ministers were justified in their proceedings against the court of Denmark. It was a subject that called loudly for the investigation of that house, the more especially as, in the declaration published by his majesty's ministers, they express what they term an avowal of the motives of their proceedings; and in which they say that his majesty owes it to his people to announce, in the most unequivocal manner, the causes which induced him to break with a court, so nearly allied to him as that of Denmark. It was well understood that the disgraceful expedition was not undertaken by the advice of his majesty, but with other views, and perhaps interested motives, which ministers only could explain. It was not the conduct of Denmark which led to it, but anticipation that France would, at some time or other, compel that state to join in the common cause against this country. He allowed, that it was the incessant endeavour of the ruler of France to employ all possible means for the destruction of the British empire; but he insisted that there was no proof that Denmark had fallen in with the views of France, nor any proceedings on her part, within the last twelve months, calculated to arouse the jealousy of England. He next remarked, that if Denmark had really entertained any hostile intentions towards us, it must have been manifest long before the sailing of admiral Gambier, and certainly before his arrival at Copenhagen; and ministers must have had the information of it, and having it, cannot refuse to publish it, by granting the motion, which to that effect he should propose to the house: but he anticipated the rejection of his motion, and for this reason, be1808. cause he was convinced no infor mation of that kind existed. At the time that admiral Gambier entered the Sound, Denmark dreaded no harm from this country, conscious of not having entered into any engagement with the French emperor; 350 of her ships were in different British ports, with cargoes amounting to two millions of rix-dollars; and when the Danish subjects got alarmed by the ru mours spread respecting the destination of the armament, they applied to the Danish court, and received a reply, which at once allayed their fears, namely, that Great Britain had no such inten tion, as both courts were then on the best possible understanding. Was it to be supposed that Denmark would risk its most valuable colonies, her commerce, her ships, and every thing else dear to its existence, merely to gratify the wish of the French ruler? But at the time the negotiation between the court of Denmark and the emperor of France was supposed to be going forward, the Danish force in Zealand amounted to 35,000 men, and the army in Holstein to 30,000; so that there was a force of at least '65,000 men, exclusive of Swedish and British. The French could not take Zealand while there was such a force to defend it. Nor could France take the Danish fleet without the consent of Denmark: the Belt has not been crossed on the ice by an army for the last 150 years; and it had rarely happened that even individuals had been enabled to cross in that manner. It was well known that the cold in most of the European states was not now what it had been. The draining of morasses, the cutting of forests, and the general cultiva tion and improvement of countries, C had us. had made great alterations in the climates; so that not only had no troops passed the Great Belt on the ice during the last 150 years, but during the last 60 years no instance had occurred in which that arm of the sea had been so bound up by frost that a general would have ventured to march an army across it. Neither could Russia force Denmark into a confederacy against If we knew that to be her object, why did we suffer the Russian fleet to rove about unmolested; or why did not ministers now produce some proof of it? Russia was reproached with having such design by our ambassador; and yet she was required to give up the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and was also called to account for her conduct at Corfu, Turkey, and in the Mediterranean. All this was done while Russia was of fering her mediation to stop the horrors of war. He remarked on the great impolicy of our conduct, after we had made Denmark our mortal enemy, in leaving 65,000 of her troops, unmolested in Holstein and Zealand, in possession of all her strong holds, and of the Crown battery. He said, we dealt our impolitic malice but by half measures; we were shabby in our iniquity, but without the skill to complete it. He warned niinisters against believing that nations may be absolved from the rules of morality. France, by interfering between America and the mother country, had overwhelmed her own government, and sent her royal race into exile. Prussia and Austria had been severally punished for the share they took in the infamous partition of Poland; and so also was Russia, who made the third in that act of spoliation, now the abject suitor of the victor Bona parte, trembling at his nod, and obsequious to his purposes. He then concluded by moving, "that an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he would be gra ciously pleased to cause to be laid before the house the substance and dates of the information sent by our minister at Copenhagen relative to the naval force of Denmark, &c." Mr. Canning then rose.-Whatever, he said, might be the decision of the house, he, for one, should always feel the highest satisfaction in having been accused of his share in the Danish expedition! He was well convinced that ministers had obtained what they deserved, the thanks of their country, for the success of the expedition against Copenhagen, as that enterprise had been, in a great degree, the salvation of the country. He observed, that it never was nor had been imputed to Denmark, that she had to choose whether she would go to war with us. Such a principle had never been maintained; neither would it have been at all necessary. It had been said, that the weakness of Denmark was a suflicient justi fication of the measure; but that was not the case; neither was it true that we had the hearts of the Danes with us. It was impossible to conceive for one moment, after the defeat of the northern confederacy, that Denmark could ever have been with us. On the contrary, from that period the feelings of Denmark had been hostile to a degree against this country. Here the right hon. gentleman stated the circumstances attending the northern confederacy in 1780, and in 1502. Since the latter the league was to the same effect, only more firmly knitted, and more vigorous, by the strong compulsion of France. In all Bonaparte's capitulations and decrees, ge. decrees, he has declared his design, and his firm and inveterate determination, to persevere in such a confederacy, by combining the naval-force of Europe for the exclusion and depression of our commerce, in which nothing, he said, should prevent Denmark from being an associate. When the first danger menaced the frontiers of Denmark, it was the French troops that occupied Hanover in the year 1803. This cordon of troops was however withdrawn, when the troops of Sweden and England entered Holstein. After the battle of Auerstadt, Denmark was violated by the French, a Danish neral taken prisoner and treated with great disrespect, and the Danish forces compelled to retreat from the frontiers of Holstein. After that, prince Murat was sent by Bonaparte to the king of Sweden, entreating that monarch to make common cause with France, and promising him, in that event, Norway, which belonged to Denmark. The king of Sweden in stantly communicated this offer to the prince royal of Denmark, and offered him 20,000 troops for the defence of Holstein, which was refused by the prince royal, believing he could only rely on the assurances of France: and he did more-he. concealed from England the fact of the French offer respecting Norway. Having stated these and other points, the right hon. gentleman appealed to the house, whether or not it would be wise or prudent in ministers to have relied on the fidelity and independence of Denmark, especially after the warn ings she had received. Mr. Canning went at great length into the general policy of the attack at Copenhagen, and ridiculed the notions of morality held by those who condemned it. He concluded by giving the resolution his most decided and hearty negative. Mr. Windham could not withhold himself from expressing his very great astonishment at the manner in which the right hon. gentleman opposite had alluded to certain transactions of the late administration. It was true, the late ministers had sent a fleet to Lisbon, as the present ministers hati sent one to Copenhagen: but there was this difference, that the late ministers, having precisely the same grounds for seizing the feet of Por tugal, had declined to act to that extent upon those grounds that the present ministers had in the case of Copenhagen. The success of the present ministers consisted in doing what was improper to be done at all, and what might as well have been done at any time since the commencement of the war. The right hon. gentleman, therefore, had no reason to exult in a comparison which made against him, and he might address him in the words of the poet, "Can nothing but thine own reproach "Serve for a motto for thy coach?" Mr. W. deprecated the measures adopted by ministers, and acensed them of sacrificing the reputation of the country. The ruins they had made at Copenhagen would prove a lasting monument of disgrace. We should be objects of scorn and execration; and it would be the interest of our enemies to cherish the monument we have left! He condemned the Spanish war as a war of plunder; and declared that the only way left for him, in his individual capacity, to act, towards wiping out the stains on the country, was to avow publicly his sincere and pointed condemnation of, and to express his C 2 heart heartfelt regret, at the measures that night under consideration. Mr. Milnes, Mr. Foster, lord Palmerstone, and Mr. Morris vindicated the measure. Mr. Bathurst spoke against it. Mr. Lyttleton was in favour of it-after which Mr. Whitbread, having noticed Mr. Littleton's mode of justifying ministers, said, the right honourable secretary asserted there was not a man in the country who was not satisfied of the expediency of the expedition to Copenhagen. He was sorry to differ with the right honourable gentleman, and he was convinced that the country would feel the falsehood and delusion of the assertion, and the wretched and puerile effort by which it was at tempted to justify this violent and unprincipled measure. He could not help saying, that the right honourable secretary and his colleagues were so compi.tely at variance in the manner in which they have endeavoured to justify this act, and so contradictory and inconsistent with themselves, that one was at a loss which of their stories to believe. They were like a set of witnesses who had agd among themselves to tell the same story, but, when afterwards examined in separate rooms, varied in their evidence. He then took notice of the variance between the statements in the king's speech and these since made by the ministers. His najesty was made to say, that the powers of Europe had combined to form a confederacy against us; but the right honourable gentleman in his speech stated, that Denmark, c. these powers, was in a connivance with France against this nd mi. Nod our N listen to cruel advisers. Without going into the various details of contradictory statements, he would take it as a fact, that Denmark did wish to continue in a state of neutrality; and he desired ministers to give some more information. Let Mr. Garlicke be called to the bar of the house, and say what he knew of the disposition of the Da nish court. He surely was in no danger of being seized by Bona. parte. Let the whole of lord Hut chinson's letters be laid before the house. Let lord Granville Leveson Gower state what he knew of the disposition of Russia. A heavy charge was made by Russia against this country, for not affording her any cooperation during the campaign in Poland. Now, was there any foundation for the reproaches of baron Budberg? Every body knew that a force of 10 or 20,000 men, exposed, as they must be, to certain destruction, could never have averted the fatal battle of Friedland. But, if ministers were in possession of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit, why did they not produce them? It had been said that a hostile mind existed in Russia against this country; and that she would seize on the Danish navy. "Now," continued Mr. Whitbread, "I ask ministers, whether it was known to them that Russia was hostile to this country previously to the attack on Copenhagen? (Mr. Canning answered across the table, Yes.) I am not," replied Mr. Whitbread, "disposed to doubt that the right hon. gentieman thinks what he says is true; but let that be proved: let witnesses be examined as to the fact. Frequent mention had been made of the inveterate hostility of France; but what else could bee pcdfrom France except hostilit to Theendeavour enthe pait of Franc to combine all the powers of Europe against us, was no more unjustifiable than the attempt of this country to form combinations against France." It was, however, evident that Russia was hostile to this country after the attack on Copenhagen; and, on that account he contended, it was a meanness in this country to ask a power so hostile to us, to interfere for the purpose of making up the quarrel between us and Denmark. He was ready to admit, the right honourable gentleman had that night advanced strong reasons why an attack should not be made on Cronstadt. With respect to the value of the Danish ships, it was stated, in some accounts, that they were very good ships, because they stood the weather so well incoming home. -But it appeared from admiral Gambier's account, that it was necessary to repair some of them before they were putto sea. From the regularity and preparation in the Danish navy, an inference was drawn, that they were intended to be made use of against us. But it must appear to any person who ever visited Copenhagen, that, for fifty years past, it had been the practice of the Danes, a practice in which they prided themselves, to have their ships laid up in ordinary, in so complete a state of repair, that they could be fitted out in a very short time. But when we took the ships, we took the least efficient part of the Danish navy. We left behind 18,000 seamen, who would be ready to enter into the service of France: and France had ships enough for herself. The English acted like shabby thieves, they took only one half of their booty. Why was not the French property at Copenha. gen seized also? The only effect of the expedition was, to arm the people of Denmark against us, and to shut us out from the Baltic trade; while Holland was entirely under the power of France, without the latter being at the expense of sending troops to conquer it. If the act in question was justified by necessity, he was ready to admit, that it was justified in morality, and in the sight of God. But it could not be justified. Ministers wanted to imitate the energies of France. How did they do that? France had slain a giant, and then England must go and kill an innocent helpless child. The question now was, not whether the expedition was justifiable, but whether that house was bound to give credit to the assertions of ministers, and whether it ought not to require more information. Lord Granville Levison Gower denied positively that the hostility of Russia was caused either by the neglect of England to send her succours, or by the attack on Copenhagen. The real cause of that hostility was the battle of Friedland. The moment the emperor Alexander arrived at Petersburg from Tilsit, after signing the peace with France, the first person he visited was his minister of marine; and the first order he afterwards gave, was to repair the batteries at Cronstadt. He had heard it said, that our attack on Copenhagen was a subject of reprobation among the people of the continent. For his own part, he could affirm, that almost all the people whom he conversed with in Russia approved it; because by that attack, they considered themselves as released from the danger to which they might otherwise be exposed, if the French were to make Sweden the highroad for marching into Russia. He thought sufficient explanation C 3 had |