General Lee issued an address, which read as follows: "The people of the South have seen with profound indignation their sister State deprived of every right and reduced to the condition of a conquered province. Believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen."

The people of Maryland did not feel, however, that they were under a foreign yoke, or that they were a conquered province. They did not swing their hats and hurrah, but on the contrary made up their minds to stand by the Union.

All the Confederate troops in and around Richmond were hurried forward to reinforce General Lee. General Walker joined him at Frederick with two brigades. On the afternoon of September 7th General Lee unfolded his plans to General Law. "There are," he said, "between eight and ten thousand stragglers between here and Rapidan Station. Besides these we shall be able to get a large number of recruits who have been accumulating at Richmond for some weeks. They ought to reach us at Hagerstown; we shall then have a very good army. In ten days from now, if the situation is then what I confidently expect it to be after the capture of Harper's Ferry, I shall concentrate the army at Hagerstown, effectually destroy the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and march to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. That is the objective point of the campaign. I wish to destroy the railroad bridge over the Susquehanna, which will disable the Pennsylvania railroad for a long time. With the Baltimore and Ohio in our possession, with the Pennsylvania broken, there will remain to the enemy but one route of communication with the West-that by the lakes. After that I can turn my attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington. General McClellan is an able general, but a very cautious one. His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations, or he will not think it so, for three or four weeks. Before that time I hope to be on the Susquehanna.”

Mary

There were eleven thousand Union troops at Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, where there were strong works, with heavy cannon. land Heights are higher than all the other summits in the vicinity and commanded Harper's Ferry and Loudon Heights, on the south side of the river. General Lee saw that it would not do to leave so large a force in his rear to pounce upon his trains. Harper's Ferry must be captured. We can now see just how General Lee laid his plan, and what considerations led to his adopting it. His whole army is near Frederick. He

issues his orders on Wednesday evening, September 9th. He will divide it into five sections. He will send Jackson, who has so drilled and disciplined his troops that they can march thirty miles in a day with ease, over South Mountain westward, through Boonesboro', through Sharpsburg,

to cross the Potomac at Shepardstown, marching south to Martinsburg, in Virginia, seizing the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and pushing east to Harper's Ferry. Jackson is to be at Martinsburg on Friday evening, and at Harper's Ferry on Saturday morning. While he is making this wide circuit of nearly sixty miles, in as many hours, McLaws's division is to march south-west, and close upon Maryland Heights. At the same time Walker's division is to cross the Potomac opposite Frederick, turn west, and seize Loudon Heights, on the east bank of the Shenandoah, overlooking Harper's Ferry. These simultaneous movements will cut off the eleven thousand from McClellan.

While these three sections of the army are thus employed, D. H. Hill is to hold the passes at South Mountain, and Longstreet is to move on to

Hagerstown. General Lee understands the qualifications of McClellan to command an army. He saw the commander of the Army of the Potomac remaining at Alexandria through the winter; saw him sit down before Yorktown with more than one hundred thousand men, with only eleven thousand Confederates in front of him. He knows how long he was in advancing from Yorktown to the Chickahominy; how he lingered at Harrison's Landing while he himself was hastening northward to crush Pope. His scouts give him information every evening of the slow movement of McClellan towards him. He can count upon McClellan's slowness as a permanent factor in all his plans and calculations. On the other hand, he can count upon Stonewall Jackson's swiftness. If he orders Jackson to be at Harper's Ferry on Saturday morning, he will be there without fail. General Stuart is to send a squadron of cavalry with each division to pick up all stragglers. When Harper's Ferry falls, all are to hasten northward towards Sharpsburg. It is a bold, hazardous plan, based on the known slowness of McClellan. Lee will have time to strike the blow and concentrate his army before McClellan will be in position to attack him.

The Union army had been reorganized with right and left wings and a centre. The right wing was commanded by General Burnside, and consisted of the First Corps, commanded by General Hooker, and the Ninth, under General Reno. Each corps had three divisions: the First Corps, King's, Ricketts's, and Mead's divisions; the Ninth Corps, Wilcox's, Sturgis's, and Rodman's.

The centre was commanded by General Sumner, who had the Second Corps, with Richardson's, Sedgwick's, and French's divisions; and the Twelfth Corps, under General Mansfield, composed of Williams's and Greene's divisions.

The left wing, commanded by General Franklin, contained the Fifth Corps, under General Porter, and the Sixth, under Franklin.

On Sunday afternoon, September 7th, General McClellan left Washington, establishing his headquarters near Rockville, fourteen miles from Washington, where he remained till the following Friday. The army was moving less than six miles a day towards Frederick.

On the morning of the 10th the Confederate troops began to move away from that town. Two days later, on the 12th, General McClellan wrote: "From all I can gather, Secesh is skedaddling, and I don't think I can catch him unless he is really moving into Pennsylvania. In that case I shall catch him before he has made much headway towards the interior. I am beginning to think he is making off to get out of the scrape by recrossing the river at Williamsport, in which case my only hope of bagging

him will be to cross lower down, and cut into his communications near Winchester. He evidently don't want to fight me, for some reason or other."

While McClellan was writing this on Saturday evening, the Union. cavalry and the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, were marching into Frederick. A soldier brought a very important paper to McClellan, picked up. in the house which had been occupied by General D. H. Hill—a copy of Lee's orders, giving all the details of the proposed movements of the Confederate army.

It is not often that a general commanding a great army comes into possession of a document revealing all the plans of his opponent, making him master of the situation. Longstreet at Hagerstown would be thirty miles away from the divisions at Harper's Ferry. The old National Road, over which the stages rattled before the railroads were constructed, leads north-west from Frederick; first over the Catoctin range of hills to the little village of Middletown, then over the South Mountain Range, through Turner's Gap, to Boonesboro', and on to Hagerstown. Another road leads south-west, crosses the South Mountain Range through Crampton's Pass, six miles south of Turner's Gap, and descends into Pleasant Valley. It would be an easy matter for McClellan to move with half or two-thirds his army through Crampton's Pass, while the remainder marched up the old stage-road. By such a movement he could thrust himself between the two wings of Lee's army, and at the same time relieve Harper's Ferry. There would be few Confederates to confront him at Crampton's. Pass; and once in Pleasant Valley, he would be in rear of D. H. Hill, who was holding Turner's Gap, and who would be compelled to fall back towards Hagerstown. Instead of doing this, General McClellan decided to send Franklin's corps and General Couch's division of the Fourth Corps through Crampton's Pass, and to move with the bulk of the army-more than sixty thousand men-up the old stage-road. It would not be a flanking movement, but following a retreating army, and attacking its rear-guard in a strong position.

At twenty minutes past six on Saturday evening he wrote the order to Franklin to move at daylight on Sunday morning. Quickness and resolute energy were the all-important considerations. The army had moved slowly. The troops were fresh, and well supplied with provisions. Franklin's troops had taken no part in the battles under Pope at Manassas. They were in superb condition. The weather was delightful, the roads excellent. Why have Franklin wait till morning? Why not make the march in the night? There were no Confederates to confront