of his majesty and the sovereigns of his illustrious house, require that parliament should be distinctly apprised of the true grounds of entering into new wars, especially in a situation of our country wholly unprecedented.

"Had Denmark been a party to any hostile confederacy against the rights or interests of the Bri tish empire, our resistance would have been necessary, and our warfare legitimate. Under such cir

cumstances we should only have had to regret, that the ports and arsenals of that country should so lightly have been abandoned, when advantages so very considerable had been derived from their tem porary occupation; and when, by our continuing to hold them during the war, all real danger from that quarter might have been effectually averted.

"But we cannot doubt that Denmark, instead of engaging in hostile leagues, had resolved still to maintain her neutrality. This fact is

proved even by the imperfect documents which have been laid before us, and is confirmed by the proclamation issued by his majesty's commanders immediately before the attack.

"Certainly Denmark was no party, nor does it appear that she was privy to any confederacy hostile to this country. We are not even satisfied that such a league did really exist.

"The conclusion of any secret articles at Tilsit, affecting the rights or interests of the British empire, appears to have been uniformly denied both by Russia and France.

"The correspondence of his ma❤ jesty's secretary of state, and the dates of the transactions themselves, prove that his majesty's ministers could not be in possession of any such articles when the attack was ordered against Copenhagen; and it has been di stinctly admitted in this house, that they have not yet obtained a copy of them.

"The king's ambassador at Petersburgh

tersburg, in an official note, rested the defence of the measures not on any hostile purposes either of Denmark or Russia, but solely on the designs which it was said the French government had long since been known to entertain.

"His majesty's ministers not only forbore to advise such measures as would have been necessary to repel any real hostility of Russia, but they actually solicited the mediation of that power to extinguish a war, and her guarantee to defeat projects, in which it is now pretended they knew her to have been a principal and contracting party.

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Allegations thus inconsistent with each other, and contrary to admitted facts, weaken, instead of supporting, the cause to which they are applied.

With respect to the alleged nccessity of the case, we beg leave to assure his majesty, that we can. not think so meanly of the power and resources of his empire, of the spirit of his people, or of the valour and discipline of his fleets and armies, as to admit that such an act could have been required for any purpose of self-preserva

tion.

"Any temporary advantages which the possession of such ships and stores as were taken at Copenhagen can afford, are already much more than counterbalanced by the other consequences of a measure which appears not less objectionable in policy than in principle. That measure has augmented the number of our enemies; it has countenanced the injurious representations circulated throughout Europe respecting our principles and designs; and has inflamed against us the warmest passions of neutral and of friendly nations.

"But it has, above all, shaken our own persuasion of the justice of our cause: a sentiment which had hitherto supported us through all our difficulties; commanding the respect of other powers, and encouraging us in a humble but confident reliance on the ultimate protection and blessing of Provi dence.

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Unwilling as we are even yet to pronounce definitively on a subject, the full knowledge of which has been so pertinaciously withheld from us; and reluctant as we must ever be to admit conclusions unfavourable to the justice of those counsels by which his majesty's conduct has been actuated; we are yet compelled, on such an occasion, to speak to his majesty the language of truth. And we must, therefore, with all humility, and with the most unfeigned and heartfelt sorrow, represent, that in a case which, above all others, required the clearest proof, every presumption is against us; and that no particle of evidence has yet been adduced, by which our national character can be vindicated from the guilt of an unprovoked and premeditated violation of that good faith, justice, and humanity, which have hitherto been at once the glory and the safe, guard of the British empire."

Lord Elliot thought the noble earl had brought the question respecting this expedition fairly to an issue; but differed from him entirely with respect to the merits of the expedition; which he thought a wise and vigorous measure, that had prevented much risk and dan ger to this country. A mistake had, he thought, arisen in the arguments of those who condemned the expedition, in supposing that we entered the harbour of Copenhagen as friends, and seized the Da

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