unequal to alarm us for the consequences, even should America be added to the number of our foes, an event which could in no wise be attributed to misconduct or precipitation on the part of his ma jesty's government. In a moment of phrensy, France had issued edicts levelled at our commerce. Had the object of these measures been obtained, had they even partially crippled our means, the considera. tion that a temporary distress to ourselves was utter ruin to our op ponents, must have induced us to persevere in the contest with tran quillity and firmness; but the very reverse was the fact. So far from our means having diminished, although the different branches of our commerce might vary in extent, the aggregate of it exceeded that of the most prosperous period of our history; so much so indeed, that his majesty, in his most gracious speech, expressed his confidence, that no material increase to the burthens of his people would be necessary, He trusted, that we might look forward with as much hope and satisfaction as we could look back with content and gratiInde. There was one subject from the contemplation of which,in every point of view, unalloyed pleasure must be derived; it was the rescue from the power of France, of one of the oldest and most faithful of our allies, transferred from a country weak and indefensible, to one secure and powerful; an occur. rence which afforded a field for brilliant anticipations on our part. He concluded by moving that an humble address be presented to his majesty, &c. The noble lord here delivered in the address, which was read at the table by the clerk, and was, as usual, in terms correspondent to those of the speech. Mr. C. Ellis seconded the mo. tion. Seldom had so many im portant events been crowded toge ther in such a short space of time, as that which had intervened since the close of the last session. Here the honourable gentleman went over the various subjects to which his majesty's speech referred; and coming to America, he said, the rela tive situation of this country and America might afford ample room for remark, but the subject was of such a delicate nature, that he would abstain from enlarging upon it. The magnanimity of his ma jesty in offering reparation for injury, was most praiseworthy. He trusted that the Americans would see that it was not their true policy to unite themselves to France. The exception made in their favour in the British orders of council would, he hoped, be felt by them; an exception of the propriety of which he somewhat doubted, disposed as he was to bestow on those orders his general and decided approba tion. The project of excluding us from the continent was now trying; the trial would require on our part great constancy, great exertions and great sacrifices. Of the result, there could be no apprehension, They had enjoyed the satisfaction of hearing from the throne, of the stability of the resources, and the flourishing state of the commerce of the country. In the moral character of our government and of our people, in the wisdom and energy of the one, in the bravery and unanimity of the other, we possessed complete assurance of success in the contest in which we were engaged. If he dwelt more on the necessity of war, than on the the more popular topic of the possibility of peace, it was not because he estimated too lightly the blessings of peace, but because he dreaded the effects of hasty and premature peace. We had ample means of carrying on war. In our navy we had not only the most efficient defence, but a greater power of active hostility than perhaps we were yet ourselves aware of. By exerting our naval force in every possible direction, we might show the enemy that a predominant navy gives a power scarcely inferior to that of a conquering army; we might control the haughty mind of the ruler of France, and inspire him with that respect for this country, which alone would ensure permanent tranquillity. Viscount Milton regretted to find that ministers were not apparently disposed to peace. Peace he should ever think most desirable, and he could have wished, that ministers had expressed their willingness to enter into a negotiation on suitable conditions; at the same time he did not approve of any idle clamours for peace, before the terms of a negotiation should be ascertained. The attack on Copenhagen he considered as prima facie unjus tifiable; but, at the same time, did not deny, that there might be circumstances (as yet unrevealed) that might ultimately justify it, Mr. Ponsonby said, that his majesty's speech embraced such a variety of topics, that it was not easy. to express one's sentiments upon it. Its principal object he understood to be the elucidation of our rela, tions of peace and war with other powers: and, before he could declare an opinion upon the conduct on which these relations depended, he must be in possession of the correspondence which had taken place between our own govern ment and the governments of foreign nations. If he was to express an opinion in general terms, it would be, that it was unquestionably desirable that we should make as many friends and as few enemies as we could, and that the blessings of peace should be as much extended, and the calamities of war as much circumscribed, as possible. This, however, was merely an abstract opinion, and the extension of hostilities in present circumstances it might have been impos sible to prevent. He thought that ̧ ministers were not only perfectly. justifiable, but were bound in duty to assume an attitude of dignity, worthy at the same time of the character and resources of the. country; but if they acted upon any other principle than was authorised either by our honour or our interests, they did wrong. England ought not to stoop to France; for if she once bowed her neck, she never would raise it again; but whether a prolongation of the war with France, or the commencement of hostilities with other powers, was the only alternative left us, he was not possessed of information sufficient to enable him to form an opinion. Ministers might be perfectly right, in which case they were entitled to praise, or they might be entirely wrong, and in this case he certainly would express his disapprobation. One of the principal objects of the speech evidently was to obtain the unqualified approbation of the house to their conduct towards Denmark, without producing a single document to justify it. They promised to lay before parliament copies of their correspondence with the courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna; but they thought it altogether unnecessary to communicate a single particle of in formation upon a measure which, beyond all others, involved the national character. It had been, Mr. Ponsonby asserted, the great boast of this country throughout the whole progress of the war, that we had exercised an exemplary for bearance, notwithstanding all the unprincipled aggressions of France, and the numerous instances on her part of contempt of the independence and rights of other nations. Our good faith had often been contrasted, with a sort of triumph, with the treachery of our enemy; and this good faith had, deservedly perhaps, been considered as one of our surest bulwarks of defence, We now lay under, not barely the suspicion, but a formal accusation of having forfeited this character; and how was parliament to judge how far this accusation was true or false, without being in possession of all the documents connected with the transaction which has furnished our enemies with matter of reproach? He hoped the reproach was ill-founded. He could conceive circumstances in which ministers might be perfectly justifiable; in which they might be right in acting as they did; nay, in which they would have been altogether unjustifiable in acting otherwise. But as ministers them selves, if he could judge from the speech, seemed to have no idea of giving any papers of their own accord, he should certainly consider it as his duty to move for them, in order that it might be made apparent whether their conduct was justifiable or unjustifiable, politic or unwise. He then entered at large into the situation of the country with regard to Petersburgh, Vienna, and Berlin. Here too, it was possible that he might be wrong; but all that he wished was, that the house should not give any pledge till they were in possession of the information necessary to re, gulate their judgment. The house, he asserted, was equally destitute of information upon the question re lative to America and neutral nations, and till this information was granted, he had no wish to anticipate their opinion. He should only observe generally, that he should be willing and ready at all times to support any measures which might be found necessary for the assertion of our honour, or the maintenance of our interest. There was another subject of much importance which might have been introduced into the speech, but respecting which it was wholly silent, namely, the present state of Ireland. On this subject not one word was said, though there was certainly none to which it was more the duty of ministers to call the attention of parliament. He hoped, however, that it was their intention to supply this omission, in the course of this session of parliament. He was fully sensible of the importance which every measure of a public nature derived from coming directly from the servants of the crown; and he hoped that much time would not elapse before they came forward with some propositions calculated to quiet those apprehensions which were at this moment, he was afraid, equally general and well founded. Having said these few words, he professed to have no intention of taking the sense of the house upon the address. Upon questions where they were wholly without without information, it would be absurd to call upon it to express an opinion. He hoped that ministérs had conducted themselves with propriety; but if they had not, he was well assured that the country would not submit to the obloquy of a disgraceful transaction. Mr. Milnes said, he could without difficulty concur in the address, because he had no hesitation in giving his entire approbation to the conduct of his majesty's government. If ministers had, since the termination of the last session of parliament, performed so many essential services to the nation; if they had crowded, as had been well and ably stated by his honourable friend (if he would allow him to call him so), into so short a space of time, a greater number of important events than had ever in the compass of a similar period been accomplished, and certainly than had been effected by the administration which preceded them in office; he could not possibly feel any difficulty in supporting the address which expressed approbation of their measures. He looked upon it to be no inconsiderable test of the unobjectionable nature of the address, that neither the sagacity of the honourable member who had just sat down, nor of the noble lord who preceded him, could select any one point to which they could seriously object. It was the first duty of ministers to act upon the necessity, and it was equally their duty to use their discretion in judging of that necessity; and if in acting upon it they were to err at all, it was much better that they should err upon the side of public security. Their conduct might be made the subject of factious accusations, but in such a case they would defend themselves from the charge, by providing for the safety of the factious in common with the other members of the commu nity. He should not then enter into an argument to show that governments were justified in acting on probabilities, because that doctrine was consonant with the law of nations, if any public law had survived the subjugation of the powers of the continent, or if there was now any rule for the conduct of nations to be found in Europe but the Napoleon code. Mr. Milnes then went into the various questions respecting Russia, Portugal, and Denmark. These were the various topics which arose out of the ad dress; they with him bespoke individually the prudence and acti vity of ministers, and presented in the aggregate a prospect the most satisfactory. What might be the issue of these our endeavours, whe ther peace or war, he could not say; if war, we had the hope of similar success; if peace, the con sciousness that we have earned it, That peace, of which they had that night heard so much, he would entrust to the hands of ministers, They would on the one hand perceive and estimate, what the sin cerest lover of peace must admit to be discouraging, that peace in its most flattering aspect would be little more than a suspension of hostilities, and that no formal act of government could root out ran cour and stifle jealousy; and if therefore we did sheath the sword, that our hand must never quit the hilt: and above all, feeling that Bonaparte would in his terms wish to question our maritime su premacy, a patrimony entailed up on us, and therefore not matter of negotiation, they would judge how far a peace was promising under such appearances, He repeated it, that that were Bonaparte to abdicate his throne, and depose all his minion princes; were he to restore to France her legal government, and to Europe the balance of power; they would not in his mind be equivalents for the sacrifice of our command at sea, or justify ministers in dishonouring this unattainted title by which we style ourselves Englishmen. On the other hand, he trusted that ministers were fully awake to the exigencies; that they require no speeches or petitions to tell them that privations must be numerous, and the pressure deplorably severe. Mr. Whitbread intended, at a moment so critical and important, to submit a few observations to the house: but even if he had no such intention, he should have found himself called upon to advert to some things that had fallen from the honourable gentleman who had just sat down. If there was no other justification of the attack upon Denmark than what had been given this evening, he had no hesitation in declaring it base and treacherous; and in prognosticating, that it would prove as prejudicial to us in its political consequences as it had been unjust in its origin and cruel in its mode of execution. The honourable gentleman had attempted to justify the deed, on the score of necessity; and, in doing so, had argued, that the more concealed was the enmity of Denmark, the more necessary it was for us to follow it up. But by the same mode of reasoning, would not any indi vidual in private life be justified in assassinating another, whom, for some cause or other, he suspected of entertaining a sentiment of concealed hatred? When the honourable gentleman who seconded the address, in talking of our resources, numbered among them our mora1808. lity as a nation, he was surprised that he did not blush. Are we really, Mr. Whitbread asked, come to this pass, that it is announced in a public declaration, given in the name of the king, that we who have been always bowing at the altar of the living God, acknowledging his superintending providence, and professing obedience to his laws, have been always in the wrong; and that Bonaparte, that worshipper of Baal, has been al ways in the right? The honourable gentleman, too, had talked of the glorious results of the contest, while, with the same breath, they were told, that after fifteen years war, we had arrived at a state in which we could exert our naval force so as to surprise the enemy! And how was this illustrated? We had, in the course of the last summer, taken sixteen hulks (for this was the only name by which he could call them) from Denmark, so many tons of hemp, and a quantity, he knew not how many, of spars, masts, &c. And what, he asked, had we paid for these, merely politically speaking? We had given the whole maritime population of Denmark to France; we had given to France the hearts of all her people. Mr. Whitbread declared that he would rather have seen the fleet of Denmark in forced hostility against us, manned by her sailors, acting under compulsion, than he would, after what has happened, see them moored in our own ports. In addition to the inveterate animosity of Denmark, to which this act had given rise, had it not also been the means of cutting off our communication with the continent, as well as of throwing Denmark into the arms of France? But we were told, that it would be dangerous to grant the information desired. To whom, B he |