Page images
PDF
EPUB

which Bonaparte had-sustained in troops, as well as in territory and military reputation: and if we reflect by whom all this had been effected; under what disadvantages and difficulties; and above all, in what a short space of time; we shall be convinced that a faithful and accurate representation of the victories of their countrymen would have been sufficient both to support

the spirit and perseverance of the Spanish nation, and to incite them to prepare their minds with patience and fortitude sufficient to bear those evils, by passing through which they could alone hope to secure the fruit of their victories, and obtain permanent possession of the grand object of their patriotic struggle.

CHAPTER X.

Afairs of Spain continued-Proclamation of the Council of Castile to the People of Madrid, on the Departure of the French-Their Letter to the Provincial Junias-Legislative Manifesto of the Junta of Seville-mstallation of the Supreme Government-Establishment of a Military Junta -Proposed Reforms of the Supreme Government-biracter of its Proceedings-Defence of Gerona-Situat on and Objects of the French and Spanish Armies in September and October-Remarks on be Inactivity of the Spanish Armics-Declaration of Biscay-Attacks on Bilboa-Exertions of the British Government in behalf of Spain-Laberation of be Marquis of Romana's Trops-Proffered Assistance of Sir A. Wellesley's Army, and Expedition under Sir David Baird-Disposition of the Rest of Europe with respect to Spain-Proceedings of Bonaparte-Reports of bis Ministers-Decree of the French Senate-Bonaparte's Address 10 bis Solders-Conference at Erfurib-Proposals of Peace-His Majesty's Declaat.on-Arrival of Bonaparte in Spain.

[ocr errors][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small]

men.

They began their proclamation by expressing their confidence that the people of Madrid will not, even at the monent when the armies of Spain are triumphing over the in vincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, judge harshly and prematurely of the principles and conduct of their fellow-citizens. They may be assured, that if there have been in the supreme tribunal any traitors to their sovereign and their country, it will be their wish and endeavour, not less than the imperious demand of their duty, to detect and punish them. But it was more incumbent on the inhabitants of Madrid to put themselves upon their guard against those men; (and they were numerous and active avidst the confusion of the capital) whose sole object was to grow rich by the plunder of their countryFrom these the city ought to be purified, if it wished to express its gratitude to heaven for the great victories which the Spanish armies had obtained. While the different provincès had been exert ing their energy and patriotism, and sending forth zealous and brave soldiers to fight the battles of Spain, the capital had been made subject, on account of the corruption of its manners, to the most dreadful calamities. But it had now an opportunity of witnessing the sincerity of its repentance, and of recovering its character for tranquillity and order. Though the behaviour of many of the Spanish nobility, and the chiefs of the nation, might appear at first sight to afford a pretext for the indignation and vengeance of the people, yet the council of Castile could assure their fellow citizens, that 3 fair representation would rescue them from the imputation and punishment of treachery and cowardice. They

had been placed in a most arduou: situation. Not a few of them had been led by fraud or force far beyond the limits of Spain; yet at a di stance from their country, un supported by the exhortations or the example of their fellow citizens, and surrounded by the me naces and insults of their tyrant, they had preserved unsullied their loyalty, and attachment to their legitimate sovereign. It might be difficult to do away the strong presumption of their guilt; since no schemes had been left untried by which their patriotism might be exposed to suspicion. But when such men were the objects of sus picion, and when it was evidently the object and interest of such a man as Bonaparte to excite and fix that suspicion, proofs apparently the most directed and strong were to be doubted. Even the signatures which had been circulated ought to be looked upon with dis trust. After an animated apostrophe to the armies, conjuring them to hasten to Madrid, in order to protect it; and assuring them that they would be received with the gratitude and joy of their relations and friends; the council conclude their proclamation by again adverting to the chief and prevailing object of their anxiety and solicitude. They pray that no dis turbances may allay the general satisfaction and joy, and fill the city with lamentation and mourn ing; and call upon the inhabitants to live in the confidence that their magistrates will protect them, and will speedily and effectually punish all who may be guilty of any excess.

Through the whole of this proclamation, the apprehension of the council, that the people of Madrid might be disposed not merely to

dispute

dispute and oppose their authority, but also to treat them as unworthy of the situation they held, on account of their submission to the French, is very apparent. The çircular letter which they transmitted to the several provincial governments displayed the same humble and conciliatory spirit. They begin it, by professing in the most explicit and strong terms their uniform and steady attachment to those principles of loyalty and justice for which their character had always been distinguished. By these principles they had been cheered and supported in the midst of all their trials and disasters; ac tuah by them, they had steadily refused to recognise the king whom the most monstrous perfidy had designated for them, further, perhaps, than circumstances justified." The council, under the firm assurance that the different provincial juntas are convinced of the purity and firmness of its principles, and of its determination to support with all its power their lawful sovereign and his rights, is anxious to join its feeble efforts with the prompt and efficacious measures they have it in their power to adopt, for the purpose of settling and carrying into speedy and effectual execution such plans of defence as may be judged most expedient and advisable. With respect to those measures of internal regulation and civil government, which the peculiar situation of the country demands, the council of Castile will confine itself to the indication of a plan, in which it would concur with the greatest satisfaction; viz. that deputies from it and all the juntas should confer on this important subject, and arrange their measures in such a manner, that what they may determine upon, as

2

necessary for the good of the coun try, may be carried into effect with as much expedition as the great obǝ ject they had in view would permit..

The apprehension of the council of Castile, that the provincial juntas would not be very well disposed to give up their authority to a body of men, who had yielded, even on compulsion, to the enemy, appears to have been in some instances well

founded. In reply to the circular letter, the governments of Gallicia and some other provinces expressed their determination to abide by the decision of Seville. Indeed, as much as the council of Castile had lost, either from the unfortunate situation in which they were placed, or from their own want of firmness and loyalty, the junta of Seville had gained, in the opinion of the whole kingdom, by the soundness and judgment displayed, in their different addresses, and by the promptness and vigour of the military proceedings which they had directed and superintended. But it was advisable, on many considerations, that a supreme junta,

to act in the name and on the behalf of the whole of Spain, should, be called; and though Madrid might be objected to, as the seat of the proposed junta, on account of its vicinity to the enemy's forces, yet for many other reasons it would be considered as the most proper place. The junta of Seville prepared to yield up its functions, when the good of their country, for which alone they had assumed them, no longer required or admitted their separate and indepen dent exercise. But before they laid them down they issued by far the most important state paper towhich the Spanish revolution has given birth. We fully recollect, when

we

[ocr errors]

we give it this character, the great merit of the celebrated precautions issped by the same juta. But the paper to which we now allude, being of a legislative character, we conceive to be of much more permanent and general interest than the precautions which relate and apply only to a state of war of a limited and peculiar kind. The great intrinsic merit of this manifesto, as well as the circunstance of its being the only one on the subject of legislation, expressly issued by the provincial governments, will induce us to lay a pretty full abstract of its contents before our readers.

It begins with pointing out the beneficial effects which had resulted from the establishment of provincial juntas, in the dreadful and alarming crisis in which Spain had been placed by the treachery of Bonaparte towards its royal family. By means of these juntas, the diffe rent provinces had been induced to aim themselves with so much unanimity, vigour, and success, that the French were no longer objects of terror, but, on the contrary, were themselves amazed and terrified. No danger appeared to threaten the cause of Spain, but a want of plan and union among the different provinces to prevent this the junta of Seville drew up their precautions, which they communicated by every means in their power to all the different parts of the kingdom. It seemed now much more necessary than ever to carry into full and immediate execution the plan proposed in that state paper. The enemies of Spain were on the watch; and there were many feelings and passions, even in the present state of disinterestedness and patriotism, which might cooperate with their designs.-

Against discord and disunion, there fore, evils not only of the most fatal nature, in the midst of their struggles for independence, but which might creep among them by slow and imperceptible degrees, it behoved them to be specially and continually upon their guard, as they valued their honour, their loyalty, their duty as Spaniards, and their faith as Christians. One method of avoiding all cause of disunion would be carefully to abstain from all conversations about the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families connected with it. The history of Spain presented many instances of the change of succession: and the different legislative proceedings which tock place in consequence, or in the prospect, of such changes were ako well known. The last and therefore the only binding rule on this important point was that which had been established by the cortes in 1789.

But there is no need to prove, by referring to history, that in cases where it may be necessary to change the succession, the constitution has clearly and fully provided for the emergency. While Ferdinand and his brothers live, it is useless, and may be prejudicial, to anticipate inquiries which can only be necessary in default of these. It is absurd and dangerous to dispute about the order and right of succession in cases certainly remote, and which probably may never occur. A general determination on the part of all the provinces of Spain, that hereditary succession, according to the fundamental laws of the monarchy, is what they look forward to, and are willing to support, is assuredly all that the present circumstances require.

But the other question, moved

by

by the different juntas of the kingdom, is of a different character, and stands in a different predicament. This question is warmly agitated by all ranks and degrees of the people; and unless it be stated with perspicuity, and discussed with calmness and candour, it may lead to divisions fatal to the cause of the country. This question regards the necessity for creating a supreme government, possess ing the sovereign authority, till the restoration of Ferdinand. Of the necessity of such a supreme government, the junta of Seville have fully, from the beginning of the revolution, expressed their firm conviction. And in this conviction they are by no means singular: they are countenanced and supported in it, by the corresponding opinion of different suprenie juntas and military chiefs.

The necessity and advantage of such a supreme government are obvious. No nation, even when it is in a state of perfect tranquillity, can go on without a directing and overruling head. How much more necessary, therefore, is such a head to Spain, in the state into which its endeavours to regain its liberties, and the actual result of those endeavours, and the prospects and duties which still lay before it, had thrown it! Without a supreme government no public confidence could exist: and without public confidence, the public funds and even the property of individuals world be liable to suspicion and depreciation. There was no alternative but cither immediately to appoint such a government, or to submit quietly in all cases to military power. But the military chiefs uf Spain were not only sensible of Chinadequacy and danger of mili

[ocr errors]

tary power, extending itself to the direction and management of civil concerns, but they now, as in every former case, were the first to recommend, and would be first to embrace that system which the constitution, the safety of the people, and the emergency and difficulty of the crisis, equally recommended.

The necessity of such a supreme government being established and acknowledged, many important inquiries respecting it naturally offer themselves to the mind. In whom does the power reside of creating it? Who are the most proper persons to form it? What limits ought to be set set to its authority? Above all, how is it to be established, so that the public tranquility may not be interrupted or endangered, and that its confidence and authority, when established, may be immediate, general, and paramount? The junta of Seville are aware of the difficulty and importance of these natural and obvious inquiries; but they are not without hope of being able to give them the most satisfactory replies.

The council of Castile has been helt up, in most of the papers which have been written on this subject, as possessing, by prescription and usage, the right and power to convoke the cortes. This is most assuredly an unfounded opinion. It does not by law or usage possess this right; and certainly after the specimens it has lately given of its loyalty, and of its disposition to sacrifice its security to the good of the country, it can have no claim to obtain that right. Its conduct throughout the whole of the revolution has been such, that it must have forfeited the good opinion and confidence of the people

of

« PreviousContinue »