he asked, would it be dangerous? To ministers? It might or it might not be so, for he verily believed they had none to give. As to the fact itself, we have assertion against assertion: the assertion of the crown prince of Denmark on the one hand, and an assertion which ministers had put into the mouth of their sovereign on the other: and for his own part, he had no hesitation in saying, that he gave credit to the former in preference to the latter. From the subject of the expedition to Copenhagen, the honourable member passed to the emigration of the court of Lisbon, from which ministers had the countenance to claim great merit. That this had turned out fortunate ly he was ready to admit, but that they had any thing to do with it he utterly and entirely denied. In the speech they would make the world believe that they were not likely to be tricked and bamboozled by the prince regent of Portugal, as they would have been by the crown prince of Denmark had it not been for their vigorous and energetic measures. No, no; every thing at Lisbon was sincerity, openness, and good faith. They and their agent lord Strangford brought about the whole by dexterity and address. But in the midst of all this boasting, did they forget that the prince regent had published a proclamation in the first place, telling all the English to get out of the way as fast as they could, and, in the next place, announcing his determination to join the continental confederacy against this country? In the mean time, however, Bonaparte's injudicious, cruel, and wicked proclamation (they might call it by what epithets they would) appeared, and in the absence of lord Strangford the prince regent changed his mind. At length lord Strangford returned: finding, very unexpectedly, that the court had embarked, he assured it of the forgiveness of his sovereign, and fortunately the fleet set sail to the Brazils. This was the plain matter of fact. As to the commercial prospect which this event was represented as opening to us, all he would say was, that the gentlemen on the other side, who had drawn such a lively picture of what might be expected from it, were very young, and might live to see their prophecies realized, but for himself, he had no such hope. He could neither, therefore, approve of thanking ministers for getting off the court of Portugal to the Brazils, nor for their expedition to Denmark, in which, in his opinion, they had a great deal of demerit; and if he thought that he could be supposed as approving of that part of the address which related to these subjects, he would move that the two paragraphs should be left out. But there was another part of the address, which, instead of being matter of congratulation, was to him the subject of the greatest possible pain. It was easy to perceive that its great object was to impress the public with the idea that this was not the time to make peace. It had been his constant object, from the beginning of the contest, to bring about this event, and he had no hesitation in now giving it as his opinion that negotiation had not always failed Because France was in the wrong, and the powers with which she negotiated in the right. He was far from wishing to yield, as it was called, to France. But he wished that ministers should yield to the dictates of prudence; and above all, that they should yield their asperi ties: and while they complain of passed between his majesty's mithe acrimonious expressions of nisters and the Russian and Austrian France against us, they should for- ministers. If the honourable genbear provoking them. Of the or- tleman should think that his maders in council he should only say, jesty's ministers were justified in that they would be productive of not accepting the mediation offered, much distress to a great body of until they could ascertain whether the people. In consequence of the power offering it was in a situthis distress, they must lay their ation to mediate impartially, and account with hearing complaints; the notes to be produced should and these complaints, instead of prove that fact, he hoped for his being repressed, he was of opinion, approbation of their conduct, in ought to be encouraged; because, not consenting to treat till they if they were stifled, they would should know upon what basis, a vent themselves perhaps in a way question that had occupied three less constitutional than by petition months in the late negotiation. As to the legislature. These complaints to Austria, she has never assigned would be louder and more frequent, any cause for her hostility to this if it was understood that ministers country, and this fact would apwere resolved upon war. He was pear from the documents to be not sure that peace could be ob- produced. With respect to the tained, but at any rate negotiation motion of which the honourable ought to be tried. He wished ra- gentleman had given notice, for ther that the country should perish, papers relating to the expedition to than that it should submit to ig- Copenhagen, it was very possible nominious terms; but he depre- he might move for some informa cated all attempts to show our ca- tion which might safely be propacity to carry on endless war. If duced. But if he should, for the we must die, said Mr. Whitbread, purpose of removing, as he relet us die manfully and with glory; presented it, the foulest stain that but do not let us be told that death is ever attached to the annals of any impossible. He concluded by press- nation, move for the secret infor ing the state of Ireland on the at- mation upon which that expedition tention of ministers. was undertaken, as far as his judg ment went, he believed he would never have ocular conviction. The honourable gentleman was at a loss to imagine why this secret intelli gence was not published. But he would assure that honourable gen. tleman, that as the fact now stood, and as it would be made out in argument, niinisters would trust to it for their justification, and never expose the source of their secret intelligence. If this subject was again to be brought into discussion, he begged then to state that he would prove the measure not to have been unprecedented; and Mr. secretary Canning expressed some surprise that the honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Ponsonby) should have required time to marshal his arguments, with a view to convince any small portion of persons who might be persuaded to agree with him in his opinions upon the matter of the address. By what had fallen from the honourable gentleman, he seemed to expect voluminous documents respecting treaties with those courts; but on a reference to the words of the speech, he would find that they referred only to official notes which B 2 though 20 though their conduct might be held up in a few speeches in that house to the execration of the country, they would run that risk and incur that penalty rather than suffer the secret to be torn from their bosoms. But was this the moment when such a publication was to be called for? Was it possible, at a time when there was no capital on the continent where the power of Bonaparte could not drag the of fender against him to execution; when there was no British accredited agent in any country of Europe; was it possible that such a time should be fixed on for divulging the sources of secret intelligence? Was this country to say to the agents, who served it from fidelity, or from less worthy motives, "You shall serve us but once, and your life shall be the forfeit ?"-He should contend, as his honourable friends had done, that the arrangements at Tilsit, and the measures which ensued, without any document, fully justified the measures of government. glad to know what motives could He should be be ascribed to his majesty's ministers for acting as they had done, if not from the conviction of the necessity of the case. surance, that in no case should the persons of British subjects, or their jesty's government thought it right property, be injured or violated, Under these circumstances, his mato allow some latitude for obtaining by negotiation, and particularly by showing the vigorous determination of Britain in distant prospect, the though some doubt may have been forbearance of France. entertained of the stability of the Even good faith of Portugal, it seemed better to run all risks, and the issue justified the determination. With respect to sending an army to de fend Portugal, we had the assurance of a most able officer that no army Britain could send would be adequate to that object. And the presence of such an army was deprecated by the prince regent, as tending to precipitate his ruin. A secret treaty signed in October last, bound the Portuguese government to adtuguese forts or harbours, and to mit an English garrison to the Porprotect the persons and properties was faithfully executed on the part of English subjects. This treaty of Portugal. spect to the late proceedings at With reLisbon, it was necessary for the country to know, that the court of Lisbon always made an unreserved communication to his majesty's representatives and servants, of the full extent of the demands of France, as well as of the extent to which it was itself disposed to comply with those demands, rather than proceed to the last extremity; and of the point beyond which it would refuse compliance, let the refusal be accompanied with what risk it may. These communications were accompanied with an as-. application of force at Copenhagen It was remarkable, that while the opposite, the non-application of it was condemned by the gentlemen verely; but so it would have been if at Lisbon was censured no less sethe force had been applied at Lisbon, and negotiation at Copenhagen. Censure would have still fol fowed the force and the negotialost by foolish confidence, and Portion. Copenhagen would have been tugal outraged by unprincipled and impolitic violence. With respect to the points of mediation and peace, he had no objection to discuss those also at the present moment. Though there was reason, after the treaty of Tilsit, for this country to enter entertain a more hostile policy towards Russia; every thing that friendship and conciliation could dictate was done to the last moment, when the hostile declaration came with as much surprise upon Petersburg as it did upon London. So it was also with respect to Austria. No complaint, no remonstrance, no discussion had preceded the recal of the ambassador of that power; not even so much as a notice; so it was also with respect to the recal of the Prussian ambassador: and here he felt himself called upon to contradict an insinuation in the Moniteur, which charged baron Jacobi with giving to the court of London the secret information re. specting the proceeding of the French government in Prussia, when the fact was, that this infor mation came from a British minister. With respect to the late supposed negotiation for peace, no tangible overture had been made by the French or the Austrian government. Prince Stahremberg, with that generosity of character for which he was so distinguished, had made an offer of his personal services to institute and establish a pacific intercourse. But that was not a mode of negotiation which could be satisfactory to a country like this. With respect to the remain ing independent state of Sweden, it was our duty to invigorate, in spire, and support it, rather than to excite doubt and despondency. He should say more on this subject in a few days, when he should probably have to bring down a message from his majesty, calling on the house to make provision for subsidiary engagements which were about to be concluded with the king of Sweden, and which would be communicated to the house of course. With regard to the dif ferences with America, it had been thought right frankly and voluntarily to disavow the unauthorised act of hostility towards the Chesapeak. The provocation the officer who had committed that act had received, went far to excuse him; but the right of searching ships of war had never been acted upon long, or to any extent, and in later times it had not been acted upon at all. It was, therefore, thought right to abandon this unfounded pretension unequivocally; but, in doing so, his majesty's ministers were determined not to concede a point of what the strict and established right of Britain, and the usage of nations, justified, and required the British government to support. With respect to the late orders of council, retaliating the restrictions of the French government upon our commerce, he maintained our right to go as far as France; and make France feel, in the effects of her own injustice, that we could hope to bring her to more reasonable conduct. The vigour of the British navy, when put forth with a determination which the moderate spirit of the government had hitherto restrained, would prove equal to cope with the power that France had established on land. It would appear, that if France combined all the powers of the continent to oppress us, the effect was but to increase our strength and energy, and to make us triumph under oppression. Lord Henry Petty said, whatever merits, as to style, the speech ascribed to his majesty might possess, it wanted the more vulgar but more important mert of a full statement of facts. It was a sin gular instance, to be in a state of war with a power against which there were no documents to prove a hostile B 3 a hostile act. The only reason stated for refusing information was, that those who had communicated the intelligence would be thereby injured. He contended, that the principles of right and wrong were to be considered in politics as well as in philosophy, and on these they must reason generally till a particular case was made out. It became those, he said, who checked petitions for peace, to take care that no opportunity of negotiation should be let slip, merely on points of form. We ought to examine with jealousy into the subsidiary connexion with Sweden. He agreed in the propriety of keeping the affair of the Chesapeak distinct from other points, and in the necessity of maintaining our essential rights; but we ought to guard against unnecessary irritation, and to be aware of being led away by the name of vigour, so as to inflict a severe blow on our own commerce. He concluded by expressing his regret, that there should be so little in the speech respecting the temporary policy as to Denmark, and nothing at all as to the permanent policy respecting Ireland. house that no man of honour would betray the source of the intelligence ministers had received. But, independently of this, he contended that there was upon the face of the measure sufficient to justify it to every candid mind. He should rest it on this test: he called upon every gentleman in that house to put his hand to his breast and say, whether he did not believe that Bonaparte's design was to direct the force of a maritime confederacy against this country, and to make the naval force of Denmark more immediately instrumental in effect. ing that great object. The right honourable gentleman had said, the captured ships would rot; certainly they would be rotten some time or other; but not in the ensuing spring; not at a period when they might be employed in convey. ing French troops to Ireland; not when they were to be employed in excluding us from the Baltic, and furthering the designs of the ene my. The right honourable gentle. man then briefly alluded to the other topics, especially that relating to the order of council; and said that he should, he trusted, on a fu ture occasion, when the papers were laid before the house, be enabled to satisfy gentlemen that in no one instance had his majesty's present government been indifferent to the interest of the empire. Mr. Bathurst spoke on the same side. So also did Mr. Windham; who concluded by saying, that he would rather Bonaparte had now possession of the Danish fleet by the means which he must have resorted to in the seizure of it, than that England should have got it in the way in which she did. The ships would be rotten when the effervescence of national feeling would live in the remembrance of national injury. The chancellor of the exchequer followed Mr. Windham, and insist ed that it was a sufficient answer to the demand for documents and secret communications, to tell that Mr. Sheridan reprobated the miserable, pettifogging subterfuge to which the learned and right honourable gentleman had recourse, If ministers had the substance, why not give that substance? Precise legal evidence was not to be expected in that case. If it appeared that there was a collusion between the Danes and the French, and the former were unable to defend themselves, then, in justice to ourselves, |