under the necessity of acting solely on the defensive. Ir the month of December how reversed was the picture! The armies of Blake, Castanos, and count Belveder had been defeated and dispersed; the capital was again in possession of the enemy; his immense armies, constantly increasing, were spreading themselves over the whole of the north and the centre of Spain; while the only remaining hope of the patriotsrested with the southern provinces, and with the dispersed troops which might be able to collect and rally there. It would be worse than useless, it would be both foolish and criminal, to shut our eyes to the dangers and disasters of the Spaniards, or to shrink from the patient and impartial investigation of the causes and circumstances which produced them. The bad effects of this obstinate blindness, of this weakness of mind which rests content with expressions of wonder and lamentation, and which dares not penetrate too deeply lest some national blame should appear or some new evil should be discover ed, may be traced through all the wars which this country has waged for the delivery of Europe since the commencement of the French revolution. With respect to the gloomy appearance of affairs in Spain at the close of the year, especially when they are contrasted with her successes and her prospects in the month of August, it appears that the reverse she has experienced must, in a great degree, be ascribed to one of the three following causes. Either the enthusiasm and determination of the people was not, at the commencement of the insurrection, nearly so general and so strong as was represented or those who 1803. were intrusted with the direction of affairs failed through want of talent, vigour, activity and promp titude, in. keeping alive that enthusiasm and determination, and in taking advantage of the feelings of the Spaniards to increase the armies; neglected to adopt those measures which were necessary for their support, and their easy and regular communication, and intrusted them to men incapable of performing the arduous task of directing the operations of undisciplined and inexperienced troops, opposed to troops habituated to war, and led on by generals whose sole object and thought through the greater part of their lives had been the perfection of the military art or, lastly, the cause must be sought in a still more dispiriting and melancholy consideration, that ten millions of people, determined to conquer or die, are unequal to combat with success against a regular army of two hundred thousand men. It may indeed he remarked, that the cause of the Spaniards is not yet desperate: that a great part of their country is still unconquered: that the people of the south, who assisted the army of Castanos to defeat Dupont; the junta of Seville, who marked their conduct by all those virtues and talents which the state of their country required; and the people of Cadiz, who first who first openly opposed the French; are still to be conquered. We ardently and cordially hope, that a brighter day still remains for Spain; but that hope, instead of checking a severe and impartial scrutiny into the causes of the failures and disasters she has already suffered, ought rather to prompt and call forth their immediate investigation. If what has unfortunately happened in the north north of Spain is to be avoided in the south, it must be by ascertaining accurately and fully the real causes to which the misfortunes of the patriots ought to be ascribed. As Britons, it particularly becomes us to inquire whether this nation has done all that she promised, all that was expected, and all that she might and ought to have done, in support of the Spanish cause. We are unwilling to admit the heart breaking supposition that the ar mies of Bonaparte are invincible; and if we do not admit that, or if we even admit that his victories in Spain have been much more rapid and decisive than could antecedently have been expected, it will be impossible not to seek the cause of those victories, partly at least, in the mismanagement of his opponents. CHAPTER XII. Affairs of Portugal-Manifesto of the Prince Regent on its Invasion-Report of the French Minister on the same- Edicts of Junot against British Property, and the wearing of Arms-Unsettled and gloomy State of LisbonDisposition of the Portuguese on the breaking out of the Spanish Insurrestion-French driven from Oporto-State of the North of the KingdomJunot disarms and imprisons the Spanish Troops in Lisbon-Formation of a Junta in Oporto-Its Edicts respecting the Increase of the Military Force-The Suspension of Law-suits; the Trial of suspected Persons; and the Expenses of the War-Deputies sent to England—Expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley-Proceedings before it landed in Portugal-Coolnes between the British and Portuguese Generals-Battle of Roleia-Battle of Vimiera-Anecdotes of this Battle-Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple-Armistice-Convention of Cintra-Protest of the Portuguese General against it-Disgraceful Plundering by the FrencbAppointment of a Commission to protect the Properly of the PortugueseInquiry bow far they could be of Service in this Respect-Delivery of their Arms to the Spanish Soldiers-Re-establishment of a Regency-Divisions among the Portuguese-General Hope's Proclamation-Delay in dispatching the British Force to Spain-Force left in Portugal-State of that Kingdom at the Close of the Year. IN N detailing the transactions which took place in Portugal, (secondary in the importance of their nature, and of their consequences, only to the events which we have just recorded) we shall avail ourselves of the manifesto is sued by the prince regent soon after his arrival in the Brazils, so far as to enable us to trace the designs of France upon that kingdom back to the treaty of Tilsit, the period at which the plans of Bonaparté appear to have assumed their most mature and regular form. This manifesto is entitled, "A justificatory Exposition of the Conduct of the Court of Portugal with respect to France, from the Commencement of the Revolution to the Time of the Invasion of Por tugal, and of the Motives which com of Portugal declared its firm intention to confine itself, in the manifesto, to a simple and moderate detail of facts, and to abstain carefully from all declamation or invective. compelled it to declare War against France in consequence of that Invasion, and the subsequent Declaration of War made after the Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations." As the former part of this manifesto, which relates to After stating the sacrifices Porthe conduct of Portugal prior to tugal had made in order to oblige the treaty of Tilsit, is not interest-France, or to keep at peace with ing, either from the fulness and her, and the benefits France had minuteness of its detail, or from its, enjoyed by means of the neutrality immediate connection with the in- of Portugal, in obtaining most ofvasion of that kingdom, we shall her colonial commodities and the omit it, and confine ourselves to raw materials for her manufacthe substance of the latter part: tures; and the interruption which we are aware, that we shall neces- was given to the hostile designs of sarily be obliged to retrace our Bonaparte against the prince resteps beyond the commencement of gent, first by the war with Prussia, the year 1803; but we trust that and subsequently by the war with the importance of the part of the Russia; the manifesto comes to manifesto which we shall make use the period of the treaty of Tilsit, of, as well as the completeness when no other object interfered which we shall by means of it be with the views of the French goenabled to give to our narrative, vernment upon Portugal. will plead our excuse for indulging in a short retrospect. The motives which led the court of Portugal to issue this manifesto, are detailed in the beginning of it with plainness and candour. By means of it they hoped to be able to establish, in the minds of the different nations of Europe, a firm persuasion of the purity of the conduct it had pursued, and of the principles upon which it had acted; as well as to exhibit another instance and proof of the duplicity and violence of the French government. One great purpose and object of the manifesto would be completely and happily answered, provided those states which still retained their independence should be incited to combine for the, purpose of curbing and narrowing the power of France, and of restoring the Continent to its former state of tranquillity, equality of territory, and independence. The court Immediately after the conclusion of this treaty, Bonaparte caused it to be notified to the court of Portugal, through the medium of the French chargé d'affaires, and by. the Spanish ambassador, that he peremptorily required, First, that all the ports of Portugal should be shut against England: secondly, that all Englishinen resident in Portugal should be prevented from leaving the country; and, thirdly, that all English property should be confiscated. If the court of Portugal refused to accede to these demands, Bonaparte threatened that immediate war should be declared against it both by France and Spain. Three weeks only were given it to deliberate: if, at the end of that period, all the demands of the French government were not fully complied with, the French chargé d'affaires and the Spanish ambassador had orders to leave Lisbon. Bonaparte, however, did Z 2 not A not wait even this very short space of time; for, soon after his commands were notified to the Portuguese count, all the Portuguese merchant ships which happened to be in the ports of France were detained; and by this act hostilities were actually commenced. The prince regent now found himself situated in a very awkward and perilous predicament: the long and tried alliance between his country and England forbad him to comply with the demands of Bonaparte; while, on the other hand, by an absolute and total refusal, he exposed himself and all Portugal to the enmity and vengeance of the unrelenting and ambitious tyrant. Persuaded that the British government would feel and make every due allowance for the extreme pressure and urgency of the difficulties and dangers by which he was surrounded, and ascribe any appearance of unfriendly or hostile conduct on his part to its real cause, the prince regent acceded to the shutting up of his ports, but refused to agree to the other two articles; alleging that they were contrary to the principles of public law, and to the treaties which subsisted between Portugal and England. As it was by no means probable, that this iniperfect and evidently unwilling compliance with the demands of Bonaparte would avert the storm which was preparing, and seemed fast approaching, the court of Portugal began to adopt such measures as it thought would secure, or assist, its retreat to that part of their dominions where the power of the enemy could not reach it. For this purpose, orders were immediately given, that all the ships of war which were fit to keep the sea should be fitted out. While by this order the court pre pared for their departure, in case Bonaparte should in his persevere hostile intentions, they did not neglect or delay to carry into execu tion that demand of the French government which they had expressed their willingness to comply with. The British ministry were informed that it might be neces sary, for the purpose of saving Fortugal, to shut her ports against England; and intimation was gi ven to the British merchants resi dent in Portugal to the same effect. But the court of the Thuilleries had determined that no conciliatory measures on the part of Portugal should prevent the erecution of those designs which had been formed against her. They insisted more peremptorily, and in a more haughty and determined tone than before, that all. British subjects should be imprisoned, and their property confiscated; and having learnt that the prince regent intended to quit Portugal, and embark for the Brazils, they more over demanded that this project should be given up. The prince regent, still relying on the gener sity and candour of the British government, and convinced that every Englishman who yet remai. ed in Portugal was naturalized there, and that all English property had been sold, reluctantly determined, in order if possible to avert the threatened danger, not only to shut the ports against the vessels of his old ally, but also to comply with the other demands of France. He declared, however, at the same time, that as soon as ever any French troops should er ter Portugal, he was determined to remove the seat of government to the Brazils. Notwithstanding the prince regent had thus fully complied with the the demands of Bonaparte, he yet seems to have had just and wellgrounded reason to apprehend, that he had not purchased the safety and independence of his king-, dom, or his own personal security. In order to be provided against the evil he saw approaching, he order ed his whole army to move towards the coast and sea ports; and put things into such a train as would enable him to embark, without much difficulty or delay, as soon as he had ascertained, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the French had entered Portugal in a hostile manner. While he was engaged in these preparations, general Junot, with the van-guard of his army, entered Portugal. No previous declaration had been issued, nor had the consent of the prince regent been obtained; and yet the French general assured the people in the country through which he marched, that he and his army came as the friends and allies, not as the enemies, of the Portuguese; that he was sent by Bonaparte for the purpose of defending the kingdom against the threatened invasion of the English, and of acting in concert with the troops of the prince regent. Coming with these professions, and for this avowed purpose, the French army was every where received and treated in the most unsuspicious and friendly manner by the Portuguese; nor did they perceive, through the whole course of their march, any reason to believe that Portugal was in the least inimical to France. The corps with which Junot at first advanced, was by no means formidable either from its numbers or its equipment; and the prince regent, in his manifesto, asserts, that by rallying around him the troops which were at a short distance from him, and causing the English fleet to enter the port of Lisbon, he might easily have cut to pieces the French armies. In this situation of affairs, theprince regent adopted the only measure by which he could preserve his own honour and safety, and afford a chance to stich of his subjects as preferred liberty and tranquillity in the Brazils, to the degrading and crushing tyranny of the French, of accompanying him in his emigration. His fleet, which had long been in a state of preparation, sailed under the protection of the English to the Portuguese settlements in South America. He thus found himself at last obliged to escape from the power of the French, even after he had compli ed with every demand which the caprice of their tyranny had required of him. Although, in this manifesto of the prince regent, he evidently takes credit to himself for more decision and firmness of character and conduct than he actually exhibited; yet so far as it unfolds the views and the plans of the French upon Portugal, and the measures of duplicity, artifice, and violence, to which they had recourse, it may justly be regarded as a valuable document. It is curious and not uninstructive to compare the demands which Bonaparte made upon the prince regent, and the purposes for which Junot assured the people that he had entered Portugal, with the scheme for dividing that kingdom which was laid down in the treaty of Fontainbleau, agreed to by Bonaparte and the king of Spain. By that treaty Portugal was to have been occupied and divided by the French and Spanish; according to the manifesto of the prince regent, |